2011-09-04 19:42:10 +02:00
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---
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title: "tl;dr: muflax"
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alt_titles: [muflax]
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date: 2011-09-04
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techne: :incomplete
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episteme: :believed
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---
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2011-09-04 23:05:44 +02:00
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[muflax][] likes filling out profiles about itself. Maybe it's a signaling
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thing. Who knows.
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2011-09-04 19:42:10 +02:00
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2011-09-04 23:05:44 +02:00
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# Philosophical Background
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Philosophically, my strongest early influence comes from Satanism and
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Discordianism. I tried to, but never really got Nietzsche and felt very much at
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home when reading Robert Anton Wilson. Later on, I picked up many Buddhist
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influences (Zen at first, later mostly [Theravada][]) and some Taoism. I belong to
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no school of thought and my belief system is very idiosyncratic, with most
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pieces coming from Theravada Buddhism, Discordianism and different schools of
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Rationality (mostly Bayesian, though).
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I was motivated at first by fascinating problems, then making sense of madness,
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understanding consciousness and fate[^why_fate], and right now, purpose.
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[^why_fate]:
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To clarify, I'm not interested in "What is fate?", but "Why do I perceive
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the world ordered in a way that is consistent with fate?".
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For me, the most important non-obvious philosophers are the Buddha (who I
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believe to be fiction and do not identify with Siddharta Gautama), for the three
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principles of [Anatta][], [Anicca][] and [Dukkha][], and [Wang Yangming][] for
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the [Unity of Knowledge and Action][]. Without those, no understanding of the world
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is ever possible.[^understanding]
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[^understanding]: Interestingly, I don't believe anymore that these 4 are
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necessarily all correct, but only that they forced me to think about my mind
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and behaviour in a way to break through very serious misconceptions. I hope
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to clarify eventually what I think about each of them, once I worked them
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out in more detail and cleared up several problems I'm having right now.
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Survey
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======
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Based on the [PhilPapers Survey][], a bunch of common questions and my position
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on them.
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A priori knowledge?
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-------------------
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No. There is no such thing as knowledge without experience. Truth is not an
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independent property of statements, but the ability to use them to anticipate
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future experiences. In other words, a map is true if I can use it to navigate.
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It is meaningless to speak about the truth of a map that doesn't have a
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territory.
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Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism?
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------------------------------------------
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Neither. Abstract objects don't exist, period. Or rather, what do you anticipate
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either way? Can you even point at an abstract object? There isn't even a
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phenomenon in need of explanation.
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Aesthetic value: objective or subjective?
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-----------------------------------------
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Subjective. See my view on morality.
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Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no?
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------------------------------------------
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No, as a priori knowledge does not exist.
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Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism?
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----------------------------------------------------
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Neither. There is no such thing as a distinction between mind and environment.
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External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism?
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---------------------------------------------------------------
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Meaningless distinction.
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Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will?
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----------------------------------------------------------
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There is no free will. It isn't even a useful illusion. It just isn't there.
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God: theism or atheism?
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-----------------------
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For a time, I thought that certain concepts could be justifiably believed that
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might be called "god", so that, under certain perspectives, you could call me a
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theist. I now realized that I was never justified in *even asking the question*.
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There is simply no evidence in need of an explanation to bring in the god
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hypothesis, so having any believes in that regard is mistaken, including a
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rejection of god.
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Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism?
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-------------------------------------
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Strongly lean towards empiricism. I consider it very important, but it seems to
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be not exhaustive. I'm still open to alternatives.
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Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism?
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-------------------------------------------------------------
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Meaningless. The concept of "truth" is nonsense. See "a priori knowledge".
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Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean?
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-------------------------------------
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Humean, in the sense that there are no objective laws of nature. All order is
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fictitious.
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Logic: classical or non-classical?
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----------------------------------
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Very strongly non-classical. Classical logic is horribly broken. I'm undecided
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about alternatives. Maybe even just a finitist version of classical knowledge
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might do. Replacing "truth" with "provability" is a good first step. (A
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challenge: if you believe [Trivialism][] is false, find an argument a trivialist
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can't see as support for trivialism.)
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Mental content: internalism or externalism?
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-------------------------------------------
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Meaningless distinction.
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Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism?
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-------------------------------------------------
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Moral nihilism. There is no such thing as morality and you should abandon the
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very concept. In other words, there are agents, they may or may not have
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preferences, and there are rational ways of negotiating these preferences (via
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decision theory, economics, etc.). That is all there is.
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Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism?
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---------------------------------------------
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Naturalism, in the sense that there is no "magic" or fundamental "mystery" that
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is unresolvable. I strongly doubt that proponents of non-naturalism believe it
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or understand what they are saying. As such, the distinction seems to be
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"understands what an explanation is" and "doesn't", so having a position on this
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is probably silly.
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Mind: Anti-physicalism or physicalism?
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--------------------------------------
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Physicalism, but not necessarily computationalism.
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To further clarify, I fully support that "the mind is what the brain does" and
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there is no such thing as a separate mind floating around somewhere, but I feel
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that a pure algorithmic description of the brain can't explain *all* aspects of
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the mind, regardless of computability.
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Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism?
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-----------------------------------------------
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Varies, but moral statements are generally non-cognitive. But as mentioned, I'm
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a moral nihilist.
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Moral motivation: internalism or externalism?
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---------------------------------------------
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Neither. Again, moral nihilism.
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Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes?
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----------------------------------------
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The only two reasons to ever pick two boxes, as I see it, are that you either
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don't trust the oracle, in which case you don't understand the question, or that
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you think you can break causality, in which case, good luck with that and let me
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know if you succeed.
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Normative ethics?
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-----------------
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None. Again, moral nihilsm. Though I have a lot of sympathy for virtue
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ethics.
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Personal identity?
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------------------
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Depends on what you mean by "self". One "self" has a name, a job, status,
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friends, memories and so on. This one is linguistically constructed. Another has
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experiences. I have no idea how that one works in detail. If I didn't live in a
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social context that demanded that I maintain a "self" persona, then I wouldn't
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even bother at all. I do not have any experience of a "self" in any meaningful
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way.
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Politics?
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---------
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None. All political systems fail. Solving problems through ideology never works.
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Solve them through experiments.
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Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death?
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------------------------------------------------
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Rebirth. Literally.
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Time: A-theory or B-theory?
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---------------------------
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Tend towards [A-theory][]. [B-theory][] is very elegant, but it's main problem
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is that it suggests a general graph of events. Therefore, if you only knew that
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the universe was B-theoretic, you would expect to find time-loops, but not a
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solid arrow of time. You can introduce a bridging law, but that makes B-theory
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much less elegant.
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Trolley problem: switch or don't switch?
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----------------------------------------
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Neither, in the sense that there is no such thing as something one "ought" to
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do. Realistically, I would freeze up and let the default happen, just like
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pretty much everyone.
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P-Zombies?
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The Zombie position can be separated into two distinct ideas, a strong and a
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weak one.
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The strong (and original) position is that of zombies being externally
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absolutely identical. You couldn't, through no experiment whatsoever, figure out
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if you are dealing with a zombie or not. Neither could the zombie themselves.
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This is Chalmers' position and complete bonkers.
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A weaker position, however, is far more interesting. Exactly how necessary is
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consciousness, really? Could you build something that does more or less the same
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things as a human, e.g. can reason, use memory, simulate outcomes, talk and so
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on, but is completely unconscious? Maybe. I strongly suspect that most aspects
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of the human mind can be implemented in an unconscious way (or already are). As
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such, assuming all people at all times to be conscious is almost certainly
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false. Exactly what role consciousness plays, however, I don't know.
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2011-09-04 19:42:10 +02:00
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