From 9981123eb8509714e5ceba967e51a1b72964a623 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: muflax Date: Sun, 4 Sep 2011 23:05:44 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] ported survey --- content/references.mkd | 13 +- content/tl;dr.mkd | 228 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- drafts/tldr/survey.mkd | 261 ----------------------------------------- 3 files changed, 238 insertions(+), 264 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 drafts/tldr/survey.mkd diff --git a/content/references.mkd b/content/references.mkd index e38b6b6..85a0245 100644 --- a/content/references.mkd +++ b/content/references.mkd @@ -19,10 +19,21 @@ is_hidden: true [Look, Ma; No Hands!]: http://www.semanticrestructuring.com/lookma.php [Spreeder]: http://www.spreeder.com [nanoc]: http://nanoc.stoneship.org +[PhilPapers Survey]: http://philpapers.org/surveys/ - + [DXM]: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DXM [Epistemology]: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epistemology +[Anatta]: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anatta +[Anicca]: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anicca +[Dukkha]: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dukkha +[Wang Yangming]: http://www.iep.utm.edu/wangyang/ +[Unity of Knowledge and Action]: http://www.iep.utm.edu/wangyang/#H4 +[Theravada]: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theravada +[Trivialism]: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trivialism +[A-theory]: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A-series_and_B-series +[B-theory]: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A-series_and_B-series + [RSS]: /rss.xml diff --git a/content/tl;dr.mkd b/content/tl;dr.mkd index 74aab99..ca894ba 100644 --- a/content/tl;dr.mkd +++ b/content/tl;dr.mkd @@ -6,7 +6,231 @@ techne: :incomplete episteme: :believed --- -muflax likes filling out profiles about itself. Maybe it's a signaling thing. -Who knows. +[muflax][] likes filling out profiles about itself. Maybe it's a signaling +thing. Who knows. +# Philosophical Background + +Philosophically, my strongest early influence comes from Satanism and +Discordianism. I tried to, but never really got Nietzsche and felt very much at +home when reading Robert Anton Wilson. Later on, I picked up many Buddhist +influences (Zen at first, later mostly [Theravada][]) and some Taoism. I belong to +no school of thought and my belief system is very idiosyncratic, with most +pieces coming from Theravada Buddhism, Discordianism and different schools of +Rationality (mostly Bayesian, though). + +I was motivated at first by fascinating problems, then making sense of madness, +understanding consciousness and fate[^why_fate], and right now, purpose. + +[^why_fate]: + To clarify, I'm not interested in "What is fate?", but "Why do I perceive + the world ordered in a way that is consistent with fate?". + +For me, the most important non-obvious philosophers are the Buddha (who I +believe to be fiction and do not identify with Siddharta Gautama), for the three +principles of [Anatta][], [Anicca][] and [Dukkha][], and [Wang Yangming][] for +the [Unity of Knowledge and Action][]. Without those, no understanding of the world +is ever possible.[^understanding] + +[^understanding]: Interestingly, I don't believe anymore that these 4 are + necessarily all correct, but only that they forced me to think about my mind + and behaviour in a way to break through very serious misconceptions. I hope + to clarify eventually what I think about each of them, once I worked them + out in more detail and cleared up several problems I'm having right now. + +Survey +====== + +Based on the [PhilPapers Survey][], a bunch of common questions and my position +on them. + +A priori knowledge? +------------------- + +No. There is no such thing as knowledge without experience. Truth is not an +independent property of statements, but the ability to use them to anticipate +future experiences. In other words, a map is true if I can use it to navigate. +It is meaningless to speak about the truth of a map that doesn't have a +territory. + +Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism? +------------------------------------------ + +Neither. Abstract objects don't exist, period. Or rather, what do you anticipate +either way? Can you even point at an abstract object? There isn't even a +phenomenon in need of explanation. + +Aesthetic value: objective or subjective? +----------------------------------------- + +Subjective. See my view on morality. + +Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no? +------------------------------------------ + +No, as a priori knowledge does not exist. + +Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism? +---------------------------------------------------- + +Neither. There is no such thing as a distinction between mind and environment. + +External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism? +--------------------------------------------------------------- + +Meaningless distinction. + +Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will? +---------------------------------------------------------- + +There is no free will. It isn't even a useful illusion. It just isn't there. + +God: theism or atheism? +----------------------- + +For a time, I thought that certain concepts could be justifiably believed that +might be called "god", so that, under certain perspectives, you could call me a +theist. I now realized that I was never justified in *even asking the question*. +There is simply no evidence in need of an explanation to bring in the god +hypothesis, so having any believes in that regard is mistaken, including a +rejection of god. + +Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism? +------------------------------------- + +Strongly lean towards empiricism. I consider it very important, but it seems to +be not exhaustive. I'm still open to alternatives. + +Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism? +------------------------------------------------------------- + +Meaningless. The concept of "truth" is nonsense. See "a priori knowledge". + +Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean? +------------------------------------- + +Humean, in the sense that there are no objective laws of nature. All order is +fictitious. + +Logic: classical or non-classical? +---------------------------------- + +Very strongly non-classical. Classical logic is horribly broken. I'm undecided +about alternatives. Maybe even just a finitist version of classical knowledge +might do. Replacing "truth" with "provability" is a good first step. (A +challenge: if you believe [Trivialism][] is false, find an argument a trivialist +can't see as support for trivialism.) + +Mental content: internalism or externalism? +------------------------------------------- + +Meaningless distinction. + +Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism? +------------------------------------------------- + +Moral nihilism. There is no such thing as morality and you should abandon the +very concept. In other words, there are agents, they may or may not have +preferences, and there are rational ways of negotiating these preferences (via +decision theory, economics, etc.). That is all there is. + +Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism? +--------------------------------------------- + +Naturalism, in the sense that there is no "magic" or fundamental "mystery" that +is unresolvable. I strongly doubt that proponents of non-naturalism believe it +or understand what they are saying. As such, the distinction seems to be +"understands what an explanation is" and "doesn't", so having a position on this +is probably silly. + +Mind: Anti-physicalism or physicalism? +-------------------------------------- + +Physicalism, but not necessarily computationalism. + +To further clarify, I fully support that "the mind is what the brain does" and +there is no such thing as a separate mind floating around somewhere, but I feel +that a pure algorithmic description of the brain can't explain *all* aspects of +the mind, regardless of computability. + +Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism? +----------------------------------------------- + +Varies, but moral statements are generally non-cognitive. But as mentioned, I'm +a moral nihilist. + +Moral motivation: internalism or externalism? +--------------------------------------------- + +Neither. Again, moral nihilism. + +Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes? +---------------------------------------- + +The only two reasons to ever pick two boxes, as I see it, are that you either +don't trust the oracle, in which case you don't understand the question, or that +you think you can break causality, in which case, good luck with that and let me +know if you succeed. + +Normative ethics? +----------------- + +None. Again, moral nihilsm. Though I have a lot of sympathy for virtue +ethics. + +Personal identity? +------------------ + +Depends on what you mean by "self". One "self" has a name, a job, status, +friends, memories and so on. This one is linguistically constructed. Another has +experiences. I have no idea how that one works in detail. If I didn't live in a +social context that demanded that I maintain a "self" persona, then I wouldn't +even bother at all. I do not have any experience of a "self" in any meaningful +way. + +Politics? +--------- + +None. All political systems fail. Solving problems through ideology never works. +Solve them through experiments. + +Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death? +------------------------------------------------ + +Rebirth. Literally. + +Time: A-theory or B-theory? +--------------------------- + +Tend towards [A-theory][]. [B-theory][] is very elegant, but it's main problem +is that it suggests a general graph of events. Therefore, if you only knew that +the universe was B-theoretic, you would expect to find time-loops, but not a +solid arrow of time. You can introduce a bridging law, but that makes B-theory +much less elegant. + +Trolley problem: switch or don't switch? +---------------------------------------- + +Neither, in the sense that there is no such thing as something one "ought" to +do. Realistically, I would freeze up and let the default happen, just like +pretty much everyone. + +P-Zombies? +---------- + +The Zombie position can be separated into two distinct ideas, a strong and a +weak one. + +The strong (and original) position is that of zombies being externally +absolutely identical. You couldn't, through no experiment whatsoever, figure out +if you are dealing with a zombie or not. Neither could the zombie themselves. +This is Chalmers' position and complete bonkers. + +A weaker position, however, is far more interesting. Exactly how necessary is +consciousness, really? Could you build something that does more or less the same +things as a human, e.g. can reason, use memory, simulate outcomes, talk and so +on, but is completely unconscious? Maybe. I strongly suspect that most aspects +of the human mind can be implemented in an unconscious way (or already are). As +such, assuming all people at all times to be conscious is almost certainly +false. Exactly what role consciousness plays, however, I don't know. diff --git a/drafts/tldr/survey.mkd b/drafts/tldr/survey.mkd deleted file mode 100644 index fc72174..0000000 --- a/drafts/tldr/survey.mkd +++ /dev/null @@ -1,261 +0,0 @@ -% Philosophical Survey - -Just a few thoughts on my answers to PhilPapers excellent [survey] for -philosophers. I'll explain my positions somewhat and almost certainly go into -more details in future articles [citation needed]. - -Background -========== - -Philosophically, my strongest early influence comes from Satanism and -Discordianism. I tried to, but never really got Nietzsche and felt very much at -home when reading Robert Anton Wilson. Later on, I picked up many Buddhist -influences (Zen at first, later mostly Theravada) and some Taoism. I belong to -no school of thought and my belief system is very idiosyncratic, with most -pieces coming from Theravada Buddhism, Discordianism and different schools of -Rationality (mostly Bayesian, though). - -I was motivated at first by fascinating problems, then making sense of madness -and currently understanding consciousness and fate[^why_fate]. - -[^why_fate]: - To clarify, I'm not interested in "What is fate?", but "Why do I perceive - the world ordered in a way that is consistent with fate?". - -For me, the most important philosophers are the Buddha (who I believe to be -fiction and do not identify with Siddharta Gautama), for the three principles of -[anatta](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anatta), -[anicca](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anicca) and -[dukkha](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dukkha), and -[Wang Yangming](http://www.iep.utm.edu/wangyang/) for the unity of knowledge and -action. Without those, no understanding of the world is ever -possible.[^understanding] - -[^understanding]: - Interestingly, I don't believe anymore that these 4 are necessarily all - correct, but only that they forced me to think about my mind and behaviour - in a way to break through very serious misconceptions. I hope to clarify - some point in the future what I think about each of them, once I worked them - out in more detail and cleared up several problems I'm having right now. - -Survey -====== - -A priori knowledge? -------------------- - -No. There is no such thing as knowledge without experience. - -Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism? ------------------------------------------- - -Neither. Abstract objects do not exist, but neither do particular ones. - -Aesthetic value: objective or subjective? ------------------------------------------ - -Subjective. - -Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no? ------------------------------------------- - -No, as a priori knowledge does not exist. - -Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism? ----------------------------------------------------- - -Neither. There is no such thing as a distinction between mind and environment. - -External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism? ---------------------------------------------------------------- - -Skepticism, very similar to the most common Gnostic position. - -Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will? ----------------------------------------------------------- - -There is no free will. Determinism is also provably false. Make of that what you -will. - -God: theism or atheism? ------------------------ - -For a time, I thought that certain concepts could be justifiably believed that -might be called "god", so that, under certain perspectives, you could call me a -theist. I now realized that I was never justified in *even asking the question*. -There is simply no evidence in need of an explanation to bring in the god -hypothesis, so having any believes in that regard is mistaken, including a -rejection of god. - -Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism? -------------------------------------- - -Strongly lean towards empiricism. I consider it very important, but it seems to -be not exhaustive. I'm still open to alternatives. - -Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism? -------------------------------------------------------------- - -Relativism. There's no such thing as separate knowledge and certainly no -objective knowledge, at least not in any meaningful way. - -Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean? -------------------------------------- - -Humean, in the sense that there are no objective laws of nature. All order is -fictitious. - -Logic: classical or non-classical? ----------------------------------- - -Very strongly non-classical. Classical logic is absolutely bankrupt and should -be abandoned asap. I am strongly leaning towards -[dialetheism](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dialetheism) and even -[trivialism](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trivialism). (A challenge: if you -believe trivialism is false, find an argument a trivialist can't see as support -for trivialism.) - -However, more fundamentally, the basic *assumptions* of logic, especially -definite, discrete truth values, seem very questionable to me. I suspect that -most problems in logic today, like the Liar's paradox, Curry's paradox, the -debate around contradictions and so on, really derive from an -oversimplification or basic misconception about what is exactly *meant* by truth -and a discrepancy with what we actually *want* it to be. - -Mental content: internalism or externalism? -------------------------------------------- - -Externalism. Again, there is no distinction between mind and world. - -Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism? -------------------------------------------------- - -Moral nihilism. There is no such thing as morality and you should abandon the -very concept. - -Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism? ---------------------------------------------- - -Naturalism, in the sense that there is no "magic" or fundamental "mystery" that -is unresolvable. I strongly doubt that proponents of this view actually -believe it or understand what they are saying. As such, the distinction seems to -be "understands what an explanation is" and "doesn't", so having a position on -this is probably silly. - -Mind: Anti-physicalism or physicalism? --------------------------------------- - -No form of pluralism holds up even under mild scrutiny, so they can be safely -rejected. But I simply don't see how physicalism ever *could* explain the -subjective experiences of the mind, so I'm fairly skeptical of this view, too. -This is, of course, a statement about my understanding and not about the world, -so physicalism may very well be right. It is, after all, currently the best -model in existence. I strongly suspect, though, that a major revolution will be -necessary and that certain universal assumptions, like the idea of a "particle" -in physics a century ago, are fundamentally broken. I have no idea *which* -assumptions these may be, however. - -To further clarify, I fully support that "the mind is what the brain does" and -there is no such thing as a separate mind floating around somewhere, but I feel -that a pure algorithmic description of the brain can't explain *all* aspects of -the mind, regardless of computability. - -Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism? ------------------------------------------------ - -Non-cognitivism. As mentioned, I'm a moral nihilist. - -Moral motivation: internalism or externalism? ---------------------------------------------- - -Neither. Again, moral nihilism. - -Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes? ----------------------------------------- - -The only two reasons to ever pick two boxes, as I see it, are that you either -don't trust the oracle, in which case you don't understand the question, or that -you think you can break causality, in which case, good luck with that and let me -know if you succeed. - -Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics? ------------------------------------------------------------------ - -Neither. Again, moral nihilsm. Though I have a lot of sympathy for virtue -ethics. - -Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory? ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -Of those, mostly qualia theory. Otherwise nondualism. The question is far from -being answered, but anything that rejects the subjective reality of experience -is simply wrong. - -Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view? ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ - -Depends on what you mean by "self". One "self" has a name, a job, status, -friends, memories and so on. This one is linguistically constructed. Another has -experiences. I have no idea how it works. - -Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism? --------------------------------------------------------------- - -Neither. All fail. Solving problems through ideology never works. Solve them -through experiments. - -Proper names: Fregean or Millian? ---------------------------------- - -Unsure, though Frege seems to be sensible. I haven't thought much about this -problem. - -Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism? -------------------------------------------------------- - -Anti-realism. There is no objective law to be discovered, only new ones to be -invented. - -Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death? ------------------------------------------------- - -Rebirth. Literally. (Similarly to sleep.) - -Time: A-theory or B-theory? ---------------------------- - -A-theory. B-theory can be useful, but is fundamentally false. - -Trolley problem: switch or don't switch? ----------------------------------------- - -Neither, in the sense that there is no such thing as something one "ought" to -do. Realistically, I would freeze up and let the default happen, like pretty -much everybody would. - -Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic? --------------------------------------------------- - -Neither, really. I have a lot of sympathy for social constructivism, but would -probably just reject the concept of truth altogether. Everything is true. - -Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible? ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -The Zombie position can be separated into two distinct ideas, a strong and a -weak one. - -The strong (and original) position is that of zombies being externally -absolutely identical. You couldn't, through no experiment whatsoever, figure out -if you are dealing with a zombie or not. Neither could the zombie themselves. -This is Chalmers' position and complete bonkers. - -A weaker position, however, is far more interesting. Exactly how necessary is -consciousness, really? Could you build something that does more or less the same -things as a human, e.g. can reason, use memory, simulate outcomes, talk and so -on, but is completely unconscious? Maybe. I strongly suspect that most aspects -of the human mind can be implemented in an unconscious way (or already are). As -such, assuming all people at all times to be conscious is almost certainly -false. Exactly what role consciousness plays, however, I don't know. - -[survey]: http://philpapers.org/surveys/