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ported survey
This commit is contained in:
parent
5796980228
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@ -19,10 +19,21 @@ is_hidden: true
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[Look, Ma; No Hands!]: http://www.semanticrestructuring.com/lookma.php
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[Spreeder]: http://www.spreeder.com
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[nanoc]: http://nanoc.stoneship.org
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[PhilPapers Survey]: http://philpapers.org/surveys/
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<!-- Wikipedia articles -->
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<!-- Wikipedia articles (and similar) -->
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[DXM]: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DXM
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[Epistemology]: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epistemology
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[Anatta]: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anatta
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[Anicca]: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anicca
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[Dukkha]: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dukkha
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[Wang Yangming]: http://www.iep.utm.edu/wangyang/
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[Unity of Knowledge and Action]: http://www.iep.utm.edu/wangyang/#H4
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[Theravada]: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theravada
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[Trivialism]: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trivialism
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[A-theory]: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A-series_and_B-series
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[B-theory]: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A-series_and_B-series
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<!-- internal links -->
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[RSS]: /rss.xml
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@ -6,7 +6,231 @@ techne: :incomplete
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episteme: :believed
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---
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muflax likes filling out profiles about itself. Maybe it's a signaling thing.
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Who knows.
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[muflax][] likes filling out profiles about itself. Maybe it's a signaling
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thing. Who knows.
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# Philosophical Background
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Philosophically, my strongest early influence comes from Satanism and
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Discordianism. I tried to, but never really got Nietzsche and felt very much at
|
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home when reading Robert Anton Wilson. Later on, I picked up many Buddhist
|
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influences (Zen at first, later mostly [Theravada][]) and some Taoism. I belong to
|
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no school of thought and my belief system is very idiosyncratic, with most
|
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pieces coming from Theravada Buddhism, Discordianism and different schools of
|
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Rationality (mostly Bayesian, though).
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I was motivated at first by fascinating problems, then making sense of madness,
|
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understanding consciousness and fate[^why_fate], and right now, purpose.
|
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|
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[^why_fate]:
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To clarify, I'm not interested in "What is fate?", but "Why do I perceive
|
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the world ordered in a way that is consistent with fate?".
|
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|
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For me, the most important non-obvious philosophers are the Buddha (who I
|
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believe to be fiction and do not identify with Siddharta Gautama), for the three
|
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principles of [Anatta][], [Anicca][] and [Dukkha][], and [Wang Yangming][] for
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the [Unity of Knowledge and Action][]. Without those, no understanding of the world
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is ever possible.[^understanding]
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[^understanding]: Interestingly, I don't believe anymore that these 4 are
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necessarily all correct, but only that they forced me to think about my mind
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and behaviour in a way to break through very serious misconceptions. I hope
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to clarify eventually what I think about each of them, once I worked them
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out in more detail and cleared up several problems I'm having right now.
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Survey
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======
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Based on the [PhilPapers Survey][], a bunch of common questions and my position
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on them.
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A priori knowledge?
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-------------------
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No. There is no such thing as knowledge without experience. Truth is not an
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independent property of statements, but the ability to use them to anticipate
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future experiences. In other words, a map is true if I can use it to navigate.
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It is meaningless to speak about the truth of a map that doesn't have a
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territory.
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Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism?
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------------------------------------------
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Neither. Abstract objects don't exist, period. Or rather, what do you anticipate
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either way? Can you even point at an abstract object? There isn't even a
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phenomenon in need of explanation.
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Aesthetic value: objective or subjective?
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-----------------------------------------
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Subjective. See my view on morality.
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Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no?
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------------------------------------------
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No, as a priori knowledge does not exist.
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Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism?
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----------------------------------------------------
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Neither. There is no such thing as a distinction between mind and environment.
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External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism?
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---------------------------------------------------------------
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Meaningless distinction.
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Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will?
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----------------------------------------------------------
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There is no free will. It isn't even a useful illusion. It just isn't there.
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God: theism or atheism?
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-----------------------
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For a time, I thought that certain concepts could be justifiably believed that
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might be called "god", so that, under certain perspectives, you could call me a
|
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theist. I now realized that I was never justified in *even asking the question*.
|
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There is simply no evidence in need of an explanation to bring in the god
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hypothesis, so having any believes in that regard is mistaken, including a
|
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rejection of god.
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|
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Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism?
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-------------------------------------
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Strongly lean towards empiricism. I consider it very important, but it seems to
|
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be not exhaustive. I'm still open to alternatives.
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Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism?
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-------------------------------------------------------------
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Meaningless. The concept of "truth" is nonsense. See "a priori knowledge".
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Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean?
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-------------------------------------
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|
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Humean, in the sense that there are no objective laws of nature. All order is
|
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fictitious.
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Logic: classical or non-classical?
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----------------------------------
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Very strongly non-classical. Classical logic is horribly broken. I'm undecided
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about alternatives. Maybe even just a finitist version of classical knowledge
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might do. Replacing "truth" with "provability" is a good first step. (A
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challenge: if you believe [Trivialism][] is false, find an argument a trivialist
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can't see as support for trivialism.)
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Mental content: internalism or externalism?
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-------------------------------------------
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Meaningless distinction.
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Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism?
|
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-------------------------------------------------
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|
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Moral nihilism. There is no such thing as morality and you should abandon the
|
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very concept. In other words, there are agents, they may or may not have
|
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preferences, and there are rational ways of negotiating these preferences (via
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decision theory, economics, etc.). That is all there is.
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Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism?
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---------------------------------------------
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Naturalism, in the sense that there is no "magic" or fundamental "mystery" that
|
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is unresolvable. I strongly doubt that proponents of non-naturalism believe it
|
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or understand what they are saying. As such, the distinction seems to be
|
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"understands what an explanation is" and "doesn't", so having a position on this
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is probably silly.
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Mind: Anti-physicalism or physicalism?
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--------------------------------------
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Physicalism, but not necessarily computationalism.
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To further clarify, I fully support that "the mind is what the brain does" and
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there is no such thing as a separate mind floating around somewhere, but I feel
|
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that a pure algorithmic description of the brain can't explain *all* aspects of
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the mind, regardless of computability.
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|
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Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism?
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-----------------------------------------------
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Varies, but moral statements are generally non-cognitive. But as mentioned, I'm
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a moral nihilist.
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Moral motivation: internalism or externalism?
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---------------------------------------------
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Neither. Again, moral nihilism.
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Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes?
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----------------------------------------
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The only two reasons to ever pick two boxes, as I see it, are that you either
|
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don't trust the oracle, in which case you don't understand the question, or that
|
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you think you can break causality, in which case, good luck with that and let me
|
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know if you succeed.
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Normative ethics?
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-----------------
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None. Again, moral nihilsm. Though I have a lot of sympathy for virtue
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ethics.
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Personal identity?
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------------------
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Depends on what you mean by "self". One "self" has a name, a job, status,
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friends, memories and so on. This one is linguistically constructed. Another has
|
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experiences. I have no idea how that one works in detail. If I didn't live in a
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social context that demanded that I maintain a "self" persona, then I wouldn't
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even bother at all. I do not have any experience of a "self" in any meaningful
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way.
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Politics?
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---------
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None. All political systems fail. Solving problems through ideology never works.
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Solve them through experiments.
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Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death?
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------------------------------------------------
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Rebirth. Literally.
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Time: A-theory or B-theory?
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---------------------------
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Tend towards [A-theory][]. [B-theory][] is very elegant, but it's main problem
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is that it suggests a general graph of events. Therefore, if you only knew that
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the universe was B-theoretic, you would expect to find time-loops, but not a
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solid arrow of time. You can introduce a bridging law, but that makes B-theory
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much less elegant.
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Trolley problem: switch or don't switch?
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----------------------------------------
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Neither, in the sense that there is no such thing as something one "ought" to
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do. Realistically, I would freeze up and let the default happen, just like
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pretty much everyone.
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P-Zombies?
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----------
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The Zombie position can be separated into two distinct ideas, a strong and a
|
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weak one.
|
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|
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The strong (and original) position is that of zombies being externally
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absolutely identical. You couldn't, through no experiment whatsoever, figure out
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if you are dealing with a zombie or not. Neither could the zombie themselves.
|
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This is Chalmers' position and complete bonkers.
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|
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A weaker position, however, is far more interesting. Exactly how necessary is
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consciousness, really? Could you build something that does more or less the same
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things as a human, e.g. can reason, use memory, simulate outcomes, talk and so
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on, but is completely unconscious? Maybe. I strongly suspect that most aspects
|
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of the human mind can be implemented in an unconscious way (or already are). As
|
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such, assuming all people at all times to be conscious is almost certainly
|
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false. Exactly what role consciousness plays, however, I don't know.
|
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|
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|
|
|
@ -1,261 +0,0 @@
|
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% Philosophical Survey
|
||||
|
||||
Just a few thoughts on my answers to PhilPapers excellent [survey] for
|
||||
philosophers. I'll explain my positions somewhat and almost certainly go into
|
||||
more details in future articles [citation needed].
|
||||
|
||||
Background
|
||||
==========
|
||||
|
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Philosophically, my strongest early influence comes from Satanism and
|
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Discordianism. I tried to, but never really got Nietzsche and felt very much at
|
||||
home when reading Robert Anton Wilson. Later on, I picked up many Buddhist
|
||||
influences (Zen at first, later mostly Theravada) and some Taoism. I belong to
|
||||
no school of thought and my belief system is very idiosyncratic, with most
|
||||
pieces coming from Theravada Buddhism, Discordianism and different schools of
|
||||
Rationality (mostly Bayesian, though).
|
||||
|
||||
I was motivated at first by fascinating problems, then making sense of madness
|
||||
and currently understanding consciousness and fate[^why_fate].
|
||||
|
||||
[^why_fate]:
|
||||
To clarify, I'm not interested in "What is fate?", but "Why do I perceive
|
||||
the world ordered in a way that is consistent with fate?".
|
||||
|
||||
For me, the most important philosophers are the Buddha (who I believe to be
|
||||
fiction and do not identify with Siddharta Gautama), for the three principles of
|
||||
[anatta](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anatta),
|
||||
[anicca](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anicca) and
|
||||
[dukkha](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dukkha), and
|
||||
[Wang Yangming](http://www.iep.utm.edu/wangyang/) for the unity of knowledge and
|
||||
action. Without those, no understanding of the world is ever
|
||||
possible.[^understanding]
|
||||
|
||||
[^understanding]:
|
||||
Interestingly, I don't believe anymore that these 4 are necessarily all
|
||||
correct, but only that they forced me to think about my mind and behaviour
|
||||
in a way to break through very serious misconceptions. I hope to clarify
|
||||
some point in the future what I think about each of them, once I worked them
|
||||
out in more detail and cleared up several problems I'm having right now.
|
||||
|
||||
Survey
|
||||
======
|
||||
|
||||
A priori knowledge?
|
||||
-------------------
|
||||
|
||||
No. There is no such thing as knowledge without experience.
|
||||
|
||||
Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism?
|
||||
------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
Neither. Abstract objects do not exist, but neither do particular ones.
|
||||
|
||||
Aesthetic value: objective or subjective?
|
||||
-----------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
Subjective.
|
||||
|
||||
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no?
|
||||
------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
No, as a priori knowledge does not exist.
|
||||
|
||||
Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism?
|
||||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
Neither. There is no such thing as a distinction between mind and environment.
|
||||
|
||||
External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism?
|
||||
---------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
Skepticism, very similar to the most common Gnostic position.
|
||||
|
||||
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will?
|
||||
----------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
There is no free will. Determinism is also provably false. Make of that what you
|
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will.
|
||||
|
||||
God: theism or atheism?
|
||||
-----------------------
|
||||
|
||||
For a time, I thought that certain concepts could be justifiably believed that
|
||||
might be called "god", so that, under certain perspectives, you could call me a
|
||||
theist. I now realized that I was never justified in *even asking the question*.
|
||||
There is simply no evidence in need of an explanation to bring in the god
|
||||
hypothesis, so having any believes in that regard is mistaken, including a
|
||||
rejection of god.
|
||||
|
||||
Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism?
|
||||
-------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
Strongly lean towards empiricism. I consider it very important, but it seems to
|
||||
be not exhaustive. I'm still open to alternatives.
|
||||
|
||||
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism?
|
||||
-------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
Relativism. There's no such thing as separate knowledge and certainly no
|
||||
objective knowledge, at least not in any meaningful way.
|
||||
|
||||
Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean?
|
||||
-------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
Humean, in the sense that there are no objective laws of nature. All order is
|
||||
fictitious.
|
||||
|
||||
Logic: classical or non-classical?
|
||||
----------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
Very strongly non-classical. Classical logic is absolutely bankrupt and should
|
||||
be abandoned asap. I am strongly leaning towards
|
||||
[dialetheism](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dialetheism) and even
|
||||
[trivialism](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trivialism). (A challenge: if you
|
||||
believe trivialism is false, find an argument a trivialist can't see as support
|
||||
for trivialism.)
|
||||
|
||||
However, more fundamentally, the basic *assumptions* of logic, especially
|
||||
definite, discrete truth values, seem very questionable to me. I suspect that
|
||||
most problems in logic today, like the Liar's paradox, Curry's paradox, the
|
||||
debate around contradictions and so on, really derive from an
|
||||
oversimplification or basic misconception about what is exactly *meant* by truth
|
||||
and a discrepancy with what we actually *want* it to be.
|
||||
|
||||
Mental content: internalism or externalism?
|
||||
-------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
Externalism. Again, there is no distinction between mind and world.
|
||||
|
||||
Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism?
|
||||
-------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
Moral nihilism. There is no such thing as morality and you should abandon the
|
||||
very concept.
|
||||
|
||||
Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism?
|
||||
---------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
Naturalism, in the sense that there is no "magic" or fundamental "mystery" that
|
||||
is unresolvable. I strongly doubt that proponents of this view actually
|
||||
believe it or understand what they are saying. As such, the distinction seems to
|
||||
be "understands what an explanation is" and "doesn't", so having a position on
|
||||
this is probably silly.
|
||||
|
||||
Mind: Anti-physicalism or physicalism?
|
||||
--------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
No form of pluralism holds up even under mild scrutiny, so they can be safely
|
||||
rejected. But I simply don't see how physicalism ever *could* explain the
|
||||
subjective experiences of the mind, so I'm fairly skeptical of this view, too.
|
||||
This is, of course, a statement about my understanding and not about the world,
|
||||
so physicalism may very well be right. It is, after all, currently the best
|
||||
model in existence. I strongly suspect, though, that a major revolution will be
|
||||
necessary and that certain universal assumptions, like the idea of a "particle"
|
||||
in physics a century ago, are fundamentally broken. I have no idea *which*
|
||||
assumptions these may be, however.
|
||||
|
||||
To further clarify, I fully support that "the mind is what the brain does" and
|
||||
there is no such thing as a separate mind floating around somewhere, but I feel
|
||||
that a pure algorithmic description of the brain can't explain *all* aspects of
|
||||
the mind, regardless of computability.
|
||||
|
||||
Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism?
|
||||
-----------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
Non-cognitivism. As mentioned, I'm a moral nihilist.
|
||||
|
||||
Moral motivation: internalism or externalism?
|
||||
---------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
Neither. Again, moral nihilism.
|
||||
|
||||
Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes?
|
||||
----------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
The only two reasons to ever pick two boxes, as I see it, are that you either
|
||||
don't trust the oracle, in which case you don't understand the question, or that
|
||||
you think you can break causality, in which case, good luck with that and let me
|
||||
know if you succeed.
|
||||
|
||||
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics?
|
||||
-----------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
Neither. Again, moral nihilsm. Though I have a lot of sympathy for virtue
|
||||
ethics.
|
||||
|
||||
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory?
|
||||
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
Of those, mostly qualia theory. Otherwise nondualism. The question is far from
|
||||
being answered, but anything that rejects the subjective reality of experience
|
||||
is simply wrong.
|
||||
|
||||
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view?
|
||||
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
Depends on what you mean by "self". One "self" has a name, a job, status,
|
||||
friends, memories and so on. This one is linguistically constructed. Another has
|
||||
experiences. I have no idea how it works.
|
||||
|
||||
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism?
|
||||
--------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
Neither. All fail. Solving problems through ideology never works. Solve them
|
||||
through experiments.
|
||||
|
||||
Proper names: Fregean or Millian?
|
||||
---------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
Unsure, though Frege seems to be sensible. I haven't thought much about this
|
||||
problem.
|
||||
|
||||
Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism?
|
||||
-------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
Anti-realism. There is no objective law to be discovered, only new ones to be
|
||||
invented.
|
||||
|
||||
Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death?
|
||||
------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
Rebirth. Literally. (Similarly to sleep.)
|
||||
|
||||
Time: A-theory or B-theory?
|
||||
---------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
A-theory. B-theory can be useful, but is fundamentally false.
|
||||
|
||||
Trolley problem: switch or don't switch?
|
||||
----------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
Neither, in the sense that there is no such thing as something one "ought" to
|
||||
do. Realistically, I would freeze up and let the default happen, like pretty
|
||||
much everybody would.
|
||||
|
||||
Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic?
|
||||
--------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
Neither, really. I have a lot of sympathy for social constructivism, but would
|
||||
probably just reject the concept of truth altogether. Everything is true.
|
||||
|
||||
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible?
|
||||
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
The Zombie position can be separated into two distinct ideas, a strong and a
|
||||
weak one.
|
||||
|
||||
The strong (and original) position is that of zombies being externally
|
||||
absolutely identical. You couldn't, through no experiment whatsoever, figure out
|
||||
if you are dealing with a zombie or not. Neither could the zombie themselves.
|
||||
This is Chalmers' position and complete bonkers.
|
||||
|
||||
A weaker position, however, is far more interesting. Exactly how necessary is
|
||||
consciousness, really? Could you build something that does more or less the same
|
||||
things as a human, e.g. can reason, use memory, simulate outcomes, talk and so
|
||||
on, but is completely unconscious? Maybe. I strongly suspect that most aspects
|
||||
of the human mind can be implemented in an unconscious way (or already are). As
|
||||
such, assuming all people at all times to be conscious is almost certainly
|
||||
false. Exactly what role consciousness plays, however, I don't know.
|
||||
|
||||
[survey]: http://philpapers.org/surveys/
|
Loading…
Reference in a new issue