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[sutra]: http://sutra.muflax.com
[dlog]: http://daily.muflax.com
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title: Being Immoral
date: 2012-02-03
techne: :done
episteme: :speculation
slug: 2012/02/03/being-immoral/
---
During my Beeminder experiments, I noticed an odd mental state. A few times I deliberately *ignored* my plan and explicitly gave up. It feels like defecting against Future Me. It's unfortunately somewhat common that I think, "I *could* start this today and keep it up until the deadline, work maybe 1 hour a day, *or* I do nothing for a month, then work my ass off" and then refuse the first option.
Well, one reason is that I am not Future Me and so have the choice between:
1. a small sacrifice now and a small harm to Future Me
2. no sacrifice, but a large harm to Future Me
I act egoistically, so I choose 2). Now, one could try making arguments how this screws over Future Me, but these are irrelevant. *I don't care*. What needs to be done is an argument why it is wrong *for me* to do this, not why Someone In The Future would like me to change. I don't engage in blackmail, ever. The fact that I'm strongly (acausally) linked to Future Me - and so the decisions will repeat themselves many times - is of no interest, either.
In a draft about personal identity in a computationalist universe, I wrote:
> I have this view of myself as a myriad of slices over time, each representing a tiny aspect of this brain being in control, who are all fundamentally independent agents. They sometimes cooperate when goals happen to match, but essentially, muflax(t+1) isn't muflax(t). Even worse, there isn't even a unifying stream of consciousness, there is merely one moment of consciousness now that through memory falsely believes to have a continual existence.
>
> But I didn't fully internalize this view because I thought it had a consequence I didn't want to embrace - *long-term selfishness would be incoherent*. Or in other words, it would make no sense to say, I do this so I may benefit from it later. muflax(t+1) is as much me as random_person(t+1). Why would I favor one and not the other? The only coherent scope for muflax(t)'s goals is *right now* and that is it. Which is what the Buddhists have been telling me for a long time. It didn't surprise me that people holding this view don't get anything done - there is no *point* in getting anything done! Also, universal altruism seems to follow directly from it. Or, as Eliezer says:
>
> > And the third horn of the [trilemma][LW trilemma] is to reject the idea of the personal future - that there's any *meaningful* sense in which I can anticipate waking up as *myself* tomorrow, rather than Britney Spears. Or, for that matter, that there's any meaningful sense in which I can anticipate being *myself* in five seconds, rather than Britney Spears. In five seconds there will be an Eliezer Yudkowsky, and there will be a Britney Spears, but it is meaningless to speak of the *current* Eliezer "continuing on" as Eliezer+5 rather than Britney+5; these are simply three different people we are talking about.
> >
> > There are no threads connecting subjective experiences. There are simply different subjective experiences. Even if some subjective experiences are highly similar to, and causally computed from, other subjective experiences, they are not *connected*.
> >
> > I still have trouble biting that bullet for some reason. Maybe I'm naive, I know, but there's a sense in which I just can't seem to let go of the question, "What will I see happen next?" I strive for altruism, but I'm not sure I can believe that subjective selfishness - caring about your own future experiences - is an *incoherent* utility function; that we are *forced* to be Buddhists who dare not cheat a neighbor, not because we are kind, but because we anticipate experiencing their consequences just as much as we anticipate experiencing our own. I don't think that, if I were *really* selfish, I could jump off a cliff knowing smugly that a different person would experience the consequence of hitting the ground.
So if I have no coherent self over time, and I don't happen to care, why shouldn't I be jumping off metaphorical cliffs? I don't want to work, so I don't. Future Me may or may not make up for it, but that's not my problem. (One interesting implication I didn't notice back then: suicide is meaningless in such a framework. You are timeless anyway. You don't *end*. You can't *kill* yourself. You can only causally disconnect some instances of almost-you from instances of almost-people-you-know. Algorithms never die.)
It's not really important if this computationalist perspective is correct or even coherent. (I have my doubts.) There does seem to be a major disconnection between Me and Future Me. It may be ontological, it may just be temporal discounting, but it's there. The *real* problem is that my actions are inconsistent with my own stance on antinatalism.
Basically, in my upcoming antinatalism FAQ, I currently mainly argue from two (independent) moral duties:
1. Do no harm.
2. Do not coerce.
Skipping the actual arguments why birth is always a harm and never consensual, how can I say that I oppose birth because I will never do harm, but then go ahead and screw over Future Me? How is it not ok to bring into existence a child that will experience harm, but an adult is just fine? Person-moments aren't special simply because some have a causal history to other person-moments and others only to a fertilized egg. Pattern-theory-of-identity antinatalists should endorse suicide, always. (Excluding instrumental goals to achieve greater extends of suicide across the population, of course.)
The same goes for coercion. *My* consent *now* is not the consent of Future Me. *I* might be fine with exchanging a benefit now with a harm later, but Future Me isn't, so I'm still enforcing a non-pareto-optimal choice. For births I argue that this is evil, but when it's me doing it, I'm fine with it?
What the fuck, muflax?
This goes back to a different point. *I don't actually want to follow these duties.* Honestly, I *want* to do harm, in certain circumstances. I *want* certain volitions to be imposed. These two principles don't actually model my own preferences. (It's not relevant for now in what specific way I disagree, but as an example, I am awe-struck by the purity of [Lucius Vorenus][] in the TV show Rome. I strongly recommend watching it.)
So I discover some tensions in my ideas about morality:
1. I *really want* antinatalism to be correct.
2. I want to endorse "do no harm".
3. I want to endorse actions that are clearly harmful, including outright violence. (For example, warfare.)
4. I don't want things forced on me, so I don't endorse coercion.
5. I want to be able to do certain things that are clearly non-consensual, including outright killing. (For example, killing a soldier in warfare.)
6. I want morality to be ruthless (in the sense that there are no exceptions and no wiggle room), but also easy (in the sense that I don't want to drop any serious preference). The ruthlessness is more important.
This does not work, to put it mildly.
There are multiple ways to resolve this:
1. Give up morality and do what I want. Arguing for "only personal preferences exist" is not unusual, after all. Antinatalism can still be expressed as a preference, but it won't be very convincing for most people.
2. Overcome my preferences and embrace the kind of radical non-violence dictated by "do no harm".
3. Combine "do no harm" and "do not coerce".
3) is close to 2), but different in an important way. 2) simply says that no harm is ever good or acceptable, including harm voluntarily chosen for oneself. If I decided to slap myself, I would still be acting immorally. However, I am beginning to think that "do not coerce" is a stronger principle, as harm derives (partially at least) from an agent's volition.
Essentially, if everyone acts according to their will, they ought not be harmed. In Pareto Heaven, no harm should exist. Thus, "do no harm" is really a clarification of "do not coerce".
"Do not coerce" has several nice properties. It has no [Moral Luck][], is strictly [local][Non-Local Metaethics], suffers not from the repugnant conclusion or mere addition problem, works in the [Original Position][] and implies (almost-)categorical antinatalism because we can't get a child's consent in advance (in practice, though [not in theory][Consent of the Dead]). It's also compatible with Buddhist thought, which is nice to have, but certainly not a requirement. It also straightforwardly implies anarchism.
One direct implication of this view is that you *can't* force others to do the right thing. You are fundamentally condemned to watch the world burn, if you are unlucky enough to live in a universe full of immoral forces. There is nothing you can do about it because you can't coerce others into being good. This is outright anti-adaptive, but that will not matter. I find this hopeful, actually. It means you can be good regardless of your surroundings, like [Ksitigarbha][].
Important problems remain. What, exactly, is coercion anyway? (One promising route seems to be the distinction between means and ends. If you treat someone as a means, you are ignoring consent.) Who are the morally relevant agents? (That cursed hard problem of consciousness again.) How do I get rid of my own monstrosity that leads me towards force? (The old ascetics weren't as stupid as I sometimes think.) Coercion doesn't exist in atoms, so you can't have materialism. (This is not a big loss.) Can you still have naturalism? (Maybe.) Computationalism? (I doubt it.)
But back to the initial problem. How does "do not coerce" apply to Future Me?
Well, it solves the harm problem by allowing *some* harm - self-inflicted harm. It is acceptable to give consent to harm, as long as this harm is to *you*, *now*. You are morally bound to *not* harm future versions of you, unless they would consent (which is unlikely). So you simply *can't* think, "I will do this tomorrow, even though tomorrow I won't like it". You *must* avoid all force against future instances. This does not mean you have to prevent harm per se, only harm that is willingly inflicted. You are not to blame for failing to prevent Future You from tripping, nor are you obligated to make anyone happy (as per Benatar's asymmetry).
This still doesn't seem quite right, but it's a step in the right direction. I shall now accept that I want my slides to be done, and that this will be painful, and that only I, now, can accept this pain. I will now suffer, freely.

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title: Algorithmancy
is_category: true
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---
title: Ontological Therapy
date: 2012-03-08
techne: :done
episteme: :emotional
slug: 2012/03/08/ontological-therapy/
disowned: true
---
*Warning: this is a crazy post. I'm not sugarcoating the insanity here. You might skip this one.*
*I wanted to make a certain point and develop a way out of the problem, but progress is leading me into a different direction right now. This post is already 2 weeks old and the longer I wait, the less it applies to my current situation, so I'm putting it out now. I might at least reference it later, going "look how crazy some of this shit made me!".*
Every couple of years I have something new to freak out over. Back in 2002, it was love. 2004, truth. 2006, <del datetime="2012-03-01T11:42:19+00:00">beauty</del> God. 2008, freedom... from samsara. (Ok, now I'm really just shoehorning Moulin Rouge! references into this paragraph.) 2010, consciousness. 2012, it seems, will be time and causality.
In all the previous problems, I seem to have made actual progress once I recognized and admitted to myself what the underlying *implication* or *intention* behind asking the question was. As long as I was in denial about my motives, I couldn't get anywhere. So let's try it again.
Instead of an explanation, a little play:
- Psychologist: What brings you here today?
- muflax: I experience great anxiety and it's consuming my life.
- P: When did your anxiety start?
- m: That's it right there! I can't answer this question, and because I can't, I suffer from anxiety because I feel like I should be able to.
- P: What do you mean you can't? You don't remember?
- m: No, I do, but answering your question commits me to an ontological position I have great doubts over. See, you are already presupposing the A-theory of time in the way you phrased this question.
- P: "A-theory?" What's this?
- m: \*sigh\* Are you sure you can help me? The problem is much deeper and I don't know if you...
- P: Don't worry. I am an expert on the treatment of anxiety disorders. Just relax and tell me what this "A-theory" is.
- m: Alright. So there are two views about time, basically. Is there a special moment called the "present" or is everything a big directed graph? The first one is called A-theory, the other B-theory.
- P: That sounds like a metaphysical problem. Why would telling me when the anxiety started, as you say, "commit you to an ontological position"?
- m: Because things only ever "start" in A-theory. In B-theory, everything just is. Different events do not "follow", but are just causally linked. Even worse, in a general B-theory universe, there doesn't have to be a unique chain of events. Any "point in time" can have multiple moments that come "before" or "after" it.
- P: I see. But if you compared multiple events, couldn't you still say which came before?
- m: If you define "A caused B" as "A came before B", maybe, but that then commits you to *acyclical* graphs and especially when considering acausal interactions...
- P: You are going too fast.
- m: Sorry.
- P: No need to apologize. Please, go on.
- m: Ok. So in causality, we typically assume that the graph has no cycles. Something can't cause itself, right?
- P: Right.
- m: But that doesn't have to hold, you see. Quantum physics has no problem dealing with time loops. In fact, a common interpretation of Feynman diagrams conceptualizes anti-particles not as separate particles, but simply as the *same* particle going back in time. But this gets you into problems with the very idea of causality. For the idea of causality to be coherent, you have to have some dependencies. Basically, there must be a way to say that A forces B, but B doesn't force A. If you frame this in terms of predictions, so that knowing A gives you knowledge about B, but not vice versa, then you have statistical causality, as Judea Pearl constructed it. But this is only meaningful if the universe can't be inverted, meaning you can't compute past states even if you know everything about your current state, but that seems like a weird requirement. So basically, in B-theory you don't have a meaningful concept of causality. There are other reasons why this causality is probably not good anyway, so this makes me all very suspicious.
- P: I see. So why would you then believe B-theory?
- m: Because science requires it! Relativity strongly implies B-theory and the whole framework of computable physics is fundamentally B-theoretic. If you assume A-theory, you are in effect saying that philosophy of science is all bunk.
- P: Earlier you said that physics is compatible with time loops. But physicists talk about the past all the time. Maybe it's not really a big problem?
- m: But it is! You could limit yourself to your immediate predecessors in the graph and call this the "past", but that's not very useful. The common usage is not indicative of anything. Typical physicist have a completely confused ontology anyway and are not to be trusted about these problems at all.
- P: Why do you say that?
- m: Because most physicists are materialists or physicalists, and that's just nonsense.
- P: Materialists? Do you mean they are consumerist?
- m: No, like in "everything is matter". That's a really old view, but complete nonsense. Strict materialism is totally false. The ancient philosophers who came up with it imagined something like little billiard balls bumping into each other, and said the whole universe is like that. But then you can't explain quantum physics or gravity and so on. So we extended that with fields and other constructs, and this view is called physicalism. Basically you just wave your hands and say that all reality is describable by physics and nothing but physics.
- P: Yes, I'm familiar with this view. I think a lot of scientists are physicalists. Why do you think this is nonsense?
- m: Because you can't explain phenomenal consciousness! Within physics, nothing is ever "green" or experiences anything. You have an ontology in which at best particle interactions exist, but this is something qualitatively different from experiences. If you only knew about a universe that it ran on physics, you would never ever expect there to be experiences. The particles aren't aware of the more complex structures that they form, so how should any experience ever "emerge" from them, just because they have been arranged in some clever way? Where is this knowledge coming from? You can only either deny these structures, but then unified consciousness - which we clearly experience - doesn't exist, or you introduce bridge laws and become a dualist. It all makes no sense at all. Of course, there is a much better alternative, so I don't know why anyone bothers with this view.
- P: What's that alternative?
- m: Well, I think of it as a generalization of computationalism. So what you do is put this physicalist ontology completely on its head. You don't assume that there are particles and somehow they form a mind that somehow experiences green, but you start with the mind. You say that the mind is an algorithm, a computation. This computation fundamentally transforms inputs into outputs. Within these inputs, it looks for patterns, so it models them as green or as particle interactions or what have you, but these are just aspects of these internal models. The algorithm only experiences inputs and "green" is just the label we give this specific input.
- P: Computation? Do you think you are a computer program?
- m: No, or really yes, or really.. Well, the difference is that within computationalism, there isn't such a thing as the universe. There is no "real" world, no physical reality at all. It's complete idealism. There are only ever algorithms, inputs and outputs. Even these can be transformed into computational dependencies between algorithms, so you really only have algorithms that depend on each other in their computation. They are not *instantiated*, in the sense that "this thing there" is an instance of an algorithm and "this" isn't. Everything you experience, the whole world, is *you*, this one algorithm and its inputs. The other algorithms are fundamentally distant from you and only reachable through these computational dependencies. So it dissolves the problem of solipsism and an external/internal world by saying there is only this algorithm that models other algorithms within it.
- P: I see.
- m: Alright, so this basically solves the problem of consciousness. There is no problem like "are thermostats conscious?". *Every* algorithm is conscious, but things within this algorithm aren't. So what you call a thermostat is just an artifact within your models, so it's not conscious, but the actual computation that the thermostat computes *is* conscious, just like you. This algorithmic view also has no conception of time in it, so it fits nicely together with B-theory. That's the big problem, you see - *all* these ideas fit together perfectly, but it's their implications which are totally weird.
- P: Like what?
- m: Now you might say that's really just a philosophical oddity that in this algorithmic view, there is no "time" or "causality", but only computational dependency. Just words, right? But here's the thing. You don't have to assume that you are bound by physics anymore. There is no "future" or "past" to interact with, but only algorithms and inputs. So you can depend on whatever algorithm you want. Basically, you become literally timeless. Time-travel? Go ahead. Interact with "future you"? Sure, no problem. When I think about this for too long, I don't know where or even *when* I am anymore. I just kinda am everywhere at once. I am floating outside, seeing the whole universe at once, all my instances as one being.
- P: Dissociation, I understand. Is this the source of your anxiety?
- m: Almost. So because you are an algorithm, you fundamentally have to interact with *all* other algorithms, regardless what your physical model tells you happens in your "universe". Math is not compartmentalized; there is no light cone of computation. Is there *any* algorithm in all of algorithm space that might care about you? *You now have to interact with it.* This means any superintelligence, any god, anything at all that can be expressed in terms of powerful computations, no matter how insane or alien, exists and *you have to deal with it*. How can you make any decision this way? ... Have you heard of Pascal's Wager?
- P: Isn't that the idea that you should be a Christian because if you are right, you will go to Heaven, but if you are wrong, you die either way?
- m: Right. The common answer is, why assume Christianity? I can postulate a new god that will send you to Heaven only if you *aren't* a Christian. There are potentially infinitely many gods, so the wager doesn't work. The problem is, in computationalism, *this reductio ad absurdum is actually correct*. There really *are* an infinite number of gods, all interacting with you! You can try to ignore them, but this won't be a smart idea. You really have to answer this question. This is full-on modal realism. Anything that can potentially exist actually exists, and this means you have to deal with it. "I haven't seen this before" is no excuse.
- P: So you are saying that evidence doesn't count? Aren't some algorithms more likely than others?
- m: Exactly, that's the typical extension here. We start discounting algorithms by their complexity. This can be done in a really elegant way, so we still deal with all algorithms, but we decide we treat them all equally and put equal resources into all of them. This way, only simple algorithms end up with lots of resources and really complex ones, like crazy arbitrary gods somewhere, don't matter much. That's all nice, but fundamentally doesn't work. There is no absolute framework for simplicity. It all depends on your machine model, but that can't be right because algorithms don't *have* machines. Dependencies are just there, as a logical necessity, not as an aspect of whatever programming language you use to express them. Complexity is not a meaningful measure in a universal sense, so you are still stuck having to interact with all possible minds at once now go and don't fuck up good luck.
- P: ... I see. Have you tried not taking your beliefs so seriously?
- m: \*starts sobbing\*
I better stop there. That's only a small fragment of the whole mess. I didn't even mention uncertainty about meta-ethics, utility calculations ('cause as XiXiDu has correctly observed, if utilitarianism is right, we never ever get to relax, and have to fully embrace the worst consequences of Pascal's Mugging), how it removes "instances" as meaningful concepts so that "I will clone you and torture the clone" stops being a threat, but "I will make my calculations dependent on your decision" suddenly is, or how all of this fits so perfectly together, you'd think it's all actually true.
What I want to talk about is this: it's completely eating me alive. This is totally basilisk territory. You don't get to ever die (this really bums me out because I don't like being alive), you have to deal with everything at once right now (no FAI to save you, not even future-you), any mistake causes massive harm (good luck being perfect) and really, normalcy is impossible. How can you worry about bloody coffee or sex if *all of existence* is at stake because algorithmic dependencies entangle you with so vast a computational space? You have to deal with not just Yahweh, but *all possible gods*, and you are watching [cat videos][])? Are you *completely insane*?!
This is not just unhealthy. This is "I'm having a mental breakdown, someone give me the anti-psychotics please". I've tried this [belief propagation thing][LW belief propagation]. As a result, I don't belief in time, selves, causality, simplicity, physics, plans, goals, ethics or anything really anymore. I have absolutely no ground to stand on, nothing I can comfortably just believe, no idea how to make any decision at all. I can't even make total skepticism work because skepticism itself is an artifact of inference algorithms and [moral luck][Moral Luck] just pisses on your uncertainty.
*I hate this whole rationality thing*. If you actually take the basic assumptions of rationality seriously (as in Bayesian inference, complexity theory, algorithmic views of minds), you end up with an utterly insane universe full of mind-controlling superintelligences and impossible moral luck, and not a nice "let's build an AI so we can fuck catgirls all day" universe. The worst that can happen is not the extinction of humanity or something that mundane - instead, you might piss off a whole pantheon of jealous gods and have to deal with them *forever*, or you might notice that *this has already happened* and you are already being computationally pwned, or that *any bad state you can imagine exists*. Modal fucking realism.
The only thing worth doing in modal realism is finding *some* way to *stop caring about the rest of the multiverse*. Discount by complexity, measure, psychological distance, *whatever*, as long as you discount enough to make infinity palpable. It won't work and you know it, but what else can you do? Take it seriously?
Have people ever considered the *implications* of straightforward analytical philosophy? You have no self and there is no time. All person-moments of all persons are as much future-you as what you *think* is future-you. Normal consequences don't matter because this is a Big World and everything exists infinitely often. The Universe Does Not Forget. Prevention? Totally impossible. Everything that can happen is happening. Any reference to something is not literally impossible is actually resolved. This is not just the minor disappointment we felt when we realized Earth wasn't the center of the universe. This time, *the universe* isn't the center of the universe, if you catch my drift. Instead of changing the world, you are reduced to decision theory, intentions and dependencies, forced to interact with *everything that it is possible to interact with*. Life, death, a body, a will, a physical world - all delusions. This is like unlearning object permanence!
I think the bloody continentals were right all along. Analytical philosophy is fundamentally *insane*. When I was still sitting in classical archeology classes, I could at least fantasize about how I would maybe someday get over my awkwardness and at least get a cat, if not a relationship, but now I can't even make pasta without worrying that any inconsistency in my decision making opens me up for exploitation by acausal superintelligences. I thought I was nervous when I had to enter a public laundry room in my dorm (and had a panic attack almost every week)? Try not ever dying and knowing that whatever decision you make now will determine all of existence because you are only this decision algorithm right now and nothing ever helps because algorithms don't change.
You might try the "I am the instantiation of an algorithm" sleight-of-hand, but that's really problematic. Do you also believe God has given you information about the Absolute Encoding Scheme? (If yes, want some of my anti-psychotics?) How can you know what spatial arrangement of particles "encodes" what particular algorithm? This is an unsolvable problem.
But worse than that, even *if* you could do it, I don't think you actually grasp the implications of such a view. Here's [Susan Blackmore][Blackmore no-self], giving an eloquent description of how the position is typically envisioned:
> This "me" that seems so real and important right now, will very soon dissipate and be gone forever, along with all its hopes, fears, joys and troubles. Yet the words, actions and decisions taken by this fleeting self will affect a multitude of future selves, making them more or less insightful, moral and effective in what they do, as well as more or less happy.
"Very soon"? Try *Plank time*. Blackmore is still acting as if this were Memento, where person-moments last seconds, maybe even minutes, as if *any* feature of consciousness *at all* would survive the time scale the universe *actually* runs on. *This is not the case.* Even the most barest of sensation takes milliseconds to unfold. Plank time is *10^41* times faster than that.
Besides, taking the person-moment view completely screws over your sense of subjective anticipation and continuation. Or rather, *there is no continuation*. There is *no* future-you. Morally, *all* future instances of *all* people are in the same reference class. (Unless you want to endorse extreme anti-universalism. Not that I'd mind, but it's not very popular these days.) See how evil your own actions are, shamelessly favoring a very narrow class of people? I honestly don't know if should be more troubled by the insanity of this view, or the implied sociopathy of virtually all actions once you take it seriously.
Breathe. Take an Outside View.
Will Newsome once remarked:
> The prefrontal cortex is exploiting executive oversight to rent-seek in the neural Darwinian economy, which results in egodystonic wireheading behaviors and self-defeating use of genetic, memetic, and behavioral selection pressure (a scarce resource), especially at higher levels of abstraction/organization where there is more room for bureaucratic shuffling and vague promises of "meta-optimization", where the selection pressure actually goes towards the cortical substructural equivalent of hookers and blow.
Exactly. Once you begin taking this whole "analytical thought" thing seriously, it will try to hog as many resources as it can, trying to convert *everything* into analytical problems. And you can't get more analytical than "literally everything is algorithms". Result: massive panic attacks, nothing gets ever done, everything needs to be analyzed to *death*. (Case in fucking point: the whole akrasia mess on LW.) I can't even watch a movie without immediately thinking about what game-theoretic considerations the characters must be making, who is exploiting who, why acting this way will support a monstrosity of hostile memeplexes and screw over whole populations you monster, oh for fuck's sake, you haven't non-ironically enjoyed a movie for years, so shut up already.
But what else can I do? Reject the only worldview that actually makes internal sense?
Consider an alternative. A simple model, one that doesn't actually explain much; it doesn't want to. It's a strength, it claims. It goes like this:
- Alternative: Who are you?
- muflax: I am the algorithm that outputs "yes" to this query.
- A: No, you don't believe that. Who are you?
- m: What do you mean?
- A: Point at yourself. What is it that is you?
- m: I am all of existence.
- A: No, you don't believe that either. This sensation - is that you? Does it feel like you?
- m: No.
- A: Good. Then what does? Point at it.
- m: This observation does. This experiencing-the-sensation. Not the sensation itself, but the experiencing-the-sensation. Not this thought, but the hearing-this-thought. Not the confusion, but the feeling-this-confusion.
- A: Correct. In a state of pure emptiness, pure equanimity - is there confusion?
- m: No.
- A: Confusion is an imposed state. What gives rise to confusion?
- m: When I experience a situation I cannot understand.
- A: What is "not understanding"?
- m: When no correct thought comes up.
- A: What makes confusion go away?
- m: Analysis. Thinking a thought that explains a situation, that makes the internal workings transparent.
- A: How do you know this state has been reached? What makes a thought correct?
- m: When I no longer feel confused.
- A: What do you do when you feel confused?
- m: I facilitate thinking. I plan. I make goals. I divert resource into the solution of the confusion.
- A: Imagine the same process had the power to generate confusion and make it go away. What could it do?
- m: A complete power grab.
And with this, muflax felt enlightened.
For a moment, that is.
Because when you doubt your thought processes because you suspect they are emotionally exploiting you... and you reach a conclusion based on an enlightened state of mind you feel when thinking this conclusion... well, then you ain't paying much attention.

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---
title: A Point About Realism
date: 2012-07-09
techne: :wip
episteme: :speculation
---
What's "realism", in the philosophical sense?
Consider the following topics:
- moral realism
- physical realism
- scientific realism
- wave function realism
- modal realism
- mathematical realism
What do they have in common?

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---
title: Simplifying the Simulation Hypothesis
date: 2012-01-28
techne: :done
episteme: :speculation
slug: 2012/01/28/simplifying-the-simulation-hypothesis/
disowned: true
---
Just slightly too long for [Twitter][]: Everyone who has experimented with lucid dreaming knows that a computer the size of a coconut, primarily designed to climb trees, is enough to simulate worlds of sufficient detail to convince a mind that it is in a full world, containing many other minds it can communicate with.
This should dramatically lower our bound of the necessary computational power of a computer simulating *you*.
Ask not how expensive it might be to simulate the whole universe you see with its diameter of 46 billion light years. Ask how expensive it is to fool *you*.
Also, if it is easier to fool you than to build a whole world, then what evidence do you have of other minds? If there are no other minds, are there still anthropic puzzles? If the reference class is small enough, birth rank stops being surprising.
But do not consider the thought that, like in a dream, it is your own expectation that shapes the world, for then you would have to answer why you would imagine a world like this, so unlikely and wasteful, as if you wanted to distract yourself from solipsism. This thought brings only madness.

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---
title: 'Probability of Liberation: One in a Kalpa'
date: 2012-07-11
techne: :done
episteme: :speculation
---
Just realized something listening to a [Bhikkhu Bodhi talk][Bodhi talk].
Theravada Buddhism has a fundamental Big World cosmology, a multiverse full with an enormous number of worlds, existing for enormous time periods, all condemned to suffering until a Buddha arises and liberates that particular world (or rather, only a small subset of it).
Previously, I thought that's just a weird bit of mythology, or a claim to authenticity (we go back to the rare Buddha, you don't) dressed up in sci-fi terms. But I'm getting the impression it's weirder than that.
In Theravada, the Buddha doesn't use any kind of reliable or reproducible method to discover the Path of Liberation. He just *lucks into it* (or more euphemistically, spontaneously derives it from his innate wisdom). This makes the Buddha fundamentally a [Boltzmann][Boltzmann Brain] Savior! We are all stuck in a world full of suffering and rebirth we can't get out of, and that has no solution you could in any way derive. You need enormous statistical luck to just randomly get the Path right, or that's it, another round of suffering for you.
Which is why the Buddha is so extremely rare, and why it's so important to preserve his teachings and practices *exactly* - you can't get them any other way! If the teaching's lost, that's it, another bazillion years of waiting. The practices themselves don't have to be hard (and people are getting enlightened left and right in the scriptures, after all), but their authenticity is key.
This has a few important implications:
1. The Buddha can literally show up one day, pull the whole Pali Canon out of his nether regions, claim it came to him spontaneously out of nowhere, but it's all true and you should follow him instantly. As far as Theravada is concerned, *that's exactly what happened*.
2. This means Theravada can be as arbitrary and complex as it wants to be. If it were elegant or easy to understand, you wouldn't need luck in the first place! It also needs no justifications whatsoever for its beliefs and practices except that they go back to the Buddha - he didn't get them from anywhere, or following any kind of procedure - it's sheer blind epistemic luck.
3. Bad rebirths as punishments, especially for anything sectarian, is necessarily a feature of the world, not because the universe hates heretics and wants to personally punish them, but simply because doing anything that distances you from Boltzmann Buddha is like throwing away your incredibly rare winning lottery ticket.
4. Theravada can fully embrace boundless levels of [moral luck][]. For example, attaining Nirvana from scratch might require exactly zero karma, an insanely hard thing to do. Take one step, crush an insect? No Buddha is you.
So I think one thing is clear - "a reborn demon guru from Tibet told me, and he may have learned it from a dragon" is no longer the craziest Buddhist origin story.

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---
title: Antinatalism
is_category: true
---
<%= category :antinatalism %>

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---
title: ! 'Introducing: Antinatalist Antelope'
date: 2012-01-19
techne: :done
episteme: :fiction
slug: 2012/01/19/introducing-antinatalist-antelope/
---
<%= image("tumblr_ly1vbmddTG1rndvvro1_400.jpg", "Antinatalist Antelope") %>
(go to [my tumblr][Antinatalism Tumblr] for more)
Somebody had to do it, and that somebody might as well be me.

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---
title: Sunk Cost Fallacy Assumes A-Theory of Time
date: 2012-02-15
techne: :done
episteme: :speculation
slug: 2012/02/15/sunk-cost-fallacy-assumes-a-theory-of-time/
---
Just read this [on LW][LW suicide] (emphasis mine):
> > The treatability of depression, as defined by the likelihood that you eventually get these people to claim they're better, doesn't tell me how much they suffered before getting to this point, whether they would voluntarily go through it again to survive, and what their future risks of recidivism are.
>
> **However much they suffered before that point**, and whether they would go through it again to survive, **are not relevant points to whether they should be glad that they didn't die. They're sunk costs.** A person might be tortured, and have a long life of good quality afterwards (data point, John McCain,) and it's possible that they would not be willing to go through torture again to survive, but this doesn't mean that they won't be glad that after they were tortured, they didn't die, even though they might have killed themselves to escape the torture if they could.
This is a common argument in the context of antinatalism. Basically, it might be the case that the overall utility of a life is not worth living, but when you evaluate a 25 year old living college student (ahem), you don't conclude that this person should be mercy-killed. Benatar himself distinguishes between "lives worth starting" and "lives worth continuing".
This strikes me as really weird because the only way to make sense of this is to presuppose the A-Theory of time, i.e. you have to assume there is a special moment called the "present" and clearly defined "past" and "future". However, as pointed out before, the theory of relativity is not compatible with A-Theory, so especially physicalists shouldn't be making this argument.
There are only two reasonable (as in consistent, comprehensible) views you can take as a B-Theorist:
1. The value of a person-moment depends only on this person-moment.
2. We define a "person" as a certain set of person-moments (say following psychological or legal identity) and then say the value of a person-moment is the value of this whole person.
1) is very neat and local, but gets you into totally counter-intuitive territory. For example, if you buy categorical antinatalism, then it requires you to commit suicide *now*. It also means that you can never argue that anything at any other point in spacetime ever "makes up" for current circumstances. You can never discount, or accept delayed rewards. (That is not to say that this view isn't correct. I would prefer it strongly over 2).)
More typically people go with 2), but then the moment of evaluation is always irrelevant. The value of a life is always a logical necessity. It doesn't change, regardless of "when" you look at it. It's simply incoherent to say that *now* your life has become worthwhile because there is no special moment "now". You evaluate a cluster in spacetime (or algorithm space, if you are a Tegmarkian) and then say what the value of this cluster is, especially if it's worthwhile as a life. The calculation is fixed and observer-independent, including for the person-moments that make it up. If you would have been better off if you had been aborted, this will remain true no matter how old you are. The query "Am I better off dead?" has only *one* definite answer in B-Theory. *It never changes*.
This generalizes to most sunk cost fallacies of course, not just lives worth continuing. If a project is worth working on, it is always so, or never so. How many resources you put into it or how much progress you have made is irrelevant.
I don't know if this is an important argument *for* antinatalism and suicide or *against* B-Theory. Meh, modus tollens, modus ponens, right?

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---
title: The Asymmetry, an Evolutionary Explanation
alt_titles: [Asymmetry Evolutionary]
date: 2012-01-28
techne: :done
episteme: :discredited
slug: 2012/01/28/the-asymmetry-an-evolutionary-explanation/
---
> [W]e think it is wrong to bring into the world a child whose prospects for a happy, healthy life are poor, but we don't usually think the fact that a child is likely to have a happy, healthy life is a reason for bringing the child into existence. This has come to be known among philosophers as "the asymmetry" and it is not easy to justify. -- [source][last generation]
It just hit me how *obvious* an evolutionary explanation for the asymmetry is. Azathoth doesn't give a shit about children's well-being and has no interest at all to make *us* care. But what the Mad Designer *does* care about is a worthwhile investment. Having children is expensive, especially for the mother. If resources are short, it might well be worth it to abort a child instead of bringing it to term. (This happens all the time.) If we think a child is particularly likely to be sick, it will just impose a cost on us and no benefit. So we feel bad about it, so that we may do something about it. No such feedback is necessary to make children in general.
The asymmetry isn't about *potential people*. It's about *how we can benefit from them*. That we care about strangers at all is really just the result of a superficial implementation that never had to deal with people living among non-relatives. (It's the same reason something as evolutionary suicidal as adoption exists.)
We should therefore suspect that the asymmetry is stronger when the potential people have reduced fitness, but not when they are simply dissatisfied. As far as I can tell, this is the case. People seem more willing to be apathetic about someone being born into a dead-end career than about someone being very sick, even though poverty creates much more suffering.
I suspect more and more that *any* talk of harm and benefit is wrong and has nothing to do with true morality. We are not just running on [corrupted hardware][LW corrupted], but *evil* hardware.

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---
title: Illusion of Agency
date: 2012-05-02
techne: :done
episteme: :speculation
---
[Sister Y wrote recently][Sister illusion] about the illusion of control, and how it's crucial to well-being.
There's a mirror version of this illusion, though it may only[^only] affect those on the [schizotypal spectrum][Schizotypy].
[^only]: Though realizing how robotized, to use Gurdjieff's term, most people under most circumstances are might have the same effect. Though I suspect it's commonly excused with "there's a real person hidden somewhere in there" (which may well be true), so it's not quite the same.
Here's the [full quote][reddit lain] from a Reddit comment about it:
> I used to hear voices. For years. It started when I'd walk into my room and say hello to my Lain poster (I've always over personified objects) and eventually she started responding. Over time I could talk to her elsewhere, I'd pull her up when I was sitting in class or riding the bus, and I'd put on headphones so nobody would notice I was talking to myself since it was barely audible. Eventually Lain told me she was a god and I was too, and there were two others, but they didn't really like me so they would almost never talk to me.
>
> A long time later, maybe years, she started being really mean, and it turned out there was another voice who was just pretending to be Lain named Misery. This one was stereotypical, everything I did was wrong and I had to pay for my actions, I should cut myself if I was ungraceful, everyone hated me, etc. Lain split again, and this time she was sisterly. When I was upset and crying myself to sleep I could feel her holding me and telling me everything would be alright. Misery looked different but could look like Lain if she wanted to fool me (although she would turn back into herself when I called her out on it), and the two Lains all looked the same, so I could only tell who they were when they started responding to me.
>
> After a while they all just disappeared. I guess I saned up, because during the peek it never occurred to me I was hearing voices, they truly were gods who were speaking to me, and later during the time period I realized that I was hallucinating with delusions of grandeur. Then at one point I realized that there was more of me and less of them, when I pulled them up it was a conscious effort and part of their responses were forced on my part. Then eventually I just gave them up, they were so weak that it was really just like talking to myself and not to other people that lived in my head.
>
> That's not my secret, I've mentioned it to a few very select people that I truly trust. My secret is that I miss them. I miss them with with all my heart. Even Misery. They were friends and family, they were close to me, they understood me, and they were always there for me. Now even with real friends and family, there's nobody that close. I can't just pull up someone to talk to when I'm lonely, I have to call up a real person and that person never knows what I want to talk about or what I'm hiding from them, they only know what I say. Lain (the main one) would always call me on my bullshit and make me keep changing my answer until I told her the truth. Misery could always find my biggest weaknesses, which allowed me to work on strengthening them. Sisterly Lain could calm me down in a way that's unimaginable, you can't comprehend how good it feels to be hugged by someone inside of you.
>
> And now I feel lonelier than I have in years because I almost never think of that time or remember how it felt, but tonight I'm sitting by myself at 2am and all I can think about is how much I want a voice to talk to and it's been so long since I had one and I'd give anything to have another psychotic break so I could get back all my friends that live in my head.
>
> I once had a psychiotic episode where I could talk to clouds and I could feel how much they loved me, the clouds, the trees, the birds, they were all my friends and they all loved me and they all wanted me to be happy. I had that feeling on mushrooms once, everything in the world loved me, every single thing, the house, the ceiling, the lamp, each blade of grass, it all loved me and it was the best feeling I have ever known, that was the best night of my life. I can't tell you how much I want to feel that again, I just have no way of tracking them down again.
>
> Being crazy feels amazing, whether it's good or bad. Even the bad crazy where I'd stay awake all night because I knew something was going to get me in my sleep and I'd try to claw the evil out of my skin, even that's preferable to being normal because the intensity is indescribable. I miss everything about being crazy. I miss it more than I can possibly describe.
This also applies to drug experiences. [James Kent about DMT elves][tripzine]:
> The archetypal DMT "entities" are pretty well categorized, with most people seeing elves or aliens or fairies or angels or some kind of loopy little spirits that dance about and tell riddles. Sometimes it is a spirit-animal like a jaguar or a snake, sometimes it is none of the above and goes totally off the map.
>
> But getting back to the elf thing (which is what many people find to be the most curious aspect), I initially found it very surprising to be confronted by elves in my DMT experiences, and on psilocybe mushrooms as well, and did indeed perceive them as externalized, morphing, disincarnate beings. I even managed to carry on rudimentary conversations of sorts.
>
> However, the more I experimented with DMT the more I found that the "elves" were merely machinations of my own mind. While under the influence I found I could think them into existence, and then think them right out of existence simply by willing it so. Sometimes I could not produce elves, and my mind would wander through all sorts of magnificent and amazing creations, but the times that I did see elves I tried very hard to press them into giving up some non-transient feature that would confirm at least a rudimentary "autonomous existence" beyond my own imagination. Of course, I could not.
>
> Whenever I tried to pull any information out of the entities regarding themselves, the data that was given up was always relevant only to me. The elves could not give me any piece of data I did not already know, nor could their existence be sustained under any kind of prolonged scrutiny. Like a dream, once you realize you are dreaming you are actually slipping into wakefulness and the dream fades. So it is with the elves as well. When you try to shine a light of reason on them they dissolve like shadows.
Realizing that certain agents in one's mind are actually entirely under one's control, if one wishes, destroys not just the magic, but the agent and everything associated with it. You can't unsee it, and the intensity never comes back.[^suicide]
There are some illusions you don't want broken.
And so that this isn't entirely a quotes post, some commentary, in the form of further quotes. (Wait a minute...)
Looking at this from the outside, it bothers me that the emptiness from breaking the spell persists, even if those affected by it try to make it go away. There shouldn't be [persistent god withdrawal][How My Brain Broke].
[MixedNuts wrote on LW][LW god] once:
> The neurology involved in finding god is very real and useful and happiness-inducing. It is also completely independent of the actual existence of a god to be found. (It's actually better for people who try to find or have found god to become atheists. Once you know how god works, you can have more of it.)
>
> Believing in the existence of god, or that your arm is missing, involve wrong beliefs. The ideal (possibly forbidden by brain bugs) resolutions are learning that god isn't a dude in the sky but a perfectly ordinary oxytocin-secreting circuit, and that your arm works and you can use it.
That's how it *should* be. You realize you have causal control over the gods, e presto, press the god button any time you want. But deep down, we're all essentialists.
So imagine you're Truman in the [Truman Show][].[^truman] You have lived a fairly happy live, have a loving mother, a good relationship and a solid job. Up to your 30th birthday, you are happy and undisturbed, until you learn that virtually all the people you care about are actors and their interactions with you are entirely scripted.
Now that's devastating alright, but try to think of it from a different perspective. RAW describes an elaborate initiation ceremony in Prometheus Rising:
> One of the greatest historical practitioners of this neuroscience was Hassan i Sabbah, who used relatively simple techniques, including, evidently, a time-release capsule invented by the Sufi College of Wisdom in Cairo.
>
> As I describe Hassan's technique - based on historical records - in my novel, The Trick Top Hat: Two young candidates dine with Hassan; the food is laced with a time-release capsule. When asleep the candidates are taken to Hassan's famous "Garden of Delights." The capsule had released a heavy does of opium and they were quite thoroughly unconscious and unaware of their surroundings.
>
> [...]
>
> Both young men were conveyed into the Garden of Delights and placed several acres apart from each other. In a short time, the second stage of the time-release capsule began to work; cocaine was released into their bloodstreams, thereby over-whelming the traces of the soporific opium and causing them to awaken full of energy and zest. At the same time, as they woke, hashish also began to be released, so they saw everything with exceptional clarity and all colors were jewel-like, brilliant, divinely beautiful.
>
> A group of extremely comely and busty young ladies - imported from the most expensive brothel in Cairo - sat in a circle around each of the young candidates, playing flutes and other delicately sweet musical instruments. "Welcome to heaven," they sang as the awakening men gazed about them in wonder. "By the magic of the holy Lord Hassan, you have entered Paradise while still alive." And they fed them "paradise apples" (oranges), far sweeter and stranger than the earth-apples they had known before, and they showed them the animals of paradise (imported from as far away as Japan, in some cases), creatures far more remarkable than those ordinarily seen in Afghanistan.
>
> [...]
>
> Then, as each young man sat entranced by the beauty and wonder of Heaven, the houris finished the dance, and nude and splendid as they were, rushed forward in a bunch, like flowers cast before the wind. And some fell at the candidate's feet and kissed his ankles; some kissed knees or thighs, one sucked raptly at his penis, others kissed the chest and arms and belly, a few kissed eyes and mouth and ears. And as he was smothered in this hashish-intensified avalanche of love, the lady working on his penis sucked and sucked and he climaxed in her mouth as softly and slowly and blissfully as a single snowflake falling.
>
> In a little while, there was no more hashish being released and more opium began to flow into the bloodstream, the young candidates slept again; and in their torpor, they were removed from the Garden of Delights and returned to the banquet hall of the Lord Hassan.
>
> There they awoke.
>
> "Truly," the first exclaimed, "I have seen the glories of Heaven, as foretold in Al Koran. I have no more doubts. I will trust Hassan i Sabbah and love him and serve him."
>
> "You are accepted for the Order of Assassin," said Hassan solemnly. "Go at once to the Green Room to meet your superior in the order."
>
> When this candidate had left, Hassan turned to the second, asking, "And you?" "I have discovered the First Matter, the Medicine of Metals, the Elixir of Life, the Stone of the Philosophers, True Wisdom and Perfect Happiness," said he, quoting the alchemical formula. "And it is inside my own head!"
>
> Hassan i Sabbah grinned broadly. "Welcome to the Order of the Illuminati!" he said, laughing.
In other words, Truman might realize that the happiness he knew didn't *depend* on other people. It worked just as well with actors and scripts. And the person experiencing god withdrawal might realize that it was their own brain that made the experience wonderful, and didn't rely on some independent agents.
And somehow, this strikes me as *wrong*. Could you really imagine telling Truman that he might try convincing the director to write him some new scripts? Or worse, that Truman might try writing fanfic about his own life, and extract his happiness from it? After all, his previous life was just as fake, so what's the difference?
With sufficiently strong luminosity, you ought to be able to realize that whatever good you experienced from things you thought were independent agents, but that turned out to be illusions, wasn't *caused* by those agents (because they never existed). The power was in your brain all along.[^bias]
[^bias]: Figuring out if something is a bias or a value is [incredibly hard][LW bias value].
And similarly with Sister Y's example, the comfort you received from the illusion of control never depended on any actual control, and so you should be able to experience it just on its own. You never needed control or agents to feel better, and having the spell broken doesn't take *away* any abilities.
You should be able to be happy anyway.
Says [Manuel Blum][blum advice]\:
> "Claude Shannon once told me that as a kid, he remembered being stuck on a jigsaw puzzle. His brother, who was passing by, said to him: "You know: I could tell you something."
>
> That's all his brother said.
>
> Yet that was enough hint to help Claude solve the puzzle. The great thing about this hint... is that you can always give it to yourself."
But I tried that, and I can't get it to work. Maybe I've just not tried hard enough, and maybe I'm still stuck in an essentialist delusion, but even *if* it worked, it would still *seem* hollow to me.
Because when you do that, why are you caring about other people, or external things *at all*? Anything you feel, anything you care about, you'd still have experienced if it turns out you were being deceived, or have simply been mistaken about the existence or absence of your control over things.
Try adopting a non-essentialist perspective.
Truman should realize that, whether a romantic speech originated in a bunch of neurons located in the skull of the person he calls his girlfriend, or whether it comes from a bunch of neurons which caused it to be written on paper which another bunch of neurons read and later spoke, doesn't change the *speech*.
A perfect copy of a thing *is* the thing.[^mitchell] [Theseus][Theseus' Ship] has two ships.
[^mitchell]: I'm merely arguing from within this perspective, not endorsing it. Yes, I know all the "a copy isn't me" arguments, and I give them a lot of credence. I don't have any strong beliefs about it either way. Just sayin'.
And more importantly, an illusionary setup is actually *favorable*. Think about it, like in the illusion of control case Sister Y describes. Subjects felt more comfortable under loud noise if they believed they had a button that would stop the noise, even though they never pressed it (and in fact, it wasn't connected to anything).
But that's *good news*. In this case, for the subject to feel comfort, three things were necessary:
1. Their brain must have the ability to feel better.
2. It must be possible to activate this ability.
3. This activation must be hooked up to the belief that they can stop the noise.
In a non-illusionary setup, you need an *additional* step: the button must actually do something. That's *worse*, because in the illusionary case, all the subject needs to do is change their brain so as to connect the existing ability with a new trigger. In the non-illusionary case, this trigger *also* has to stop the noise.
You see, the ability is already there. Those who miss the gods *already* felt great. Truman *was* satisfied. The subjects already could endure the noise. So the first two steps are already done. The only thing left to do is figure out how to trigger it.
Assert causal dominance. Realize that you are already causally disconnected from the thing which you thought you cared about. What you believed you wanted (control, gods, unscripted people, ...) was never determining your state of mind in the first place. It's entirely superfluous, and for you to now insist on it, in fact to be disappointed to learn that this thing isn't real - well, it's a non sequitur. It's silly.
But that doesn't mean that the *effect* of this illusion is itself illusionary. It isn't. The effect is absolutely real. It just wasn't triggered by what you thought it was triggered by. Just a bug. That's all.
I do not know if this is the right view, but one thing is clear - the non-essentialist perspective is certainly more empowering.
Yet somehow...
I think the non-essentialist perspective misses something, misses a conditional component. It's not just about the emotional state.
The schizophrenic is not just disappointed that the Love of the Virgin Mary is gone (because they found out that they can control the Virgin Mary), but that it was *unjustified*. Feeling the love was partially a transaction, a binding contract. I will feel love if and only if the Virgin Mary is actually caring for me. (I will be less worried if and only if I know I could end it all. I will be comfortable around you if and only if I can trust you to be honest.)
The illusion then provided false evidence that this condition was fulfilled, and so maybe what is felt afterwards is not just emptiness, not just absence, but active *betrayal*. (I certainly feel that way.)
It might look a little stupid from the outside. The sufferer is willing to engage in a deal from which they would greatly benefit, and this benefit is administered by the sufferer themselves. It's entirely self-gratification. Yet when the sufferer learns that the initial condition for this contract is in fact impossible, illusionary, they *don't* just reward themselves unconditionally. They stick to their deal, no matter the harm.
It's so... non-utilitarian. Death before dishonor, suffering before illusion.
Certainly can't complain people don't actually care about the truth. Funny it's the crazy ones, though.
(And I'll leave it on this unsatisfactory note, as this most accurately reflects how shitty the whole situation feels.)
[^truman]: Which, as [Will Newsome correctly notes][LW truman], is what a schizophrenic episode feels like from the inside:
> I just watched The Truman Show a few days ago. I interpreted it as a story about a schizophrenic who keeps getting crazier, eventually experiencing a full out break and dying of exposure. The scenes with the production crew and audience are actually from the perspective of the schizophrenic's imagination as he tries to rationalize why so many apparently weird things keep happening. The scenes with Truman in them are Truman's retrospective exaggerations and distortions of events that were in reality relatively innocuous. All this allows you to see how real some schizophrenics think their delusions are.
[^suicide]: Schizophrenics have a *50x* higher suicide likelihood, with 20-40% of schizophrenics attempting suicide, and 10% succeeding. ([Source][suicide schizophrenic].) How's that for "lives worth living"?

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---
title: Consciousness
is_category: true
---
<%= category :consciousness %>

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---
title: There Is Only Quale
date: 2010-09-23
techne: :done
episteme: :fiction
disowned: true
---
> If you believe such nonsense
> You'd better dream your dreams at night.
> At last, it's really happened,
> Though we don't know how.
> The only miracles are in the storybooks
> And they are lies.
>
> -- [ジャックと豆の木][A Course in Miracles - Jack and the Beanstalk]
Lucid Dreaming
==============
I was learning to dream lucidly[^lucid] again, so that I could use some of my
sleep hours to meditate. Tibetan Buddhists swear on that kind of thing. As part
of this learning process, I needed good dream recall, so I started keeping a
dream diary. One night, I was having a weird dream where I was skipping classes
by flying over a forest in a kind of space ship with 3 old friends who were
ignoring me. (Almost all my dreams manage to be incoherent and awesome at the
same time.) When I woke up, I was exhausted from other dreams that night and I
didn't feel like writing this one down. I thought, half-asleep, that it was so
vivid that I could remember it anyway.
Several hours later, the dream came back to mind. "I was right", I thought. "I
really *do* remember this dream clearly. If I had just written it down, then the
essence of it wouldn't have been captured anyway." But then my mind kinda
exploded when I realized something.
**How can I remember that I remember it clearly?**
Think about it. It's not that I remember what happened. It's that I remember
how lucid I was at the time, how vividly I saw everything. I could recreate it,
compare it and then knew, yup, this is the same thing.
I immediately wrote down a couple of questions - the bold sentences - on my
whiteboard before the rest of my brain caught on to the fact that I just
realized that it was cheating, right then and there. A sequence of rapid
short-circuits went off and a minute later I realized I had just become lucid
*without dreaming*.
[Puredoxyk][] once said that meditation makes your brain leaky, but in a good way.
I think this is what she meant.
> From this perspective, dreaming can be viewed as the special case of
> perception without the constraints of external sensory input. Conversely,
> perception can be viewed as the special case of dreaming constrained by
> sensory input.
>
> -- Stephen LaBerge
Some years ago, when I had just gotten serious about this enlightenment thing, I
was experimenting with lucid dreaming for the first time. At the same time, I
was reading up a lot on hallucinogenic drugs. One day, something happened that
made me afraid; I have only been more afraid once in my life[^fear]. I was doing
reality checks throughout the day, where you ask yourself if you are dreaming,
and hopefully it becomes a kind of habit and you start doing it in your dreams,
too, where the answer will be "yes" and you become lucid.
I walk up some stairs, when suddenly the reality check fails and for a moment
I'm lucid while awake. It's the weirdest feeling, like you just stepped through
a mirror[^mirror] into another world. I am conscious in a way I was never
before, then relapse right back. As if Picard in "The Inner Light" - when he was
made to re-live someone else's life and memories, so that towards the end, Picard
really believed that he was always Kamin - as if he, just for a moment, woke up
to the fact that this whole life is just fake, he's really on the Enterprise. I
thought I went insane.
This scared me so much that I didn't touch lucid dreaming again for years.
Fortunately, I got over it.
Qualia
======
**How can I know that I ever _was_ conscious?**
To be able to tell how lucid I was would require for me to remember what I was
conscious of at the time. But I can't do this. At best, I can recreate the
perceptions as closely as possible and be conscious of them right now. But
that's a different thing. I'm still only conscious now, just of similar input.
So I'm essentially trying to compare two qualia, to see if they are the same.
A quale (plural: qualia) is the direct experience of something that can't be
communicated. It's the redness of red. I can tell you that an apple is red, what
wavelengths red corresponds to and so on, but what red *looks* like to me, I can
never tell you. This is a quale.
The question is, do qualia really exist? Plenty of modern consciousness
scientists reject the notion. The most common basic theory, functionalism, is
incompatible with qualia, as is materialism in general. What exactly is a quale
supposed to be in material terms? It can't be any information or you could
communicate it. It can't be a property of things or your instruments could
detect it. So qualia must be a powerful delusion, a mistake.
Pretty much everyone has thought about qualia, but probably not using this name.
The most common approach is the Inverted Color Spectrum. Maybe, what you see as
red, I see as green and so on. Because this difference would be systematic and
all the relationships between colors would be identical, how can we be sure that
everyone has the same color perceptions? (Of course, provided you're not color
blind or something like that.)
A lot has been said about qualia, but it all rests on the same basic assumption
- if qualia exist, then they can be compared.
But how exactly is this supposed to work?
**How can I know that more than one quale - the one right now - exists?**
There's a sleight-of-hand going on here, one that I only just noticed in that
very moment. The thought process goes something like this: "I see A. I store my
perception of A in my memory. I then see B. Finally, I retrieve A and compare it
with B."
But that's impossible by definition! **If memory could contain qualia, then
so could third-person perspectives. They would be encodable.**
It doesn't matter how you would try to wiggle out of this - if you can compare
them, then you can store information about them, then you can communicate them.
I could, with futuristic equipment, check your brain for this information - read
your memories - and establish if we have the same qualia. If *you* can compare
your own qualia, then *I* can compare them with my own ones, too.
But that's exactly what is supposed to be impossible with qualia. They are the
subjective experience, they can't be shared. So qualia can't be compared. Let
this sink in.
Only Now
========
**I was never conscious before and will never be conscious again.**
**I am only conscious right _now_.**
This is my only chance. I'll never see the world again. This all passes,
forever, the very next moment. Already gone, already too late. But it is my only
chance again, this time, to see this moment. How long will it last?
Every moment is a gift. There are no second chances, so pay attention.
[^mirror]:
I literally once walked through a glass door. Don't do that.
[^lucid]:
[Lucid dreaming] is when you are aware during your dream that it is a dream.
The moment you do, you gain great clarity and lots of control over the
dream. Most people start flying around. Buddhists meditate, of course. We
are one-trick ponies.
[^fear]:
This was the day I died, using Ayahuasca. Really, as long as you cling to
reality and only *think* you *may* die, it's the most horrible experience
ever. It's like years of Buddhist study condensed into one day, giving
you the worst trip of your life as the reality of no-self, impermanence and
suffering completely overwhelm you. Sure, this also happens during Buddhist
meditation, eventually, but by then you have months, if not years of
practice. But with Ayahuasca, you realize how ill-prepared you are for your
own death and this vine is gonna kill you right now over the course of the
next few hours, so *deal* with it.
Once the nice effects have come and gone and the trip just keeps on
accelerating, Ayahuasca throws away its mask and puts you on direct line
with the rest of your brain. "So you wanna see what I do all day? The crap I
have to put up with, that you are completely unconscious of? Let me *show*
you!" It's like you are travelling aboard the Enterprise all your life and
the worst you ever saw was being thrown around after a little Klingon
attack, when one day Scotty decides to show you how mind-bogglingly fast the
ship is by strapping you to the front while going to maximum warp.
At first, there is only fear, fear of being poisoned, going mad or things
like that, but then the fear gets so strong that there it isn't *about*
anything anymore. There is just fear. Whoosh-whoosh-whoosh, your mind
dissolves into a mess of colors and vertigo and you even forget to scream,
or whatever one is supposed to be doing in that kind of situation. Then the
fear goes away for a moment and you realize what is happening - you are
being digested. Everything that enters your skull, before your mind can deal
with it, has to be broken down and analyzed and so on, and *this is the raw
data stream*.
Then you die, but that's a story for another day.
Damn, I really need to write this trip up some time, and repeat it. Not sure
in which order. Until then, I watch Blueberry (aka Renegade) again. The only
accurate depiction of Ayahuasca on film.

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---
title: Es gibt Leute, die sehen das anders.
date: 2012-01-17
techne: :done
episteme: :broken
slug: 2012/01/17/es-gibt-leute-die-sehen-das-anders/
---
("There are some people who disagree.", [obligatory T-shirt][Anders Shirt])
# The Case For Bias
Coming from a kind of Hansonian and Tantric perspective, there aren't such things as "good" and "bad" goals. We might - for game-theoretic reasons - publicly approve of only some of our goals, but whatever we want, we simply want, and it's wrong to say that "I wish I didn't want X". Embrace your [monstrosity][BFV Monsters].
I can't deny that I'm a contrarian. Meta-contrarian, in fact. I *like* to disagree with the intellectual mainstream, and I can't even deny that I derive some of my values solely from the fact that The Establishment(tm) doesn't like them. So I thought... maybe I should try to be a *better* contrarian?
(That doesn't mean that *all* my unusual or controversial views are contrarianism. I really would like meditation to be useful, instrumentally and spiritually, and have spent large chunks of my life trying to make it work. Unfortunately, some stuff simply doesn't work or is [misleading][Why you don't want Vipassana]. That I call myself an "atheist divine command theorist" nowadays is not [an attempt to disagree][xkcd atheist] with *both* atheists and theists, but simply derives from the fact that I *really want* theism to be true, but it just isn't, so I'm trying to salvage as many features as I can without going too crazy in the process.)
Believing only true things just for the sake of truth is mostly a confused value. The reason you should overcome your biases is not so you only believe true things. Instead, false beliefs *on human hardware* have some typical failure modes that will fuck you up. *This* you should avoid. Fundamentally, there are two problems:
1. Truth is entangled with reality. If you only track reality, no evidence will contradict you. If you choose to believe something untrue, you need to maintain *additional* models. This can be seriously difficult. So try to minimize the amount of questionable things you accept.
2. You can't properly compartmentalize. It's not entirely possible for you to be a homeopath and believe in the benefits of modern medicine. Occasionally, you *will* act wrong and this will harm you. So try to be contrarian about inconsequential things. Don't believe in magic healing water, but that Native Americans are really Hebrews.
So how would you try to be contrarian without giving up all your rationality and its benefits? You want to believe unusual things, but not end up praying your cancer away. I think a simple way to do it is to merely adjust your priors. Keep all your Bayes (Peace Be Upon Him), but a priori favor contrarian hypotheses.
Example. There's a pretty famous disagreement if Jesus is a mythological figure or a (heavily distorted) historical failed preacher. Both are reasonable positions and there is good evidence for both. (Other views like the Zombie Jew are all nonsense.) If you were an ideal and unmotivated Bayesian, both positions would probably be reasonably similar in probability, maybe within 20% of each other. Which you favor would depend mostly on your prior. Is a historical religious founder whose message seriously got out of hand more likely than a cult making up mythological being and later historicizing it? There are certainly examples of both and it's not immediately obvious which is better as a general view. This is your chance as a contrarian! Simply adjust your prior slightly so that the more controversial view wins. Keep all the evidence and lines of reasoning in place and simply believe that, all else being equal, a myth-to-history is more likely than a failed-leader-to-hero-myth, at 3:2 odds maybe. Wham, you're a mythicist, don't have to live in a [magical parallel universe][Inerrancy] in which most evidence doesn't exist, but still get to be someone who disagrees.
"Isn't this *evil*? You're actively advocating sophistry!" Yes, but it's *efficient* sophistry. You are a monster. Don't feel guilty about it, but do a good job. As a [wise man][Sniper Feelings] once said, "Feelins'? Look mate, you know who has a lot of feelings? Blokes what bludgeon their wife to death with a golf trophy. Professionals have standards.". If it makes you feel any better, there is no practical way to choose an unbiased prior in the first place. The only known unbiased prior is the universal prior (explanation soon in the SI series) and it's incomputable, even for very simple examples. You *will* be biased, so why not be explicit about it and be biased in ways that benefit you?
# Skillful Trolling
Being a contrarian and being a troll is closely related. The only real difference is that a contrarian internalizes their trollish views, while a troll drops them outside a debate. But if you aren't trolling someone, why are you a contrarian in the first place? No-one just believes the [Dark Ages never happened][Phantom Time] in private. They *have* to publicize it and probably start a flame war over it.
It is therefore an integral part of being a contrarian that you are competent in your subject so you can actually debate someone. If you simply represent mainstream views, you can always appeal to authority. (And where the mainstream is usually right, you're certainly justified in doing so. I'm not dissing the mainstream *in general*.) You can do a good job debating an anti-vaccine crank even if you know very little about medicine or biology. You can simply point to studies, a uniform expert consensus and clear results.
But this shit doesn't fly if you think the mainstream is wrong. You *will* get simple citations of mainstream positions as actual arguments and it will be *your* responsibility to show how they are wrong (and how the mainstream came to accept them). Your opponent will *never* have to demonstrate how the argument actually works. (Though they do get bonus points if they do. Someone giving you actual arguments is strong evidence to take them seriously. Remember, *you* are the contrarian. You will be demonstrably wrong from time to time. It's a high-risk/high-reward strategy.)
So you have to put a lot of effort into not just understanding mainstream views, but also deeply understanding your contrarian positions, and how to explain them to outsiders. This is a lot of work. You better be ready to dedicate a serious amount of your time to it. You can't be contrarian about a hundred things. Focus.
(Fortunately all contrarians I know *like* this work and don't face akrasia in these fields. Which btw is good evidence against "akrasia is a general limitation" and "akrasia arises from modularity", and evidence for "akrasia is what being a hypocrite, but not acknowledging it feels from the inside". [Eat your shadow][BFV shadow].)
# Let's Talk About Me
Enough general arguments. This is my blog and so let's talk about me. (Why not embrace a certain level of narcissism? If public writing works, but it doesn't seem to depend on feedback (most of my writing I never advocate and is therefore never commented on, which doesn't particularly bother me), then it seems obvious I'm at least partially motivated by potential attention. Might as well acknowledge that and use it to fuel the learning process.)
Recently, I made a series of critical comments on one of [Luke's posts][LW chain]. I was trying to express a couple of points:
1. Legislation to abolish slavery had questionable effectiveness and mostly moved slavery to the black market where slaves don't have legal representation. It is analogous to the war on drugs.
2. The reduction in proportional slavery is mostly due to economic factors, mainly urbanization and decreasing poverty.
3. Therefore, the shift in moral attitude towards slavery is an afterthought of the real decrease, not the cause. It is mostly ideologically motivated, not a sign of moral change. The example in Luke's post is therefore irrelevant and misleading. (Like most other examples he gives.)
4. I reject the Repugnant Conclusion and find it wrong to justify harm through greater benefit. Population growth is one of the greatest evils ever because it increases the number of people who suffer. It is completely irrelevant that *more* people might live happy lives. Suffering and happiness are probably not comparable quantities.
I also hold the following beliefs (some not too strongly) which I tried to keep out of my comments so as to avoid downvotes:
1. Slavery is not morally wrong. At all. I can find no fault with it. Partial legal property of humans is already acceptable (we call this "being a parent"), so why not of unrelated humans? A state should enforce any contract people want to make, including about buying other humans. I fully support this. (I am less confident about *inheriting* slavery because I'm skeptical of inheritance *in general*. I also find making someone a slave against their will (say through war) problematic (but maybe defensible), but I firmly support the right of people to sell themselves into slavery.)
2. Slaves probably did not suffer *worse* than comparable non-slaves, so from a perspective of harm reduction, slavery is probably not a relevant evil. It gets its bad reputation mostly through [Progressivist][Moldbug condensed] propaganda.
3. The definition of slavery is very conspicuously selective. A Roman owning a personal assistant is slavery, but millions of prisoners worldwide working under forced conditions (and often against their will) is not? Prison labour should definitely be included in modern slavery statistics, but that wouldn't make it look so flattering anymore. Are children legally really different from term-limited slaves? (If you agree with animal rights arguments, what about farm animals? It's as if the institution of slavery per se isn't problematic, just when it applies to certain groups of humans under certain conditions.)
4. Historically, slavery was potentially a useful institution, superior to its alternatives. Condemning it is misguided and ideologically motivated, like blaming Christianity and the Roman Catholic Church for the Dark Ages and Medieval decline, when really they were a force of stability, drastic reform and technological progress. (And I'm not saying this as an apologist. I have little love for Catholicism, but no-one deserves blame for things they *didn't* do.)
5. And as a minor point, Europeans get a lot of hate for slavery when they *weren't even the dominant slave users*. Seriously, Christian Europe has always been the place with the *fewest* slaves. I know hating on poor, oppressed cultures isn't cool, but come on!
So there. As you can see in my comments, I did rather poorly and did not at all do these points justice. Most are currently upvoted, but they were among the most controversial things I ever said on LW. (The other two were my skepticism of akrasia and disliking vaporware artsy games.)
Let's analyze what I can learn from this:
1. It's seriously hard to argue against major moral foundations. "We aren't slavers anymore" is an important myth of modern culture and going up against it is as much a suicide mission as arguing that Hitler maybe wasn't that bad after all.
2. Arguing against the historical mainstream puts *all* the burden of proof on the dissenting voice. It's perfectly understood on LW and similar skeptical sites that someone arguing for the low-fat theory of weight loss, even though it is mainstream, has *some* burden of proof. At least they have to defend themselves against the null hypothesis, and it is perfectly acceptable to ask, if maybe a bit rude because it is easy to google, "Why do you believe that exercise helps with weight loss?". Asking "Why do you think that legislation is responsible for decreases in slavery?" does not deserve an answer and can simply be asserted.
3. I didn't do the research, did not put in much effort and thus could not convincingly argue for my points. I knew this in advance, but hoped that being transparent and honest about my deficiencies, asking others to support *their* views so I wouldn't have to collect *all* the evidence, would at least grant me enough charity so we could have a meaningful conversation. Writing comments, even on LW, doesn't work for learning something new. (Which makes me much less likely to talk about experimental stuff there, which is a shame, but I don't have XiXiDu's patience.)
4. I have repeatedly gotten the comment that I look like I'm signaling cynicism and forcing my arguments. I really wonder if there is a way I could communicate my positions without that impression. Maybe I'm particularly incompetent or calibrated for the wrong communities, but honest inquiry seems really hard to get across. Also, I wonder if I should adopt a different persona for these kinds of discussions. I feel like adopting a much more direct and more confident personality and really accepting the risk of starting a flame war, but I doubt that it would be beneficial, at least on LW. Mostly I feel that this puts *much* more responsibility on me to present my arguments well than on anyone else. No-one has to even cite statistics of, say, medieval and modern slavery, but I have to prove a huge counterfactual, namely that a modern world without progressivist influences and with fully legal slavery would have *less* slaves? I probably really have to choose my battles.
# Troll Invictus
So I was thinking. I love history, and I love all the contrarian views associated with it and the flame wars they incur, so it seems like a good investment of my time to get *good* at these things.
1. What particular kinds of arguments are effective? Should I argue mostly from statistics, from original texts, from plausibility, from ideological bias, or something else? I generally aspire to write the kind of stuff I would love to read myself. Much of my writing is an attempt to create what I wish had existed when I started, and this desire dominates my style and choice of topics. Personally, I find contrarians most effective when they
1. debunk the main tools of the mainstream,
2. give a plausible, non-evil account how the opposition developed their views,
3. make testable predictions or unite previously scattered evidence,
4. rely mostly on quantifiable evidence,
but not when they
1. make political arguments, especially when they present themselves as being persecuted (even when true),
2. link their beliefs to concrete policy,
3. violate [Hanlon's Razor][].
I should experiment with different techniques here.
2. What are solid historical methods? I can't rely on the messed-up hodge-podge of modern historians, so I have to justify and accumulate a set of meaningful approaches myself. Only then can I derive meaningful conclusions based on them, and only them. This will also be useful as criticism, by showing that a point is methodologically flawed.
3. I desperately need a good minimalistic framework of history. Only this month have I even added dates of important empires into my Anki deck, and I barely know India's history, for example. I need to branch out for a while and cover some ground. I need to rely much stronger on Anki here.
4. I really need to get my languages in order. I still can't read Latin. This is seriously not acceptable. I also need to re-evaluate my language priorities. I really wish I could read Akkadian, Russian and Chinese these days. Prof. Arguelles is right, you really need to read 10+ languages to meaningfully appreciate world history and literature. (Speaking them, on the other hand, is as useless as ever. I barely even speak German these days.) Translations are fundamentally bullshit for contrarians. Many good texts *won't* be translated, or translations won't be sufficient to establish the cultural context, or they will even seriously distort the text, as Jaynes has shown.
5. Moral philosophy, theology and political theory are actually useful. (I know! I'm as surprised as you.) As it's list day at muflax' blog today, surprisingly influential on my thought over the last year or two have been:
1. Moldbug's resurrection of reactionary thought (Broken as it is, he has shown me that a serious alternative to progressivism *is* possible and that my admiration for... questionable people and institutions has a general moral and historical core and is genuinely worth developing. It does not just derive from [Evil Is Cool][], but [Strawman Really Has A Point][Strawman Has A Point]. Many unacceptable views today actually have serious arguments and don't derive from people just being dicks.)
2. Antinatalists' defense of deontological rights (I found all rights-based morality questionable before I read [Sister Y][]. Now I take it very seriously and consider it a serious contender for Real True Morality, even potentially Objective Morality.)
3. Divine Command Theory (It's what I actually *wish* I would operate under, which I only understood when I roleplayed an explicit DCTist.)
4. analytical theology (It's surprisingly interesting and relevant as a field, once you reconstruct it from the perspective of computationalism and Turing machines, or as Will Newsome recently called Leibniz' "best of all worlds" argument: "Recursive Universal Dovetailing Measure-Utility Inequality Theorem". Once you accept that the mind might be computation, really weird shit happens as materialist frameworks break down, and you consider acausal interactions and Tegmark universes, and you realize that fundamentally there is no difference between "real" and "hypothetical" scenarios. I may even have found a way to resurrect God. This scares and excites me. At the very least, it might be a strong argument *against* computationalism, which is the only meaningful basis of monist philosophy of mind. Either way, it's very fucked up.)
5. non-protestant religions (That's a shitty name, but there's a certain core of protestantism as observed by [David Chapman][Protestant Buddhism] that repeats itself in other contexts. It's characterized by its lack of ritual, sacredness and worship, and it's focus on (pseudo-)rational thought, equality and everyday life. Once I understood that ritual and worship are meaningful practices, I found a lot of value in them and currently try to integrate them more into my life. This seems to be epistemically dangerous, but so far totally worth it. I'm not sure how much of this benefit is specific to my personality, though, nor how influential this really will turn out to be. I feel like no modern construction of this practice exists and I'm stuck with either resurrected an old religion or building everything from scratch. I really hope Chapman makes lots more progress there.)
Luckily I have stopped all AI and math research, now that I believe only in monetary support. I can put almost all my skills behind programming, history and theology. I like that.
Let us close with a prayer to an [unknown god][Unknown God]:
> I pray to you,
> unknown god,
> whose commands I have forgotten,
> but who eternally I shall serve.
>
> I acknowledge my sins,
> and in my ignorance
> wish not for mercy,
> undeserving as I am.
>
> I accept my penance
> and pray to you,
> unknown god,
> who I eternally shall serve.

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@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
---
title: Some Thoughts on Bicameral Minds
date: 2012-01-04
techne: :rough
episteme: :discredited
slug: 2012/01/04/some-thoughts-on-bicameral-minds/
---
*This is a reply to wallowinmaya's comment on my last article. I noticed I kinda wrote an article in disguise, so I'm posting it as one.*
> The multiple-personality thing is really fascinating. Do you think its been a feature or a bug, all things considered? It seems to me that basically everyone has multiple personalities but only one of them is conscious. Your deep acquaintance with your subconsciousness also explains that you endorse wireheading because most usually “subconscious parts” probably find it good. Its only our conscious, ideal and altruistic self that is against it. Am I totally wrong about this? And if our multiple personalities really have conflicting values that would probably render solutions to moral problems like CEV void, right?
I tend to think of it as a feature, but I'm really used to it, so I'm not exactly an impartial judge. Maybe I'm even less functional and inconsistent than the average person, I don't know. I also don't know if it's really the feature that's unusual or just the way I think about it.
There's a really fascinating book called "The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind" by Julian Jaynes (actually really accessible despite its title and available on library.nu). Basically, he proposes that originally both brain hemispheres were independent minds and that one (the right) commanded the other (the left) through hallucinations, mostly voices.
Quote Wiki:
> According to Jaynes, ancient people in the bicameral state of mind would have experienced the world in a manner that has some similarities to that of a schizophrenic. Rather than making conscious evaluations in novel or unexpected situations, the person would hallucinate a voice or "god" giving admonitory advice or commands and obey without question: one would not be at all conscious of one's own thought processes per se.
The main problem with this Bicameral Mode is that you can't really self-reflect and function outside of rigid hierarchies. So once civilizations got too large, these bicameral minds collapsed and merged into the modern subjective consciousness. So basically, the evolution goes:
1. monkeys want to track other monkeys, so they develop monkey-simulating hardware
2. monkeys develop language to order other monkeys around
3. one half of a monkey specializes in talking with other monkeys, the other half orders them around (built-in hypocrisy for free!)
4. one half of a monkey orders other half around via hallucinated other monkeys (really dirty hack, but explains all the redundancy between hemispheres)
5. monkeys develop internal pathway so halves can talk more directly
These internalized hallucinated voices we now call "thoughts" and we generally don't believe they come from other monkeys anymore. Because of this, our right hemispheres don't have the ability to speak anymore, but the hardware is still there. It's just not used. (Schizophrenics and people with brain damage in the left hemisphere do use it, though. That's were "God told me to!" comes from.)
Jaynes' point is that the transition from 4. to 5. is almost completely *cultural*. The monkeys in 4. were people like the ancient Babylonians who were obviously capable of writing and everything.
(Side note: I'm really sympathetic to Jaynes' basic argument, but I think his historical argument doesn't actually work out. The effect is probably more subtle than he thinks and the dating is completely off. His main problem - which he totally did not see coming - is that the texts he uses to support his argument (the Old Testament, the Iliad and similar ones) are *much* more recent than he thinks. He follows mainstream scholars at the time, thinking that some parts of the OT are from about 800-700 BCE, with even older oral traditions, but I don't see any evidence for that. I favor *much* later datings. I'd put most of the OT in Hellenistic times (so 300-150 BCE) and large parts of it actually contemporary to the *New* Testament! Almost no historical text that claims an ancient history actually has one. It's bullshit all the way down. But regardless, a weaker form of Jaynes' argument still stands, I think. The contrast in actually-ancient writing (like Babylonian clay tablets) and Hellenistic stuff is striking. Hellenistic culture looks pretty much like ours, but Babylonian culture doesn't seem to have *any* self-reflection. Characters don't think, they don't decide, they mostly follow orders from the gods. I don't know how much of this is just selection bias (great Babylonian novels just didn't survive?), but it really looks like sometime during 5000 BCE and 500 BCE, someone actually had to figure out that you could *think for yourself*, silently, in your own head.)
Anyway. If some basic form of this is true, then there really is no "unified" mind across the whole brain. There's at least two, maybe more. Basically, the hardware is flexible and can support multiple selfs, even simultaneously. Mine just broke a bit and I was stuck with three selfs at the time, or I had greater awareness of already existing ones through an unexpected new connection.
Back to Jaynes' idea, the difference between a "self" and an "other" is really just the level of personal associations and names. They are both hallucinations, in the sense that they run as simulated monkeys on the brain. Making a decision is just simulating a monkey that does something and then seeing what happens, only that we recognize that the simulated monkey is us. (Sometimes we fail the mirror test and that's called "I spoke to someone in a dream". When you have a lucid dream, try switching which person you control.)
This association process is not perfectly reliable. Particularly schizophrenics and people on certain drugs have it fail on them. Quote two schizophrenics in Jaynes' book:
> Gradually I can no longer distinguish how much of myself is in me, and how much is already in others. I am a conglomerate, a monstrosity, modeled anew each day.
>
> My ability to think and decide and will to do, is torn apart by itself. Finally, it is thrown out where it mingles with every other part of the day and judges what it has left behind. Instead of wishing to do things, they are done by something that seems mechanical and frightening ... the feeling that should dwell within a person is outside longing to come back and yet having taken with it the power to return.
Jaynes argues pretty convincingly that the left hemisphere, which is normally in charge of interacting with the outside world, can't *refuse* orders in Bicameral Mode. The right side says *anything* and the left side does it. It can't veto orders at all. That would obviously be easy to exploit, so you need to distinguish between "this is a command" and "this is just talk". One heuristic the left side uses is to only recognizes something as an order when it comes from someone higher up in the status hierarchy. So the right side impersonates high-status figures (gods, kings, parents). (There are almost no cases of someone hallucinating low-status characters! No-one thinks they are hearing voices that belong to a random beggar. It's always gods, kings or something equivalent.)
And that's how Bicameral Consciousness works. Both hemispheres already have extensive hardware to simulate people. They need it just to keep up with local status and tribe associations. So they can re-use this hardware by creating fictitious people (often direct copies of real people at first), run them for a bit and see what results they get. They can even interact with these people (i.e. talk with hallucinations). These simulations then ultimately give a direct order and the brain executes it. Achievement unlocked: complex decision making.
(Another side note: that's the reason some people call wakefulness "constrained dreaming". It's the same kind of hallucination process, but there's constant feedback from the outside to guide it, so it looks more consistent. The relevant question is only if there exists a feedback loop between the interpreting part and the generating part. In bicameral minds, thoughts and decisions are *not* connected this way, so they feel like external entities. In modern subjective minds though, we have (some) control over our thoughts - the loop is closed - so it feels internal. This loop is much weaker in practice than most people think though, which is one reason meditation freaks people out. They notice they can't easily make thoughts *stop*.)
But this bicameral setup has one major problem: it's extremely compartmentalized. The left side literally doesn't know what the right side does and vice versa, unless they talk to each other. The cultural hack - modern subjective consciousness - improves on this situation in two ways.
First, *internalize* the simulations. They don't need locations and bodies. Just put them "in your head" somewhere and call them thoughts. (The actual location differs depending on culture, btw.)
Second, talk *constantly*. (Not always literal talk, images work too and so on. Voice-based thought is just the most common.) Meditation people call this the "monkey mind" because it's so hyperactive and out-of-control. But if you don't use it, you literally can't propagate information. You *need* to talk to yourself, in some form or another (which is why I write this novel of a reply), or you can't think.
This finally brings me to the point I wanted to make. I don't think "thoughts" or "selfs" are conscious. Phenomenal consciousness - the one that experiences something - doesn't think and isn't someone. It only *notices* thoughts and selfs. From an phenomenal point of view, there's no difference between "me" or "you" or "Barack Obama". They are all three not conscious, but narrative constructs. So I can have multiple selfs in my head without needing multiple phenomenal consciousnesses. You only need to take care who has executing privileges and who is just talking. (In my case, that's exactly how I malfunction in social contexts. Suddenly all the voices shut up and I have complete radio silence in my head. There is no self, so I can't make any decisions. I just shut up and stare. Which is embarrassing.)
So what really *is* conscious is not the part that has goals or thinks, but the part that models. (Which is why when an experienced meditator stops identifying with things and stops modeling reality, they literally become progressively more unconscious. An ideal samadhi practitioner is indistinguishable from a sleeping one. But "Nirodha Samapatti" sounds so much more sophisticated then "really noticing how I fall asleep".)
(You can completely dissociate from your decision-making process, if you want. It's not particularly difficult. (I stole the idea from Susan Blackmore.) Take a lazy afternoon and try lying down with the intention "I'm not deciding anything today". (Try not to be too tired or you'll just sleep.) Just don't decide anything. You'll lie around for a bit, then get bored. Thoughts come up like, "that's stupid", "I could watch the Daily Show", "I could eat something" and so on. Doesn't matter, not going to decide anything. Eventually - it took me about 5 minutes - you'll move. I suddenly got up and started walking somewhere. "Where the fuck am I going?", I thought. *Something* had decided an action and didn't care about telling me. I found out that I had decided to take a shower. Anyway, you will eventually slip back into *making* decisions. But you don't have to. You can remind yourself that you can just observe and somehow, decisions still happen. They might be stupid and inefficient decisions, but they're still there. No conscious awareness of them whatsoever.)
So based on this, the connection between "consciousness" and "goals" is fairly questionable, I think. At least I personally don't see an obvious way how the two belong together. This brain that is typing this has goals (or something that looks almost like goals, anyway). This brain also experiences things. These two things are independent processes. Why privilege only the goals the phenomenal part notices? With the right kind of practice, I can become conscious or unconscious of pretty much any goal I want. Does that magically change its moral status? Why? (And if so, isn't having no conscious goals ideal?)
(Why privilege only the goals in this brain? Why not fulfill any goal, anywhere, or as much as is feasible at least? What's a "goal" anyway? Has my heart rights? It certainly acts like it doesn't want to stop beating, even if I just try to replace it with a better version. If not, how does a different unconscious piece of carbon suddenly gain rights just because it's in my skull? Damn, morality is so much easier when you belief in "people" as meaningful categories...)
On a related note, I don't know how I feel about wireheading anymore. Some days, I think it's the greatest idea ever, on others it looks like an ethical nightmare. I also don't like that AIXI wireheads itself and so screws up our attempts to enslave it. Makes wireheading look like a huge bug from the outside.
Also:
> Your deep acquaintance with your subconsciousness also explains that you endorse wireheading because most usually “subconscious parts” probably find it good. Its only our conscious, ideal and altruistic self that is against it. Am I totally wrong about this? And if our multiple personalities really have conflicting values that would probably render solutions to moral problems like CEV void, right?
Conflicting values aren't necessarily a big problem in general, I think. The universe is pretty big and there's enough space to satisfy a lot of values at the same time. It would be bad if there were multiple fundamentalists who couldn't accept that anyone else might disagree with them, ever, anywhere.
That's one way I currently think about objective morality - it's an attempt to enforce values when you don't have much power. If my values are Objective(tm), then I have an easy way to force others to comply against their will. (Or at least I can tell myself that, if they only thought rationally, they would have the same values as me.) If all value is subjective and accidental, well, how can I stop someone from eating the wrong kind of ice cream, short of building a Jupiter-sized AI and taking over the universe? So if I were not so insecure, maybe I wouldn't feel so bad about morality.
*Anyway. That's the still-in-process thinking I'm currently going through. I'm not sure if I said everything I wanted, but this will have to do for now.*

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---
title: Why This World Might Be A Simulation
date: 2012-01-01
techne: :done
episteme: :fiction
slug: 2012/01/01/why-this-world-might-be-a-simulation/
disowned: true
---
> Many have undertaken to draw up an account of the things that have been fulfilled among us, just as they were handed down to us by those who from the first were eyewitnesses and servants of the word. With this in mind, since I myself have carefully investigated everything from the beginning, I too decided to write an orderly account for you, most excellent Theophilus, so that you may know the certainty of the things you have been taught. -- Luke 1:1-4
I wonder. If I wrote a kind of autobiography right now, if I tried to explain to a friend what I have learned in the last couple of years, I wonder, would it sound *believable* to a distant reader?
I mean, just *look* at some of this shit.
One huge source of influence is a dude called [Eliezer Yudkowsky][]. Eliezer is a Hebrew name meaning "help of my God". A common variant is Eleasar, "God has helped". You might know Eleaser in its Latin form - Lazarus. Who's Lazarus? The guy Jesus famously raised from the dead. What's Eliezer famously advocate? You should sign up for cryonics. A literal resurrection. Come on, the name's a pun, you can't deny it. In fact, it's deliberately not "Eleasar" because he *hasn't* died yet!
But more importantly, what's more interesting about this Eliezer than cryonics? He wrote the [Less Wrong sequences][LW sequences]. Look at the size of that thing! Over a million words! *One* author? Covering quantum physics, meta-ethics, AI, cogsci, evolution and *how to write fiction*? That's totally believable.
Next dude. Also very prolific Less Wrong poster. Called Luke. As in Ecclesiastical Redactor Luke. What's New Testament Luke's real goal? Unifying the Petrine and Pauline sects. Peter, you might remember, emphasized an Old God, the God of the Torah, and its elaborate laws. Paul, on the other hand, taught salvation by faith and a New God, God the Father. The Old God was petty and cruel, but God the Father  brought a radically new message - actual mercy. What's Less Wrong Luke's real goal? Unifying Academia and the Eliezerites. Academia insists on old rules, like peer review and degrees, and its results are mindless and dangerous. If we build the AI that Academia wants, says Eliezer, we would all die. Instead, Eliezer brings a new AI - Friendly AI - and with it a radically new message - actual utopia within our lifetimes.
(Also, Luke is said to be a companion of Paul, the first to preach the gospel of a New God who brings mercy, not judgment. Our Luke is a companion of Eliezer, the first to preach the gospel of Friendly AI, a technology that brings utopia, not existential risk. Luke, in both cases, was the first to bring Paul's message to the masses, after Paul/Eliezer's direct approaches had failed. Oh and our Luke was an Evangelical Christian before he joined Eliezer. Totally a coincidence and not a wink to the audience.)
One *might* suppose that our author simply took the New Testament stories and rewrote them in the framework of AI. Like faith in the gospel stories, the [rationality that is preached by the Sequences][LW impossible] isn't actually *demonstrated*. The gospels aren't instruction manuals or history books. They are *propaganda for new missionaries*. And similarly, Less Wrong's rationality [doesn't actually do anything][LW not great]. The Sequences are themselves propaganda - a mission charge, a doctrinal creed maybe - but clearly, they are fiction. (Some are [outright attempts][LW emergence] to [silence a heretical faction][LW group selection].)
Another topic. Buddhism. Our poor protagonist - muflax, whose real name, might I add, literally means "[crown of thorns][Crown of Thorns]" - struggles years with difficult koans and meditation practices, only to find a [New Teaching][MCTB] that brings him to the level of an anagami - a Never-Returner, one of the highest ranks as far as enlightenment goes - within a *year*. Sure you're not selling some cult propaganda? But then, almost perfecting this teaching, muflax realizes that *an even better* teaching exists - tantra. And what's the source of this tantra? A [vampire novel][Buddhism for Vampires], written by a [clearly fictitious][Chapman Fiction] author. Who was once an AI researcher. Yeah, right.
Might I add that this "muflax" is not a singular person? The text has gone through some serious editing at the least. Look at these quotes, all allegedly by the same person:
> > Just to make this maximally concrete: if you were given a magic button that, if pressed, caused the world to end five minutes after your death, would you press the button?
> [...] yes, I would be mostly indifferent about the button [...] and would press it [for money]. ([source][LW button])
And also:
> > Persons have a right not to be killed; persons who have waived or forfeited that right, and non-persons, are still entities which should not be destroyed absent adequate reason. Preferences come in with the "waived" bit, and the "adequate reason" bit, but even if nobody had any preferences (...somehow...) then it would still be wrong to kill people who retain their right not to be killed (this being the default, assuming the lack of preferences doesn't paradoxically motivate anyone to waive their rights), and still be wrong to kill waived-rights or forfeited-rights persons, or non-persons, without adequate reason. I'm prepared to summarize that as "Killing: generally wrong".
> Fascinating. This view is utterly incomprehensible to me. I mean, I understand what you are saying, but I just can't understand *how* or *why* you would believe such a thing.
>
> The idea of "rights" as things that societies enact makes sense to me, but universal rights? I'd be interested on what basis you believe this. (A link or other reference is fine, too.) ([source][LW deontology incomprehension])
Then later:
> I praise you for having the wisdom of using a long enough deadline. When I first read your comment, it felt like you were exploiting me, as if you were forcing me to share my limited praise resources. But because I had enough time, I got over myself, realized that this is not a zero-sum game, that this is not an attack on my status and that what you are doing is clever and good.
>
> Well done, I praise you for your right action. ([source][LW praise])
And:
> [I strongly suspect][LW values fulfilled] that I don't actually care that my values are fulfilled outside of my experience. I see no reason why anyone would. ([source][LW wireheading request])
But then:
> I always suspected there was something wrong with being happy. [...] I really got this playing Minecraft. In a way it's perfect. It's almost exactly what I thought heaven would be like. (Needs more machinery and no height limit, though.) But when I had built a little house, I realized that there's no point to it. I stared upon the vast landscape, knowing that it would be impossible for me to ever be *satisfied* with it.
>
> There is peace, but it's the peace of a blank screen. It is not victory. (unpublished draft)</blockquote>
This same muflax has also later written works that rely on some form of [deontology][Why I'm Not A Vegetarian], something they found "incomprehensible" just a year earlier. Doesn't it seem more likely that these later works are pseudepigraphical, and that the narrative in this "autobiography" is at best a harmonization of different traditions and possibly different persons?
Maybe it's all just a myth?
*(I've been reading a lot of [Higher Criticism][] lately. Can you tell?)*

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---
title: Culture
is_category: true
---
<%= category :culture %>

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---
title: Milinda and the Minotaur
date: 2011-04-09
techne: :rough
episteme: :fiction
---
One question plagues me, plagues me more than anything else. It undermines my
rationality, casts doubt on all that I believe. Let me tell you a little story
about it.
Milinda and the Minotaur
========================
Imagine you are standing in front of a labyrinth, composed of lush hedges,
expanding into the vast distance. You climb on a tree next to the entrance and
can see the many twists and turns, make out same dead-ends, maybe even note a
few promising paths, but the maze soons just becomes a uniform green canvas.
There are many rumors about the labyrinth, and while a few warn about a monster,
most speak of the wonderful trees that are supposed to be hidden deep inside.
O, what delicious fruit those trees have!
You want to confirm this, climb up on the tree again. If it is so great,
shouldn't you be able to see it? But try as you may, you can't see them. Maybe a
few openings, which could contain a small tree, or some glittering on the
horizon, which may come from the golden fruit, but are you confident? Of course
not.
Some of those rumors are more plausible than others, as you can see from your
watch. There isn't any space for trees right at the beginning, which you can
clearly oversee. The gargantuan tree in the middle of the garden also seems
unlikely - while you can't see the middle, surely the tree would tower over it
all, visible from everywhere? And if there really is a monster, it can't be
*too* large, as the path is quite narrow and doesn't seem to widen.
Nonetheless, you embark on an adventure to explore the labyrinth. You gather all
the maps you can find - even if they are wrong, and most must be, as they all
contradict each other, they surely can't hurt. You intend to try them out and
see how far they get you. You take heed of the warning that maybe there are no
trees, that all the maps are only based on speculation, after all, and that you
surely don't want to fall into a trap or encounter the monster. Regardless, you
enjoy the scenery and the exploration, so the journey is already it's own
reward.
You wander around for a long time and maybe even find some very interesting
spots, meet new people along the way and once, you came to a little
clearing, inside which stood a little sapling. It is not a tree, and carries no
fruits, but the sight invigorates you because it makes the rumors a bit more
plausible. Maybe, one day...?
Excited, you get out all the old maps you nearly forgot about and study them.
Does any mention the sapling? You search and search, but they are all very
confusing and incomplete and you can't quite be sure you are even reading some
of them right. Some are easy to discard, they contradict your own notes of the
maze. A few look more promising and you set out to follow them for a bit. But
alas, you find yourself inside dead-ends again, but if you read the map a bit
different, or accept that they may contain some mistakes, you still find some
help in them. But is this true? Are the maps really essentially right or do you
just want them to be true? All the little contradictions and mistakes, and the
nagging doubt whenever they *don't* mention a flower or sculpture you found. If
someone really drew the map from experience, wouldn't they have seen them, too,
and written them down?
But there is this one map. It is very old and seems fairly unremarkable. Often,
it just contains rough drafts, a few broad strokes on how the way goes. In many
places, there are also revisions and additional lines, surely added much later
by other wanderers, but a strong handwriting can be seen underneath. One night,
when you take rest and the refreshing cool air calms your mind, you read it
again, more carefully. And two things come to mind, features you hadn't noticed
before or seen much anywhere else. Far away from the entry, the map suddenly
gets more and more specific, noting seemingly random turns and hidden passages.
And maybe even more curiously, there are no trees on that map. No fruits, no
sights, nothing of interest at all, at first. But you look closer and think you
can make out a pattern, a converging of paths and then you see it - there is a
*space* at the end. You didn't see it because you always looked for drawings and
notes, but it is the absence of lines that stands out. As if there was a point
where there was no labyrinth anymore. As if it ended there.
This place captures your attention. How would you get there? There are many
turns on that map, but no complete path. Often the notes don't even seem to fit
together in any way, as if they not just contained gaps, but were impossible.
But you can make out some spot not too far from here, so you decide to go, to
see for yourself how good the map really is.
The new goal leads you along a very different way, one that you hadn't
considered before. At times, it gets very confusing and the map offers no help,
and sometimes, there are even thorns and thistles, but worst are the long
stretches of boredom, when the labyrinth gets very simple and straightforward,
but just goes on and on. You have no problem figuring out which turns will be a
dead-end well in advance, but then suddenly, there comes one of those very
specific notes on the map. The part of the maze looks like one you have seen
many times before and you are already sure where to go, but the map urges you to
take a turn right here. Your intuition and experience tell you that this will be
a dead-end, one like many others just like it you have ended up in, but for some
reason, you decide to follow the map.
To your surprise, the map is right! It really wasn't a dead-end and you can
proceed. Maybe it is useful after all? But doubt creeps in again when you notice
that the new path is very close to the old one. Sometimes you can even see it
right through the hedges. Does it make such a difference? The map gets quiet
again, but your intuition serves you well for the time being, when suddenly,
just like before, the map notes an important turn. But this time you question
its judgment even more because you can look down the way and clearly see that it
is a dead-end! The map must be wrong, you can see the wall, there's nothing to
be done here.
Disappointed, you turn around. The map is faulty like the others, after all, so
there's no use staying in those tedious parts. Particularly the undergrowth
really makes you wish to return to your old ways. But one night, during another
rest, you read the map again. Maybe there *is* another way to read it... when
you notice some of the random scribblings and your vision *shifts*, it changes
of how you *see* the map. Those other lines are not about the general turns, but
about the thistles and thorns! When you look back at your last few day, you now
see that occasionally, you came to a well-known pattern and on your way through
always encountered those painful plants, but if you had gone how the lines told
you, a bit more inefficiently and seemingly in circles sometimes, then yes, it's
true, you would have avoided most of them!
That's quite a level of detail there, something you didn't expect at all. Is it
just a fluke? The next morning, you want to find out, so you follow the map
again, back to the dead-end, but this time, you try to go more along the way the
lines seem to indicate, taking detours, but to your surprise, you really have a
better time. Rarely does the path get painful, and because you wander around so
many curves and loops, even the boredom ceases.
You return to the dead-end. You can clearly see it there. If you follow this
turn, as the map says, you won't be able to go on anymore. It is futile. Still,
the recent discovery has made you more confident, so you just take the turn
anyway. You might as well see the dead-end in all its glory. Just a few minutes
and you are there, surrounded by thick hedges, with no hope of continuing your
journey. You study the map, but there really is no other interpretation.
Saddened, you sit down to rest.
You give up on thinking yourself through this, put away the map and stop
thinking about what mistakes you might have made, about how you could have
walked or what those lines really could have meant and just close your eyes and
lie down to sleep, right where you are.
You sleep long, and even though it was just the middle of the day, you do not
awake until the next morning. The sunshine finally wake you up and when you open
your eyes, you *see it*. Right in front of you, there is a small passage, right
through the hedge. You would have never seen it from above, but the twigs give
away just slightly and form a narrow space you can probably crawl through. You
have no doubts anymore. This is what the map meant, you understand now. You make
your way through the dark underwood and arrive again on a more secure path. This
time, you listen closely to the map, try out it's playful suggestions and over
all this new-found joy, you nearly forget where you were going, until, after a
long journey, something appears you have never seen - a straight path.
No turns anymore, no curves, just a straight path, that gets brighter and
brighter, the further you go, and at the end of the path, the hedge gets thinner
and spottier, until it finally stops altogether and the ground, which so far has
always been earth and sand, becomes grass and then you see it, what you could
never have seen from the entrance, because it is not a high tree, towering over
the garden, but a wide and clear lake. The glittering, it was not from the
fruits, but it is the sunlight, reflected in the calm surface of the water.
There is no wind, no disturbance at all. You sit down at the lake, let your feet
hang into the water, but before the peace of the sight can overwhelm you, you
look onto the horizon and the lake just stretches on and on, and you start to
swim, thinking, maybe, there is another shore...
What comes before a question?
=============================
There is an important fallacy, one that plagues all religious thought. I'm gonna
call it the Unjustified Focus. What it means is that among the vast realm of
possible ideas, one needs a large amount of evidence upfront to even consider one
idea as worthy of investigation. You start with general evidence, then look for
hypotheses that might fit them. Once you have narrowed it down a bit, you can
start trying to disprove specific ideas. But you can't just pick any one idea
and start the research with it. Imagine if the justice system worked like
this - you can only start investigating a specific person *after* you have some
evidence already that they might be relevant, not just on a hunch.
This is important, but hard to really grasp because it puts the normal order of
an argument on its head. Let's look at an example. Imagine there's been a
traffic accident, a car crashed into a tree. The police starts the
investigation, when one officer suggests that it was clearly aliens. Aliens?,
you ask, why aliens? And he explains, there is no evidence that *disproves*
aliens, right? No eye witness that didn't see a UFO? And if aliens did it, they
surely would leave no obvious evidence behind, and that is exactly what we find.
And of course, if aliens did it, they would probably use a laser beam of some
sort, so we would expect the car to be still hot, and just feel the hood, it
really is hot!
The problem is hopefully clear. It's not that any of the three later claims is
false - they aren't. The hood really is hot, there are no obvious signs and we
don't have evidence *against* aliens. But that's *irrelevant* because we don't
have any reason to think of aliens in the first place! We first would have to
find evidence that clearly points towards aliens, *then* we could think about
whether it actually is true or not. Just picking an arbitrary idea with no
justification and focusing on that is invalid.
And that's the crux here. Instead of dismissing any specific evidence or
argument, we need to dismiss *the question*. You don't just need evidence to
answer something, but you already need evidence to even ask about it, too!
This has been a major revelation for me. Let me state it again because it is so
important - to even start asking questions, you already need evidence at hand.
If you don't have it, then all the further speculation is irrelevant, completely
independent of the strength of any following claim.
This blows many religious lines of thought right out of the water. It matters
not how convincing a case Christians, for example, make that God *might* have
created the universe because before all that, they need to establish that they
have evidence that we even should think about this. They get the order of proof
wrong - they start with an conclusion "God did it" and then work backwards. And
it all matters not, none of it. We would first need to have evidence that points
forward, and until we have that, we can dismiss all further claims, *unseen*.
So if someone has no good reason to start asking questions, we can ignore all
their answers, even if they might be valid or even true! That's the strength of
this fallacy.
And this dismantles not just religious thought, but so many things. Whatever the
ancient Greeks thought about atoms, we can ignore it - they had no way to
observe them, so it is all meaningless. The old enlightened philosophers,
thinking about human nature? All irrelevant - they didn't know about evolution,
without which they couldn't have possibly understood the origin of any
behaviour. If you don't get your first step right, nothing that follows it
matters anymore.
How could the Buddha have known?
================================
For a while, I thought I wielded not just Occam's razor, but Occam's meat
cleaver. The power of the Unjustified Focus was so strong, I could take apart
whole traditions in one precise strike. But then one thought came up, and with
it doubt, a little at first, then more and more, until I realized that Eris had
successfully stolen the cleaver right out of my hand and cut me in two.
"Does the Unjustified Focus really only go one way?"
The idea of it is, after all, if you haven't been through the maze, you can't
draw a map. You can ignore the map of anyone that never entered it - it can't
possibly be correct. But, that's just one direction. It also goes the other way
- if someone has an accurate map, then they must have been through the maze.
And with that thought, it all came down. I have been cheating, mentally. I had
accepted ideas without considering where they came from. I took Buddhist
teachings and practices, but never considered their origin. It is not that they
might be wrong that got to me because I *knew* that they were right. I had seen
it for myself. This didn't upset me. It's the implications that got to me.
If the map is reliable, then what about it's other features, the ones I
wrestle with? And what about the one that drew it? How could it be conceivably
possible that someone knew the details without having seen them themselves? But
he claims that there is an exit. Should I then trust him?
And with this realization, the second fetter fell.
It makes no sense. Some common insights, sure. Even anatta, even that. It may,
after all, be just a lucky guess. Philosophers have claimed nearly everything by
now, so *someone* has to be right, after all. But all the details later?
If you had a map that was right the first few times, ok, that could just be
chance or maybe you had a really good look from the entrance or collected all
the popular stories you heard, hoping they'd converge to some truth.
But if the map just keeps on being right, even when you get deeper and deeper?
Beyond a certain depth, there is only one plausible interpretation - the map is
correct. But the map claims to lead you to an exit. If it is correct, that exit
must exist. If it is correct, the one that drew it must have reached it.
The more I learn about his teachings, the more I see that they are true. His
insight seems to be without limits. From every mystic I learn, I find flaws in
their teachings. This is to be expected; no one could have understood
*everything*, certainly not on their own. They all provide valuable insights,
but also many clearly false ideas.
Only one seems immune. I run out of excuses. I fail to come up with plausible
scenarios how he, in his time, could have been so wise. I find it harder and
harder to dismiss the possibility that, really, he did achieve nirvana. That the
teachings must be true. All of them. That I can no longer dismiss the parts I am
uncomfortable with, the parts I don't *want* to be true.
It seems impossible. On what knowledge could the Buddha have built his
teachings? He didn't know neuroscience. He didn't know evolution. He predates
all of science. Yet, his teachings are *true*. How can this be?
And I think of Thích Quảng Đức. He didn't even move. Desire can be overcome.

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---
title: SCP-325
date: 2012-12-14
techne: :wip
episteme: :fiction
---
**Item #**: SCP-325
**Object Class**: Keter
**Special Containment Procedures**: SCP-325 must be compartmentalized at all costs.
SCP-325 is highly polymorphous. All subjects showing a disregard of the law, periods of hope and support for institutional reform are to be assumed to be infected. Texts written by those suspected of infection should not be read outside official procedures. Only personnel assigned to the containment of SCP-325 and under explicit permission of the Chief of Staff are to investigate SCP-325 or its influence. If forced to engage in an argument about SCP-325, strict adherence to the expository material supplied to all personnel is required. Artifacts associated with SCP-325 must not be destroyed.
Procedures <%= redacted "interdict" %> and <%= redacted "excommunication" %> are currently suspended due to the weakened state of containment. Cooperation with independent researchers involved in the subversion of SCP-325's academic influence is advised, but following the failure of <%= redacted "Vatican" %>-II, no concessions in the implementation of any containment procedure are to be made.
**Description**: SCP-325 is a memetic virus that causes grave institutional damage and loss of human value. Subjects infected by SCP-325 suffer from delusions, emotional instability and disordered thought. They
These catastrophic events and only stop when it becomes.
As an effect of earlier containment procedures, SCP-325 is typically depicted as an adult white male. Such depictions are to be encouraged. Subjects infected after the catastrophic containment failure in the 16th century often lack the pictorial substitution and exhibit more dangerous symptoms.
Even though the infection is presently considered incurable, subjects with severe cases frequently describe unpleasant states of remission.
**History**:
Specialists experienced with the successful containment of SCP-<%= "072" %> were hired.
There have been two major attempts to eradicate SCP-325:
- _E-1_: The first by <%= redacted "Nero" %> in , . Subjects infected with SCP-325 henceforth wrote a prophetic text. Subjects claim to have received the text directly from agents of SCP-325 prior to the event, but due to institutional damage of SCP-325-E-1, all documents that could establish this claim have been lost.
- _E-2_: A second widespread attempt to destroy SCP-325 began in the 18th century. Supporters of the event associated the containment institutions with SCP-325 itself. They sought to replace them entirely with new institutions grounded in universal values, unaware of the fact that SCP-325 had seeded these values. An estimated 10 million people died as a direct result of the influential implementations of 1776, 1789 and 1917, with an additional estimated <%= redacted "200" %> million people in related conflicts.
Attempt _E-2_ continues to be of major influence. Without the explicit marking of the earlier containment, SCP-325 continues to subvert defense mechanisms of its weakened hosts without them becoming aware of the infection. Dr. M speculates that many academic institutions, including X and Y, have been completely compromised by SCP-325.
In addition to these events, the following procedures have been used to reduce the influence of SCP-325:
- Subjects particularly prone to the infection are routinely assigned celibacy in order to reduce the genetic fitness of vulnerable traits. Incidence levels of [REDACTED] have been successfully reduced, but so isolated subjects have been observed to devote greater time to (theology).

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---
title: Superstimulus Appreciation Post
date: 2012-05-31
techne: :wip
episteme: :believed
---
> Oh diese Griechen! Sie verstanden sich darauf, zu leben: dazu thut Noth, tapfer bei der Oberfläche, der Falte, der Haut stehen zu bleiben, den Schein anzubeten, an Formen, an Töne, an Worte, an den ganzen Olymp des Scheins zu glauben! Diese Griechen waren oberflächlich - aus Tiefe![^trans]
>
> -- Friedrich Nietzsche, Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft
[^trans]:
Translation:
> Oh, those Greeks! They knew how to live. What is required for that is to stop courageously at the surface, the fold, the skin, to adore appearance, to believe in forms, tones, words, in the whole Olympus of appearance. Those Greeks were superficial - out of profundity!

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---
title: Dark Stance Thinking, Demonstrated
date: 2012-01-30
techne: :done
episteme: :believed
slug: 2012/01/30/dark-stance-thinking-demonstrated/
merged: muflax:morality/stances
---
As I [once noted][Dark Stance]:
> In the Dark Stance, you *don't* embrace hatred because it makes you do good things, or gives you a rush, or so you can see through it and overcome it, nor do you *endure* it. That still assumes that hatred is only instrumental or an unfortunate necessity. Dark Stance embraces hatred *for hatred's sake*. Also, the Dark Stance is not an Evil Trope. The Good and the Bad Guys both don't want to suffer, they merely use different ways to overcome their own suffering. Evil might be willing to cause suffering for others, but it will never cause it's *own* suffering. The only fictional example of someone taking the Dark Stance I can think of are Planescape's Sensates.
>
> And the weird thing is, for the few days now that I've been learning this, for the few hours I've been able to hold the Dark Stance, I felt *satisfied*.
After running through a dark forest at 0°C, high (who the fuck runs sober?!), I noticed something. (Besides that I really need a better lamp than my MP3 player's display next time.)
There already is a precedence for Dark Stance thinking. And it has a catchy tune. Listen (starts a minute in):
<%= youtube("http://www.youtube.com/v/YvUbbYX9BMs") %>
In particular, look at these lyrics:
> Now take Sir Francis Drake, the Spanish all despise him,
> But to the British he's a hero and they idolize him.
> It's how you look at buccaneers that makes them bad or good
> And I see us as members of a noble brotherhood.
>
> [...]
>
> On occasion there may be someone you have to execute,
> But when you're a professional pirate
> You don't have to wear a suit. (What?)
>
> I could have been a surgeon,
> I like taking things apart.
>
> I could have been a lawyer,
> But I just had too much heart.
That's exactly what it's about. Embrace the monster that you are. If you are a pirate, be the *best* pirate you can be. Whatever you do, do it *right*.
This is the real problem, hidden by hypocrisy and moral progress thinking. The faulty idea is that we are good because we do good things. This way corrupts Honor, corrupts what Ye Olde Existentialists called authenticity. We are good because we are *pure*, unified in what we do. We embrace what we are and do it the *right* way, regardless what it is. A pirate is not evil for being a pirate, as long as they are a *professional* pirate.
*(On the off-chance that I become a religious saint some centuries down the road, I want to force the Muppets into the canon of whatever religion takes me up. This will be my true heritage.)*

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---
title: Dark Stance Exploration
is_category: true
---
<%= category :"dark-stance" %>

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---
title: How My Brain Broke
date: 2012-01-03
techne: :done
episteme: :emotional
slug: 2012/01/03/how-my-brain-broke/
disowned: true
---
# New Year Resolution: Even More Narcissism
Alright, alright. Yes, I deleted a whole bunch of stuff of me talking about myself, but hey, why not start again? This time I really feel like I'm really gonna say something original. Srsly, for real.
There are two things I wanna talk about.
1. I've actually been asked to talk about my 8 year old Ayahuasca experience *twice* so far, so let's finally do it. I'm basing this off my old trip notes, but my memory has slightly faded. (I'm actually kinda interested to revisit Ayahuasca some time, but I never got a good setting going and I don't feel like doing it again without a sitter. So not happening anytime soon.)
2. A few weeks ago, I asked for anonymous feedback about myself on LW. To my surprise, I actually got 3 replies so far. To my even greater surprise, people don't seem to think I'm a boring piece of broken hardware. Seems to me people are really, really wrong. (Just kidding. Thanks for the awesome and useful feedback, whoever you are!) Anyway, there's one problem. It's anonymous. So I can't *reply* to it, and I don't wanna publicly quote it to respect the privacy, but I really feel like I wanna *address* some things. So I'll do it now, talking about things *generally*. Give some background and motivation *why* some quirks in my personality exist. And why I blame God for that and not my own inability to maintain even the simplest of friendships. My problems be metaphysical, bitches.
# Ayahuasca
Some basic background. [Ayahuasca][] is a pretty strong hallucinogen. I prefer(ed) the term [entheogen][Entheogen] because Ayahuasca was the only drug I ever took that I felt had an independent personality. You aren't taking Ayahuasca - you are meeting Ayahuasca and it will do whatever the fuck it wants with you. Which is also why I like the translation "vine with a soul", even though it's probably bogus.
Ayahuasca is a bit tricky to prepare. You're basically interested in DMT, but your can't ingest it orally 'cause your stomach destroys it. You need a MAO inhibitor to stop it from doing so. So you are really taking two drugs. There are clever ways to get both MAO-I and DMT without many side-effects. But if you're a 17-year-old teenager with no previous drug experience, then you don't care and do things the stupid way. (You read that right. Ayahuasca was my first drug, even before alcohol. Never did things half-assedly.)
So I boiled a simple, way-too-acidic preparation in my parents kitchen without them noticing, took my MAO-I, waited half an hour, filled my Ayahuasca in a pot and took it too my room, ready to drink it all. I put on [múm][], sat on my bed and started drinking half a liter of psychedelics.
Ayahuasca looks like purple wine with some liquid metal on top. Not too healthy, but you can always close your eyes. It smells kind of like the jungle, like some fresh dirt. Not too unpleasant, actually, if you never took it and don't associate the smell with anything yet. But there's one thing you never forget.
The fucking taste.
Ayahuasca is the vilest thing in all of existence. It doesn't just taste bad. It tastes like it actively tries to strangle you from the inside. My tongue was dissolving. That brew wasn't *passive*. It fought against being digested with all its force. It's like eating washing powder that thought it was God.
I made three notes that night. The first is a stupid quote from Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas. The second just reads "\*puke\*".
I pretty much vomited it all out within a few minutes. I tried to drink a bit more, but no chance. Half an hour later, I was still vomiting. One of Ayahuasca's nicknames is "la purga". You have no idea how much you can vomit on an empty stomach if you really set your mind to it.
There are ways to prepare Ayahuasca that are actually much more pleasant. No bad taste. Little vomiting, if any. Much less volume.
Not that it would've helped me. The physical vomiting isn't so bad. It's really unpleasant, but it's soon over and you feel kinda good afterwards. For a about 20 minutes, I was just lying around and waving my arms around. They left a funny trail in the air and because I had no drug experiences, I thought that was kinda it.
Then Ayahuasca reminded me that I had paid for the whole night and that it had no intention of holding anything back. Suddenly there were colors everywhere, everything became blurry and space itself accelerated. Waves were drifting through my room, but I could barely pay any attention because the swirl of colors got faster and faster. It kinda looked like this:
<%= image("spaceballs.jpg", "spaceballs") %>
I realized I couldn't keep up, couldn't look anywhere without starting to vomit again. My thoughts were blending with the wallpaper and the room transformed into various scenes, the music itself was throwing waves, tracks merged, everything became way too intense for me. I closed my eyes and surrendered, because I was going straight to hell.
Just me and my mind. Doable. It was even faster, the visions even more intense, but more focused less complicated. Just intricate geometric patterns and a long, long tunnel I fell through.
<%= youtube("http://www.youtube.com/v/gagR2_Yi8wE") %>
(That is only accurate depiction of Ayahuasca ever, btw. The director is a big fan and you can see it.)
I fought with the descending tunnel inside and the hellish scene outside for about half an hour until I finally got shit a little bit under control. At least it wasn't getting any worse and I had stopped puking out my soul. I even managed to recognize what track was playing and so how much time must have passed. (I couldn't move at all, so I couldn't look at my watch.)
Then I got an idea. I *understood* what the tunnel *was*. I closed my eyes and paid close attention. That's not just some abstract imagery, not just chaos. That's *raw thought*. That's the input channel before it has gone through any filter. It's what goes on in my head *before* it has been digested. That's the crap my subconscious has to deal with all the time. Everything was being digested, even the self, and I had only one thought to cling to.
*Make it stop*.
I would've made an emergency call if I could've ever reached the phone. But I could just lie and wait. I was being digested, violently, and I had to watch. Panic becomes meaningless after a while if you panic so hard that you can't even move. You just realize that you're not going to *do* anything, aren't going to run anywhere, so you stop trying to run. You just play dead. Lie down, watch, don't move, count the number of repetitions the music has gone through so you don't lose track of time. After a while the panic leaves, peacefully. I just slowly faded into death.
After about 3 hours, I fell asleep.
I awoke a few hours later and the Ayahuasca was still present. Most of it was gone, but the room was still blurry and had way too many colors. It was peaceful. I closed my eyes again and tried to think. I noticed something weird: I was not alone. There wasn't a singular voice. Not one "me" that was thinking. There were three "me"s in this head. I had split up.
# Separation
That's when We were born. We, the collective inhabiting the body that calls itself muflax right now. We have gone through many members. Some good friends, some crazy ones, some obsessed, some sad, some just normal. In this moment of our birth, We immediately agreed about one thing. We would not fight. There would never be any hate, never any deception. We were all in this together and there was only one way to survive. We had to love each other. That's the third note.
Later, after the trip had ended, and We had looked into a mirror and found ourselves grinning like crazy, even happy, after we had cleaned up the mess and ate something and had a few days to understand everything, after all that, we really started the process of separation.
Each self became its own personality. We started referring to ourselves as "we", not "I". (I decided not to do so publicly for obvious reasons.) We gave every personality their own name. Some new ones joined us over the years, others left. Some merged. A few died.
What's it like to be split? Well, try to think back into your past. 5, 10, 15 years ago. Different "you"s. Imagine all of them present in your head at the same time. All with their own voice, all in control, if they want to. Kinda like that. Like role-playing, but being unable to stop assuming a role.
Oddly enough, we never really had any trouble making arrangements or pursuing goals. We always got along. We refused to hate each other, after all. Most of the time there was one master self. A center that interacted with the world, and a lot of thinking selfs surrounding it.
I spent a lot of time talking to myself. Years, really. I developed severe trust issues.  How can you trust someone that can't literally read your mind? We could read each other, we never had to explain ourselves to each other, so trust was possible. Other minds? So much harder to work with. Made it impossible to keep friends, even more so to keep a lover. We gave up and concentrated on ourselves.
I channeled my new-found energy into writing. Lots and lots of writing. Really bad writing, of course, lots of poetry and art, some fanfiction.
We started to fade a few years later. I experimented with shrooms, but every trip I got the strong sense of not-being-wanted. The Collective told me to sort myself out before ever returning. I slipped into depression and boredom, and in a desperate search for meaning, started a degree in religious studies. (Yes, really.) It was so mind-boggingly boring and anti-scientific that I quit a year later. (I spent classes proving math theorems from scratch just so I didn't have to listen to Kierkegaard anymore.)
It got worse. I lost God. Oh, I didn't tell you about God yet. Let's go back a little.
# God
When We emerged, We felt that a kind of direct Insight was possible. Gnosis, if you want. Really *knowing* something *deep*. The italics are important. It's nonsense alright, but it doesn't *feel* like nonsense. It feels like... actual emotion? Everything else is fake, but some things are *real*. This is real:
&gt; For God so loved the world, that He gave His only begotten Son, that whoever believes in Him shall not perish, but have eternal life.
I read the Bible. Parts of it, anyway. I started talking to God. (He never answered. He didn't need to. I felt his presence, his love. That's enough for me.) Life felt meaningful. Not fake. Things happened for a reason. I wasn't lost anymore.
God was a mystery, but mystery was good. It was something to retreat into, something that you could probe and that didn't go away. It *stayed* mysterious. It was unchanging. It was ever-lasting. It was full of love.
<%= youtube("http://www.youtube.com/v/yzqTFNfeDnE") %>
There actually isn't much to say about God. I didn't have much of a belief system. God has no personality. It's really just an extremely powerful emotion. A sense of true peace and belonging. Something only an eternal divine being could grant.
Until I started asking questions. I started noticing that I actually controlled this God. It wasn't an external presence, but one in the Collective. He was one of Us. This disappointed me to no end.
The Bible fell apart. Faith was meaningless. There was no insight to be gained. Enlightenment was a sham. The universe is an empty bunch of atoms, we are all going to die and I can never trust anyone again. Life's pretty much been shit ever since.
That's my God-shaped hole. I can't believe lies. I can't pretend to fill it. Doesn't work. I've prayed the same prayers, just as roleplay. It doesn't work. God is gone, forever. We have pretty much collapsed into two remaining personalities that have almost completely merged into muflax by now, and I have nothing to show for it.
I have tons of abandoned projects. I can read some Latin, some Japanese. I read a lot of books, but I'm not qualified in any field. All art has gone. I have nothing to say. I am worthless.
That's where I'm at right now. I am not worthless compared to pre-Ayahuasca-me, of course. People who only see me from the outside might even like me. But I don't have God. I have no emotions anymore, only bland apathy, compared to God's mysteries.
I've tried do replace God, but nothing works. Nothing finite ever could. If there is no Eternal Judge, then what grounds morality? Nothing. What protects us from being wiped out? Nothing. What ensures we don't screw up our lives? Nothing, of course.
When I was with God, I was immortal. Protected. *Safe*. What am I now? If I fuck something up, I probably won't get a second chance. What kind of a life is that?
What's joy compared to Eternal Bliss? What's human love compared to the Father? You're lucky if you can hold on to a lover for a decade. God lasts forever. God never doubts. What insight is there in art? The best you can hope for is getting laid. What could science ever do for me? The more I studied, the less faith I had. The more I saw religion as pure fiction, as political manipulation, saw each redactor changing the sayings of the saints to fit whatever doctrine they needed. Jesus is a highly-optimized human-engineered predator meme.
I hope that communicates the bleak darkness that not-having-God-anymore left in me. I have no idea how to deal with it. All my psychological oddities derive from it. That's why I'm so pessimistic. When God left me, he took the circuitry for joy with him. He broke my brain.

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---
title: Drugs
is_category: true
---
<%= category :drugs %>

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---
title: 3 Months of Beeminder
date: 2012-02-03
techne: :done
episteme: :log
slug: 2012/02/03/3-months-of-beeminder/
---
It's been 3 months now, time to do a recap.
## Setup
I have a separate bank account that I use mostly for book purchases and online services that require credit cards, like my S3 backups. As such, there isn't much money in it, about 50 eurons right now. The idea is that every once in a while when I have some money left over, I put it in there and then freely use it to buy <del>the rare book library.nu doesn't have</del> cool books. Beeminder drains this account. That means it's separate from anything important, but it also hurts me the most. I like this setup.
## Anki
I've been using Anki for something like 4 years now. (I started [RTK][] in the fall of 2007 and switched to Anki soon after, but definitely by spring 2008.) So I was quite surprised that I could still get substantial performance improvements. In my 3 months, I had two Beeminder resets, one just 2 days ago due to me totally getting distracted. Despite this, I have *vastly* better Anki performance than ever. Just look at it:
<%= image("selection-2012-02-01153724.png", "Anki graph") %>
The big spike about 100 days ago is the first time I used Beeminder. I added a large chunk of Japanese sentences (~8000 cards), so it's a bit unusual, but I've done stuff like that before. What is impressive, though, is the weeks afterwards. It's more consistent *and* has more volume than the rest of the year. I've also made some content changes thanks to that. Now that I *have* to do enough daily reps, I tend to add more easy cards and space out harder cards more. Overall, this is very good.
## Daily Work
The main reason I started using Beeminder was to work more consistently. I have my own GTD system (which I will write about the moment I've got one last bug ironed out) and track my daily use of productive time. I tried commitment contracts on my own, but I always end up cheating. So maybe if someone else had my money, it would work better...
Here's the graph for total logged time / day for 300 days back. Some work is missing 'cause when I have breakdowns, I also tend to stop logging. Beeminder starts at 210:
<%= image("fume.png", "fume graph") %>
Overall, Beeminder has *improved* the situation, but not completely fixed it. It's more consistent and has many more ~4h days, but I'm still hoping for more ~8h days.
One major problem: I avoid certain tasks. Case in point: this post. I *should* be making slides for my Occam presentation. I should have finished them *last* week. Yeah.
I have also had to reset this graph once, almost twice. The first time was psychologically interesting because I gave up almost *half a day* before the deadline. I could've easily prevented the loss of 5 bucks, but I didn't. I just went "fuck it, I'm not doing this, deal with it tomorrow, I'm getting drunk today". I almost did this a second time, but avoided it. I'm not sure if the amount of money was simply too low the first time, but honestly, the moment I gave up, *no* amount of punishment would've changed my mind. I'll reflect on this in the next post.
## The Future
I've recently joined [Fitocracy][Beeminder fitocracy]. Basically, it gives you points for exercise. I force a minimum of points [through Beeminder][Beeminder fitocracy]. I'm still experimenting with the parameters and how to grind most efficiently, but it's already getting me to move more, so I'm quite optimistic about it. Two things about the approach seem better than my previous regiments:
1. It's event-based, not time-based. I don't have to remember what day of the week I was supposed to do what. (I barely know what day it is anyway.) I just check how many points I'm lacking and do [something easy][xkcd fitocracy]. Less thinking required.
2. It has numbers that go up. I like numbers that go up.
I've gotten stuck with a huge reading list again. Back in 2010, I did a [100 books/year challenge][LibraryThing challenge], which got me to read ~70 books and much of LessWrong. I'm doing it again, but at 50 books/year this time because the stuff I'm reading is harder, but I need to finish these [200+ books][Beeminder] before the Singularity hits.
**tl;dr**: Beeminder is *awesome*.

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---
title: Fixing Concentration
date: 2010-07-13
techne: :rough
episteme: :discredited
toc: true
---
I had serious problems concentrating. Typically, I rapidly lost focus or just
felt blah and unmotivated the whole day, often with a (minor to medium)
depression thrown in for good measure. Here's what I tried and how I finally
fixed it.
Diet and Drugs
==============
Caffeine
--------
<%= image("coffee_cat.jpg", "totally safe") %>
Caffeine drastically improves my concentration. It gives me an indiscriminate,
but very narrow focus. I can work for hours on basically anything, but find it
hard to change topics or decide what to do in the first place. But if I made
those decisions early on and arranged it so that I could work all day without
disturbances, then caffeine works really well. However, I noticed that this
concentration isn't "real" concentration, but rather a synthetic kind. It
*feels* similar, but instead of increasing my capacity it simply makes me ignore
my tiredness. So I sit for hours, thinking I'm doing useful work, when I really
only burn myself out and get really sloppy.
And there are more problems with caffeine. Most importantly, it reduces
serotonin and builds up a resistance. Because of the resistance, you either soon
get diminishing returns while still dealing with all of the downsides, or you
keep on increasing the dosage till you crash. I typically went the crash route.
Reduced serotonin levels lead to an unstable mood, depression, crankiness and
twitching muscles. All very sucky.
Furthermore, caffeine screws up my sleep. It improves some part of it, but makes
it less regenerative and harder to fall asleep. However, a sudden large dose has
the opposite effect. I fall asleep easily and dream very vividly, totally
cocaine-fueled. While I won't *feel* sleep-deprived, I will still *be* it.
Because of this, I'd strongly advice against caffeine.
Animal Fat
----------
Despite what virtually all common wisdom is going to tell you, animal fat is
probably the most important thing for you to eat. (The second-most important are
bacteria[^bacteria]). As I'm a bit lazy, I'll do no convincing here and leave
this to the [Paleo][] crowd. (Ignore the libertarians. Just try it yourself for a
week and be amazed.) If you are an vegetarian, then you really shouldn't be one.
But the very least don't be a vegan, k? Because then you are royally screwed
with regards to food.
[^bacteria]: I'm just gonna send you over to [Seth Roberts][Seth Bacteria] on
this. I completely agree with him on everything about nutrition, having
tested it all myself. Seriously, grab yourself some strong jogurt (not the
sweet stuff, but the good, sour one), kefir or miso and eat it. Every day.
You can thank me later when most of the problems you just lived with are
gone.
Eating about 50-100g of butter refuels my energy almost completely in less than
20 minutes and greatly increases concentration. I perform better on all
intelligence and memory tests I used and find learning (especially with Anki)
to be easier and more enjoyable. I'm now reworking my diet to get in as much
as I can. I eat plenty of quark, butter (even raw) and as fatty a dinner as I
can get away with.
Butter is my clear favorite. Very high-fat (>50%) cream, cheese or quark work as
well, but I don't like their taste too much. I do eat a lot of quark with about
15-20% fat content, though, and the occasional psychedelic cheese[^cheese].
When choosing butter, be sure to pick one from grass-fed cows. It contains high
levels of Omega-3, which also greatly increases all kinds of mental functions
and general health. A good and wide-spread brand is Kerrygold, although there
are often local alternatives as well.
[^cheese]: I'm not kidding here. I have no idea what exactly is causing it, but
*something* in certain cheeses is clearly psychedelic. I get a trippy mood,
incredibly wild dreams and even some mild hallucinations. I suspect the
tryptophan, but it doesn't really fit the dosage and only seems to happen
with cheese. Anyway, I recommend Danish Havarti.
The other component is protein. I'm not yet sure about a good base level, but I
found that eating a lot more meat and eggs also helps. Not as noticeable as with
fat (that is, the effect doesn't kick in right away), but it's certainly there.
Just as with animal fat, this doesn't apply to any plant source. Soy or flour
don't count as a good protein source because of all their other negative
effects. I know how much living without grains sucks, being a big fan of pizza
and tofu, but having collected data for months now, I can quite clearly say
that, at least for me, grains are never worth it. They screw up your digestion,
your mental performance and sap away your energy. That feeling of being totally
sated and need for a nap after dinner? That's the grains. It's not normal.
Eating dinner should have you *more* active than before, not *less*.
Protein
-------
TODO
Sugar
-----
TODO
St. John's Wort
----------------
St. John's Wort has gotten quite a bit of attention recently for being as least
as effective as all other depression medicine while generally having far less
side-effects.
So far, it has been very successful in both preventing my typical seasonal
depression beginning around November and in aborting an ongoing depression. I
also took it during my most recent caffeine withdrawal and I think it greatly
improved it, but I'm quite unwilling of doing another as a control.
I'm unsure if there is any positive effect beyond preventing the depression. I
had no noticeable side effects despite taking 900mg of it for months. As a test,
I stopped a week after my caffeine withdrawal was over, as my serotonin levels
were stable anyway and I suspected that St. John's Wort slightly decreases
motivation, at least when it is unnecessary.
Unfortunately, I had about a week of withdrawal, which mostly resulted in mild
mania, severe tiredness and low motivation. Still more pleasant than caffeine
withdrawal and certainly better (and shorter) than depression, which could last
for months. I would still advocate slowly reducing the dose instead to avoid
withdrawal.
After that, my motivation didn't really recover. My mood was stable and my sleep
returned to more normal levels, but I was still wasting a lot of time, as is
typical for depression. So I went back to my daily dose and am quite happy with
the result. I'm still trying to find the perfect dosage that is *just* beneath
the overdose when my muscles start twitching and I get nervous. About 600mg work
seems to work, though. I may try getting off again next spring, nonetheless,
after everything has stabilized more.
I suspect that 5-HTP works very well, too, although I never got to test it. I
failed to try it a few years back when it was still unregulated in Germany,
although I actually wanted to. It has a very good track record and I would
recommend trying it if St. John's Wort doesn't work for you. I might... obtain
it at some point, but so far, I am happy with St. John's Wort and see no
advantage in switching.
I have a relatively low opinion of most mainstream medication for depression,
though especially SSRIs may be worth a try. Personally, I also had good
short-term success with MAO inhibitors, but wouldn't recommend them because they
are so incompatible with many other drugs or important food. It's just too hard
to eat right and too easy to kill yourself on MAO inhibitors. Also, raised
serotonin levels and drugs don't mix at all, especially MDMA or DXM.
[Serotonin syndrome] isn't nice. It's a bit of a pity, though, but I can live
with that.
Tyrosine
--------
<%= image("lolcats.jpg", "lolcatecholamines") %>
Now comes the magic bullet. Seriously, Tyrosine is among my favorite chemicals
because it fixes a problem without creating new ones. That's quite rare.
Tyrosine is basically a building block for many important neurotransmitters,
most importantly the catecholamines (CATs) which are necessary for
concentration and proper motivation. If you can't get yourself to do something
you actually want to do (and enjoy), then you have a big CAT deficiency.
Caffeine is by far the most common "cure", but with all its side-effects, it
doesn't really fix the problem.
Tyrosine, for me, does. On the first day, I took 900mg in the morning and all
desire for caffeine was gone. I took another 900mg after dinner and kicked
caffeine immediately. Without any side-effects or withdrawal symptoms. *None*.
If you have ever done a caffeine withdrawal after heavy use, that might already
be the selling point right there.
I now use 900mg every morning and occasionally 900mg after a nap if I have a
lazy day. I haven't yet experimented with higher doses (up to 4g) because I
don't wanna jinx it. Taking the powder orally (keeping it in your mouth a bit)
has a faster onset (and slight high), but taking capsules seems to have more or
less the same effect. I'm still experimenting with this, though.
I'm now completely caffeine free and have better long-term memory and a far more
usable level of concentration. Full-on caffeine mode is slightly stronger, but
so manic that it is utterly useless. Mental tunnel-vision is not a good thing,
you know.
With tyrosine, however, my concentration is as it should be. I don't have to
trick myself into starting anything, but can just work right away. I only get
exhausted when I actually did something (and can refuel with sleep and butter)
and not at random times.
As a last piece of evidence, I'm just going to mention three numbers. They are
the number of daily SRS repetitions I could do per day before my brain would
shut down. A year ago, using almost no caffeine and no tyrosine, I managed about
80 reps, max. A few months ago, using caffeine, I got up to 150, maybe 200, but
that's a good day. 100 would be normal. The last two weeks, I did over 500 each
day without breaking a sweat. I got up to 800 after 3 hours of continuous work
and that's still not the maximum level. I just normally stop after an hour or so
because it gets too time-consuming or boring otherwise.
Tyrosine is, however, useless when your serotonin levels are bad. You can be as
concentrated as you want, if you are apathetic, nothing will get done. That's
why I consider St. John's Wort more important, but tyrosine is more noticeable
right away and ultimately the effect I was hoping for.
(Outdated, effect doesn't hold up long-term.)
Nicotine
--------
TODO
Magnesium
---------
I took about 150mg of magnesium for several months for my sore knee. While it
improved the pain, I noticed a minor drop in motivation while using it. I'm not
exactly sure why and I couldn't find many reports, but a friend who used a
similar dose of magnesium at the same time noticed the same thing. This seems to
happen most commonly with magnesium citrate.
Exercise
========
For simplicity's sake, there are two kinds of exercise: resistance training
(short, high strength, causes muscle growth) and long-term endurance training.
The first one is good for you, the second one neutral at best, harmful at worst.
I found endurance training to be utterly useless for concentration. As a
reference, I have a caved-in chest (about medium) and can't swim. For most of my
life, I had very poor fitness levels. During the summers of 2009 and 2010, I
spend 3 months each on jogging. I went from not being able to run for 10 seconds
to running for over 20 minutes without pause and overall jogging sessions of
about an hour every two days. This did not affect my mental capacities in any
way I could notice. It was enjoyable, but that's about it.
Resistance training, however, is completely awesome. January 2011 I started a
serious strength program, including weight gain (from 75kg to 85kg at 185cm of
height) and everything[^strength]. Besides obviously improving my fitness and
confidence, it also increased my energy levels and sleep. Highly recommended.
[^strength]: Specifically, I follow [Convict Conditioning][] and ensure at least
150g of protein a day, mostly in the form of whole milk, meat and [quark][].
I exercise twice per week (as prescribed) and level up about one step per
month for each exercise.
Meditation
==========
Meditation works great, but has a serious disadvantage - it has a circular
dependency on its own effect. In other words, when you practice meditation
daily, it will greatly improve your discipline and concentration (among other
things, like bringing you enlightenment), but to meditate successfully, you need
discipline and concentration. You see how that's a problem?
The typical solution to that problem has been either trying for years until you
finally manage to bootstrap the process or going on retreats or entering a
monastry, for a week to a whole year, where you are forced to meditate and have
no alternative or escape route. It works, sure, but it's both kinda cruel and
very inconvenient.
Because of that, meditation is more of a middle- to end-game strategy. I highly
recommend it, but you need a certain level of skill and concentration already to
really use it. If you can't get out of bed, then meditation ain't gonna work,
either. For introductions to meditation, I recommend going on a 10 day
[Vipassana][] retreat and [Shinzen Young's][Shinzen Young] videos.
Sunlight
========
TODO

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---
title: Dude, Where's My Time?!
date: 2011-02-03
techne: :done
episteme: :log
---
A few days ago, I got up at 6:00 and went to bed around 22:00. During the day, I felt I worked rather well. Maybe not optimally so, but still pretty well. When I was about to fall asleep, I thought about what I had accomplished and couldn't help but feel disappointed. I could remember about 2 hours of work or so. But I was awake for over 18 hours! Where did all my time go?
Months ago, I kept logs about my activities (via [ashuku][]) and noticed that I would massively over-estimate how productive I really was. I would think I studied all day for an upcoming exam, but logged about 3 hours, max.
The highest I ever got was almost 11 hours of productivity. Right after I got up, I would take a little notebook and write down my exact activity I would try to do for the next 20 minutes, say learn some vocabulary or read a book. I would set an alarm and do only this activity. When the time was up, I would go back to the notebook and repeat this process. After about 4 hours, I would take a nap. But note that I did this while I was still polyphasic! I was awake 20 hours a day! I got barely more than 50% productivity!
# So where *does* all my fucking time go?!
Yesterday, I set up a webcam and did a complete [profile][Profiling]. Almost 18 hours of video, plus screenshots every 5 minutes. I tried to work typically and not let the recording affect me much. I was slightly tired and maybe below-average productive. Regardless, at the end of the day I thought I had gotten useful stuff done and there wasn't much I could've done better. Maybe 1-2 hours more work if I wasn't tired, and I played a few hours of Civ4 at the end, but that itself wouldn't have been such a huge problem, right? I mean, 3 out of 18 hours spent on games is totally fine.
Today, I opened a spreadsheet, watched the video and wrote down all activities plus time spent on them. *All* of them, including toilet visits. Here are all the interesting observations:
- Out of 18 hours, **34 minutes** where spent on stuff on my (comprehensive) todo, mostly Anki reps and reading a biology textbook. Not even one hour!
- **45 minutes** went into selecting which out of 3 biology textbooks I would use for studying. I spent more time deciding what to read than actually reading!
- **1.8 hours** went into reading [LessWrong][]. This didn't feel particularly much, so I expect that I typically spent more than 2 hours or so a day on that site. I can't say I don't learn a lot, but is this really efficient? I could read at least 3 books a week just in the time I'm on LessWrong! Very questionable priorities.
- **1.3 hours** I was on Reddit, plus **1.4 hours** on various blogs and comics in my RSS reader. And I thought that's "just some news and a lolcat"!
- **1.6 hours** I fiddled with my [XMonad][] config. I encountered [a little bug][Xmonad Bug], tried (and failed) to read the documentation, asked for help and got it fixed. I thought that took maybe 15 minutes. And I thought "To get an accurate time estimate for a software project, take the best guess you can, double the number and step up one unit. So if you guess '1 hour', it'll really take 2 days." was a joke!
- **1.2 hours** I spent only on eating and pooping. Srsly!
- Finally, that "3 hours of Civ4"? Really **5.8 hours**.
# Conclusions
I totally suck at estimating time. My priorities are fucked up. I waste much more time on things than I ever thought, even when I try to pay attention. I have almost no fucking clue what I'm doing, focus only on trivial details, rationalize when I really should be experimenting. If I were my own employee, I would be fired.
Admitting that you have a problem is the first step. Now the important part: don't stop there. *Fix* the problem.
Knowing how incompetent I am gives me strong motivation to try new techniques. Before, I thought that explicit schedules were a waste of time. Now I see how poorly I perform without them. I have several ideas how to proceed. I will experiment and set up the webcam again in a few days. Let's see if I can't get my time back!

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---
title: Ways to Improve Your Sleep
date: 2010-05-27
techne: :done
episteme: :discredited
---
Some stuff that I found that actually works.
f.lux
=====
[f.lux][] controls the level of blue your monitor shows and tones it down during
the night to allow you to get tired naturally (and not stay up all night,
playing ケロロRPG like _some_ people). There's quite a bit of research to
back it up and I achieved some really good results with it.
(While [f.lux] has a Linux version, it's just an ugly binary. Use [Redshift][]
instead. All good distros have it in their repository (i.e., Gentoo).)
Easy Exercise
=============
> When you stress a leg muscle a lot, presumably one or more chemicals are
> released that both (a) cause the muscle to grow (the well-known effect of
> exercise) and (b) cause you to sleep more deeply at night (the effect that
> interests me). In contrast to [normal exercise], theres no need for the
> concept of fitness here because you dont slowly go up and down in a measure
> of effectiveness (i.e., become more or less fit). Rather each day you are high
> or low on this measure, and the next day you start fresh. In contrast to
> [normal exercise], where the benefits accrue slowly (over weeks and months),
> the benefits are obvious the next morning (you feel better-rested) and the
> next day (youre less tired). (...) The benefits are so large relative to the
> cost that theres no motivation problem. Deciding to do it is about as hard
> as deciding to pick up a $10 bill. Deciding to do conventional exercise is a
> lot harder.
>
> Seth Roberts, [Why Did I Sleep So Well?][]
Basically, putting a ltitle bit of stress on muscles causes good sleep. The
easiest form of doing this is by standing on one leg, while pulling the other
one behind you, until it starts to feel painful. This takes about a few minutes,
10 at most, and takes so little motivation you can easily do it every day. Yes,
it works. It's very awesome. Conventional exercise works, too, but why bother?
Why run half an hour or more, when you can just stand a bit while cooking or
watching TV?
Waking up gently
================
I found that alarms that woke me up instantly always screwed with my mental
alertness in the morning, leading to brain fog and turning off the alarm as an
angry reflex. Using something that slowly fades into awareness, like slow music,
works way better. I also got good results by using TV shows. Waking up to
something engaging and interesting is always good.
Unfortunately, I haven't yet tried a strong, gradual light sources, although I
do have my 3 TFTs set up to turn on each morning, so I suspect that it would
help as well. Regardless, all artificial light sources pale in comparison to the
sun, even on a very cloudy day. You aren't able to consciously tell how bright
something really is (because most of human vision is processed as relative to
its surrounding, not in absolutes), so it's easy to get this wrong, but during
my [polyphasic][Polyphasic Sleep] experiment I found standing outside for even
just 5 minutes to be a great help in waking up.
Caffeine
========
No, not in the morning. (Although that helps, too, especially with brain fog.)
I'm talking about drinking caffeine before going to bed.
This hack applies only to some brains, mostly people with bipolar or ADD
personalities. The best sign is whether uppers like caffeine, cocaine or
Ritanol, especially in small dosages, make you hyper or calm. I actually get
sleepy from drinking caffeine. It takes me about 2 to 3 hours, minimum, to
become more active after a cup of coffee.
The critical part is getting just the right dosage. Caffeine still affects and
disrupts your tiredness, so drinking to much will prevent you from getting good
sleep. The tricky thing is that the negative effects will only kick in very
late, hours later, while you are working like crazy. I have gone multiple times
for about 3 or 4 days drinking huge amounts of coffee, like at 10 to 20 cups a
day, feeling great, sleeping great, until I finally found I suddenly couldn't
sleep all the way through because my legs were twitching so much they started to
be really sore and my heartbeat sounded very unhealthy.
Nonetheless, getting enough caffeine, especially in the evening, each day
greatly improves my sleep, my breathing and my ability to wake up.
Unfortunately, it still blocks adenosine, so I find it harder to fall asleep.
It's quite a paradox state to be in, when you can't fall asleep, but once you
do, you sleep great. I had even considered taking *both* an upper and a downer,
like caffeine and diphenhydramine, but found this too silly (and I dislike all
available downers, including melatonin).

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---
title: Experiments
is_category: true
---
<%= category :experiments %>

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---
title: Persinger's Magnetic Field Hypothesis
date: 2011-01-01
techne: :done
episteme: :broken
---
Normally, I'd do an introduction who [Michael Persinger][] is, but I'm not in the mood, so let's just say that he is a (awesome!) mind researcher who developed the infamous God Helmet, which induces just the right kind of magnetic field around a brain to trigger, in most people, a sense of wonder and presence of somebody invisible being with them in the room, and in few, a full-blown religious experience. Also, there's his great lecture on drugs:
<%= google_video "http://video.google.com/googleplayer.swf?docid=4292093832329014323" %>
So, the real point. Persinger once hypothesized that small fluctuations in the Earth's magnetic field might cause changes in the temporal lobe, triggering in extreme cases spiritual experiences, and more typically, raising the rate of reported UFO abductions and so on. He suspected that earth quakes would be sufficient to cause these magnetic fluctuations.
Regardless if that is true, there's a more reliable source of magnetic disturbance available - the Sun. Its magnetic field fluctuates quite a bit. You can find the current data on [NOAA's site][NOAA]. The bottom-middle diagram shows the current Kp index, which is just a simple classification how rapidly the field changes right now. &lt;4 means the field is quiet, 4-6 is a normal storm, &gt;6 is huge. Normal storms are enough to disturb international radio transmissions, huge one's might even fry unprepared electronics in orbit. A storm typically lasts about half a day.
So, like any self-respecting empiricist, I decided to test the hypothesis. If Persinger is right, then an index &gt;4 should be enough to trigger a noticeable change in the temporal lobe. My brain is sensitive enough to go in full-on religious experience mode when probed and I strongly suspect that I have mild to normal temporal lobe epilepsy, so I'm the perfect test subject. If *I* don't notice anything, then it must be bullshit.
Of course, I can't just look up the current value and ask myself, "Am I more spiritual today than usual?". Confirmation bias, self-fulfilling prophecies and nastier stuff would wreck my results. So I just subscribed to the official NOAA mailing list and archived the Kp index. I also took an automatic screenshot every 10 minutes so I could later reconstruct what I did that day. I then let two months pass (May and June) without reading any of that mail.
So, what are the **results**? Well, I had 6 very quiet days (Kp index 0), 5 turbulent ones (5-6) and the rest very normal, typically about 1-2. I noticed that on all 6 quiet days, I got almost nothing done and slept a lot. On 4 of the 5 turbulent days, I didn't just feel very spiritual, but read lots of Buddhist literature and had multiple strong insights. The 5th day I played NWN2. (This was the only time the storm happened during the day. The temporal lobe (and matching epileptic seizures) are most active around 0-4 at night, due to hormonal levels.) Of my 7 really productive days during that period, 4 were the turbulent ones and one came after the NWN2 session. Furthermore, I had no really lazy or spiritual day during the rest of the time.
That's... a strong confirmation. I didn't believe my data, so I continued to measure. Another 2 months, similar results. Now another 4 months, similar results (but I did look at the measurements in advance this time). So I guess I'll have to believe the basic idea now. It's definitely among the crankiest beliefs I have.

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---
title: Polyphasic Sleep
date: 2010-05-06
techne: :done
episteme: :broken
---
Definition
==========
Polyphasic sleep means sleeping in multiple chunks per day instead of one big
one. Monophasic sleep is the normal one, averaging in at about 7-9 hours per
day. The most common form of polyphasic sleep is something like 5+2, i.e. 5
hours at night and a 2 hour nap around noon.
However, the really interesting ones are those where you only sleep about 2-5
hours in total per day. Yes, that's not a typo: *2 hours per day*. They can
generally be classified into Uberman sleep, which has 6 naps of 20 minutes each,
and Everyman sleep, which has one core of 1-3 hours and up to 5 nap of 20
minutes. Both terms were coined by [puredoxyk][], who also has one of the best
sites on how to adapt to them. I'm not gonna repeat all that here, nor address
any of the common myths and criticisms (Like, "That's impossible!". It isn't.),
but instead give my own criticism why I believe it's a *Bad Thing*. Also, a bit
of personal experience with it because every site about polyphasic sleep needs
to have anecdotes how bad the zombie phase was.
Why It's Bullshit
=================
Let's start at the opposite end - what does work? Well, polyphasic sleep is the
best (known) option you have when you can't have more than 2-4 hours per day of
sleep. If you must sleep that little, for example because you are into solo
sailing or your newborn child and 2 jobs keep you up all day, than polyphasic
sleep is right for you. It minimizes the damage this kind of life will do, but
you will still be worse off. You will still be sleep deprived. [^deprived]
[^deprived]: Well, as far as I can tell, you are not doing any permanent damage,
so a week of good sleep will probably fix everything again. Also, many
polyphasic sleepers will argue that they are not sleep deprived and I
certainly accept that they don't _feel_ that way. But try using your memory
and see how fast you crash.
Ok, having acknowledged that, let's start with the criticism. In fact, it's a
very simple criticism because it only involves one point.
Polyphasic sleep destroys your memory.
--------------------------------------
Sure, you are awake more (if you are lucky; most people aren't and delude
themselves to the fact), but you can't use the time in any meaningful way. You
can't learn more; in fact, you'll learn less. All existing studies show that
performance is slightly below normal levels, which means you have 4-6 more hours
of waketime, but you are actually performing worse than if you had slept them
all. Great job. That's like taking a shortcut, only to drive slower so that you
arrive even later.
Why is there not a single polyphasic scientist? No, Tesla was not polyphasic, he
crashed regularly. Edison lied about his schedule and, while being mostly
polyphasic, didn't save any time (and he was not a scientist). Buckminster
Fuller only slept polyphasically when touring, for the reason I mentioned above.
Why is there not a single polyphasic polyglot? You'd think that someone who is
learning multiple languages at the same time would be glad over every single
hour per day they can get. Yet, not a single one of them is documented to be
polyphasic. Some have tried (mostly early polyglots), no one was happy with it.
Why does no military or space agency advocate polyphasic sleep? There are
several studies researching it, but they all document a severe loss of
performance and they all advise against it, except when external circumstances
force you to be polyphasic, as mentioned earlier.
Why does all data collected via SRS, like for example Supermemo, show that
sleeping in big chunks correlates with good performance? If there are working
examples of polyphasic sleepers, no one of them has ever demonstrated this via
their SRS statistics, and Supermemo captures a lot of those. There isn't a
single example of someone sleeping 4 hours or less per day and still getting a
normal retention rate for the same amount of data learned.
There is a simple answer to these questions: Because polyphasic sleep doesn't
work. It's bullshit. For all the claims of "superhuman" feats, there hasn't been
a single bit of evidence for it. Proponents have made all kinds of claims and
assurances, yet have presented nothing. Most of them don't even seem to be
capable of grasping the importance of empirical evidence. It is pseudoscience.
Alternatives
============
Alright, so polyphasic sleep sucks. But is there an alternative? As you can see
in my blog posts below, I occasionally got really cool runs of 3-5 days where I
worked like a madman for 20 hours a day, no problem. Sure, I crashed afterwards,
but I still got all this stuff done. And if you sleep long enough afterwards,
then your memory will catch up a lot.
If you don't care about your mental health and you don't care about being able
to sustain your behaviour, go right ahead. If you also keep in mind that the
majority of people drop out of polyphasic sleep after a month or less, I would
recommend a better alternative: Amphetamines. It has exactly the same amount of
advantages (awake at all costs), is easier to use and fucks you up just the
same.
Or, a bit more seriously, if you are bipolar like me, you can simply embrace
your manic side and fuel it every time it shows up. Every once in a while, I
go on a megalomaniac caffeine spree, drinking over 3 liters of coffee (or cola,
sometimes - I still like the added sugar high) per day. Sure, I can't maintain
that and after about a week, I look like I just escaped Arkham Asylum, but _man_
do I get stuff _done_ in this week.
Being a Zombie
==============
This is one of my old blog posts, written 8 months after my first adaptation in
2008.
> I'm pissed. So very pissed.
>
> Polyphasic sleep is getting on my nerves. Let me summarize the last 8
> (8?!) months.
>
> _October_. Yay, finally some Uberman! Oh god, this is hard! I may have only
> 2 hours of sleep, but I also only have 2 hours of
> not-feeling-like-a-zombie. Screw this shit.
>
> _November_. Experimentation. More experimentation. Even more
> experimentation. It works! I feel ok! An unexpected event occurs. I'm
> screwed.
>
> _December_. It's futile. Uberman is just not practical. Let's do everyman! 3
> hour core, sleep galore! It works! The excitement wears off, I'm screwed.
>
> _January_. Can't think, can't dream, can't move. Bang my head against the
> wall. Some days are perfect, others are hell. Experimentation.
>
> _February_. Better times, stricter schedule, more experience. Results:
> underwhelming. I crash, can't get back up. This doesn't work.
>
> _March_. Not enough time. The naps too infrequent, the core too short, the
> sleep-throughs too frequent. This is just an adaptation problem, it will
> go away.
>
> _April_. It didn't. It's futile. What about a 90 minute core and 5 naps? It
> works! Excitement! Uberman-with-a-core works! I study like mad, finish 2/3
> of the whole semester in 3 days.
>
> _May_. Instability. It really is Uberman-with-a-core. Didn't eat right?
> Oversleep. Did some exercise? Oversleep. Didn't find a bug in your code?
> Oversleep. Made the tea a little too strong? Oversleep. Every one
> destabilizes the schedule. I have 3 in one week, that's it. Impractical,
> totally impractical. Better than Uberman, though.
Another one:
> Impatience is really getting annoying. Except for the short core I can't skip
> any time at all anymore. If something takes 6 hours, like a download for
> example, I will be awake (almost) all the time and have to wait. Every.
> Minute. Of. It. You see everything pass. Someone just went to bed and you want
> to talk about something? Prepare to sit there, for 8 hours or more, fully
> awake. Wrote some email and await an answer? You'll have memorized 500 digits
> of π before you get it. You can't skip anything, can't just hibernate a few
> hours. Once the sun went down, you'll sit in darkness, for 14 hours and more
> right now. If you are not president by day, superhero by night and mad
> scientist on the side, you'll be bored right out of your skull. Your puny
> hobbies are not enough for The Night That Never Ends, mortal!
This was actually my main motivation to become polyphasic. I just had too many
hobbies and needed way more time. And when polyphasic sleep works, you feel like
on cocaine, finishing the work that takes your friends weeks during one 40 hour
weekend. I even started picking up another language just to have something to
do! But then, after a while, your brain is completely overloaded and you just
crash. So it _is_ just like cocaine, really.

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---
title: Speed Reading
date: 2010-06-23
techne: :rough
toc: true
episteme: :broken
---
Wait, what? Speed reading? Isn't that pseudoscience? Partially, sure. However,
not all of it, and that really surprised me. Yes, speed reading *is* real. This
is my collection of useful hacks.
Hacking your brain for fun and profit
=====================================
Binocular Rivalry
-----------------
While working through [Consciousness Explained][] by Daniel Dennett, I encountered
several experiments that I doubted. So I tried to replicate them. Specifically,
binocular rivalry seemed weird to me. Binocular rivalry occurs when each of
your eyes sees a different thing, typically achieved by just setting up a
barrier between them, and showing different pictures to each, e.g. horizontal
stripes on the left and vertical stripes on the right, or different letters or
faces and so on. What happens is that occasionally one side will dominate over
the other and you will only be conscious of it. Most commonly, at first you
kinda see both sides, then they partially merge, in a very patchy way, and
suddenly your vision _flips_, i.e. one side becomes clear and the other turns
invisible. This process then alternates randomly, unless even a slight
disruption is introduced to one side, like a moving dot, which causes this side
to become dominant immediately.
Allegedly, you may control which side is dominant most of the time, but you can
not be conscious of both reliably. I didn't believe that and tested it by trying
to read two texts simultaneously. In fact, I actually managed to do that! The
main visual problem is focus. It is quite hard to have each eye focus a
different thing, but using e.g. [DXM][], you can actually pull that off. But even
without it, you can try to focus a middle point and just make the letters big
enough so that you can read them even out-of-focus. The real problem comes from
assembling two sources of input into separate sentences; at first, they always
mixed and I couldn't understand anything.
Being Myselves
--------------
I then controlled for that by using series of numbers and suddenly I was able to
read two things at the same time! At first rivalry happened a lot, but soon I
got into mental soft focus and could read (but not parse sentences) just fine. I
then speculated that I might be able to exploit both halves of my brain. In
split-brain patients, who don't have a connection between their left and right
hemisphere, you actually get two independent consciousnesses and I did read up
on people that tried to induce this with normal brains.
Because the left side of vision (i.e. left in both eyes) is handled by the left
hemisphere and vice versa, you can wear glasses that have either their left half
on each glass blocked by tape or the right side, and so only give visual input
to one hemiphhere. This actually causes a significant effect if your two
hemispheres are currently in disagreement. Some people with depression or
anxiety were able to reduce it or turn it almost off temporarily while wearing
such glasses! So for example, you feel very nervous with your therapist, block
the left side, everything is the same, then instead block the right side,
woosh!, your anxiety is gone. It comes right back when you take the glasses off,
but still, way cool.
So by being able to make each hemisphere dominant at will, you can really fuck
with your mood. Find where your language side is (typically the left side) and
block it - you become more empathetic and reading gets harder. Block the other
side, reading is normal, but relating to content is harder. The effect is
typically not that large because both sides are still internally connected, but
I found it quite noticeable.
Anyway, I tried to improve on binocular reading by separating not only between
eyes, but sides of vision. Let my left half of my left eye read one thing and
the right half of my right eye another. Focus gets really tricky that way, but
it is doable. And lo and behold, I could, albeit slowly, read two things at
once! Parallel processing, bitches!
What's that all got to do with speed reading?!
----------------------------------------------
Binocular reading isn't really practical (for one, you look ridiculous, two,
it's very difficult and slow), but I got interested in *other* ways I could hack
my reading process. If I can read in parallel, can I also read non-linearly?
Start in the middle of a sentence, jump around and still get it? Read really
really fast? Maybe subconsciously?
Now we're getting there! First, let me clarify one thing: speed reading literature
is a complete and total *mess*. Barely anything scientific, vague claims, lots
of lies and false promises, no clear terms, nothing. To remedy this, I'm going
to state *exactly* what I mean and what this is about:
Speed reading involves any technique that makes you read a normal text faster
**without sacrificing comprehension**. No, it's not **skimming**: that only
tries to give you a basic overview of the text. The idea is to be able to
understand the text just as if you had read it "normally", even though the
process of getting there may be very different. There are techniques to organize
your reading better, like first skimming through and getting a feel for the
structure and so on, and they are all useful, but that's *not what this is
about*. We want pure reading speed, nothing more, nothing less.
But what can be achieved? First, measure your current reading speed. Say, pick a
Wikipedia article, read it, time yourself and then count the words. Average
among most people is about *150-250wpm* (words per minute). Good college
students read at about *300-350wpm*. A fast conventional reader gets up to
*500wpm*, maybe *600wpm* if they are really good. Speed reading, on the other
hand, falls into a range of about *800 to 1500wpm*. For some texts and some
people, this can go even higher, but as a reasonable general limit, 1500wpm is
about it.
Because a normal page in a book has about 350 to 450 words, depending on font
size, people typically read about 30 pages per hour, college students about 50
to 60 and speed readers about 150 to 250. Those numbers are of course averaged
over a lengthy text and don't have to be constant - a difficult paragraph may
slow you down and a simple one may just fly by.
What about **comprehension**? There are two components to it: **understanding**
the text and **remembering** it. Understanding means being able to follow it,
being able to give a summary of it and so on. Remembering involves still knowing
details, all characters or arguments involved and so on. Basically, if at the
end of the book, you don't sit around confused what the fuck just happened, you
*understood* the text (and didn't read James Joyce). If you can also pretty much
tell someone everything you just read, you also *remember* it. The two are
usually closely connected, but not always.
I am only interested in techniques that *maintain* a high level of
comprehension, typically a retention of 80-90% of the content. Sacrificing
quantity for quality is right out. Nonetheless, it is still true that topics
that are difficult to understand will always be read slowly, no matter the
technique used. Reading about theoretical physics will be slow unless you have
studied it. No speed reading technique will fix this problem. Most texts,
however, fit nicely into your rough skill level and the limiting factor is in
fact your reading, not your understanding.
Related to that, a common objection to speed reading is that it kills the
enjoyment, or that maybe you are just reading too easy texts. "Why hurry
something good?" I don't agree with this sentiment *at all*. If you enjoy
reading so much, why not read at 1 sentence per hour? Why not watch Star Trek at
one scene per day? What, that would be mind-numbingly boring? Why yes it would!
Also, if you increase your throughput, you become able to handle more complex
structures. A series filling thousands of pages is suddenly just as manageable
as a comic book was before. Reading up on moral philosophy by reading works
by/about the 10 or 20 most influential thinkers over the course of a week or two
is doable. Books become what Wikipedia articles were before. So if you don't
like high bandwidth and all the benefits that come with it, this just isn't for
you.
Finally, a note on **subvocalization**. When reading, there are basically 4
different aspects of sound:
1. *Reading out loud*. This is what beginners may do, or what you do when
reading to someone. It was actually quite common in ancient times and the
idea that you could read silently was very weird to many Romans.
2. *Reading to yourself internally*. You basically still do the same thing,
including moving your tongue, but you don't produce a sound. This is often a
transitional period for early readers (and quite useful - there is some
evidence, including my own experience, that learning new languages is easier
when subvocalizing). It will disappear on its own once you become more
confident.
3. *Subvocalization*. You still *hear* the sound, but you don't feel that you
produce it. Muscle movement doesn't exist (at least not any you would notice)
and speed is greatly improved. You often skip words, or only hint at the
sound. This is the normal mode for most people to be in, even many deaf (who
often are not 100% deaf), and this is the *inner voice* most of us use to
think, at least some of the time.
4. *Reading in silence*. Finally, reading without hearing any associated sound.
No inner voice, but direct meaning, just as you look at a map, for example.
Because visual processing is, for almost everyone, vastly superior to aural
processing you can read much faster that way. Personally, I believe that the
problem is that to understand an inner or outer voice, your brain has to
simulate sequential processesing, but the brain is only parallel. This
makes it all quite slow. Visual processing on the other hand is not - you
can parse many parts of an image or scene at the same time and only
coordinate results at the very end. Also, your visual hardware is far more
optimized and greater in size.
Techniques
==========
The Conventional Approach - How to read fast the normal way
-----------------------------------------------------------
The easiest hack is to just read faster - you do everything you'd normally do,
just faster. As I mentioned, you can go up to about 600wpm that way. When I was
starting out with speed reading, I was already reading at 450wpm. How did I get
that fast?
I could credit reading practice. I do read a lot, especially on the web, but
that's not all that plausible. I know enough people who easily read just as much
as I was reading at 14, and I was reading about 400wpm back then, too. Most
people never seem to go beyond 250-300wpm, no matter how much practice they have
reading texts.
So what *do* I credit? Video games. I'm serious. I played a *lot* of shooters
and racing games and this really improves your ability to react *fast* and react
to inputs from *anywhere* in your field of vision. You are also forced to shift
your attention around a lot and figure out threats as fast as you can. I also
notice that in anyone I know that played a lot of fast games: Their attention
jumps around a lot faster than normal, no matter what they are working on.
The typical example is taking a gaming teenager and having their teacher watch.
Give the teen a computer menu to figure out, or a form to fill out or something
like this, and watch how the teacher desperately tries to keep up, even though
the teacher surely has more reading practice. Still, no chance whatsoever, and
the same goes for all non-gaming teens. But any gamer will have no problem, no
matter the age.
So if you read only 200 or 300wpm, you are not playing enough. Get Quake 3 or
Halo or Starcraft, a big supply of caffeine and *train*. After a while, your
reading speed will pick up, I'm certain of it. Some people, especially those
with ADHD, may be better at this than others. Sometimes, a short attention span
really pays.. oh shiny!
Turning off subvocalization
---------------------------
The most important change to achieve any kind of real speed is getting rid of
the dependency on subvocalization. The rationale is simple: as long as sound is
involved, in any way, even just at the last step of comprehension, you will not
go faster than about 600wpm. Forget it, it's impossible.
However, the idea is *not* to permanently turn off subvocalization. It does have
some useful purposes. It's quite good at understanding names, or unknown words,
or reading anything sound-based, like poetry. However, the vast majority of text
is entirely disconnected from sound. (Some languages maybe more than others.
French and English are already only remotely linked to their actual spelling,
but many Chinese languages have basically *no* written pronunciation. It also
has never stopped any scholar from reading old languages, whose sounds have been
lost to us.) Ideally, we would like to read visually whenever possible and only
resort to sound when necessary.
So let's cut out the middleman. But how? I'm going to present three techniques that
worked for me, but before I do that, I want to address one common problem.
It is quite typical to worry how to *suppress* subvocalization. How do you *not*
think in a certain way? The short answer is: you don't because you can't.
Thought suppression never works. You can't *learn* to not think of a cow by
*trying* to not think of a cow. Try it yourself! By giving attention to the idea
of a cow, and you must, otherwise you wouldn't know that you are not thinking of
it, it will always come to mind again. However, certainly *can* not think of a
cow - by not giving cows any kind of attention. The same goes for
subvocalization - the following techniques will simply not care about it and
will in fact make it impossible to use it. It will disappear on its own.
Chunking
--------
A chunk is the largest unit of information you take in at once. When you learn
reading, your chunk size is "one letter", slowly building up to "one syllable"
to "one word". Unfortunately, most people stop there. The goal is to enlarge
your chunks to multiple words, maybe even whole sentences at once. Chunking is
the whole meat of speed reading. It's the main trick to discover.
Once you read at a very high speed, it really makes a huge difference how large
your chunks are. Here's a little demonstration:
<%= image("fast.gif", "chunk size 1") %>
<%= image("slow.gif", "chunk size 4") %>
Both animations run at the same reading speed of 1000wpm, but the first one
shows every word on its own, while the second one uses groups of 4. If you watch
it for a while, you should be able to read the second one, but the first one is
a lot more difficult. However, notice that it will also get easier once you know
what the sentence is. This is the trick behind chunking: pattern prediction. If
you have a good clue how a sentence is gonna develop, you can read more of it in
one go. This is why this will only work when you know the language well and the
text contains not too many unfamiliar ideas.
Once you go beyond about 10 chunks/second, visual processing starts lagging
behind more and more. After-images, too slow eye movement and so on start
interfering with your reading. This means you can read maybe 600wpm if you read
every word on its own, but increasing your chunk size from just 1 to 2
immediately doubles your speed! The benefit is obvious, so pacing trade-offs
when increasing chunk size are often worth it.
The highest possible chunk size, according to all sources I read, seems to be
about one paragraph, which is about 100 to 150 words long. I suspect that a main
problem here is the size of the area you can keep in focus. Chunking a whole
page at once is probably impossible because you could never get all words to be
sharp and readable.
A very useful technique for training purposes is **Rapid Serial Visual
Presentation**, or RSVP for short. That's quite a big word, when really, it just
means "flashing words really fast", exactly like the two animations before.
The best RSVP I found is [Eyercize][], even though it has
the stupidest name *evar*. Nonetheless, it's the only speed reading tool I know
with support for fixation points and complete customization. I usually set it to
2-3 fixation points per line, about 5 lines of context and increasingly higher
speeds. I occasionally ignore the marked line and read the upcoming context
instead, though. [Spreeder][] is also nice and maybe
easier to use at first.
I would also recommend [Look, Ma; No Hands!][], a book that teaches semantic
chunking very well. It's quite short and precise. You get results very fast.
To make chunking possible, you have to watch out for the right **font size**.
You can only see about 5 degrees sharp enough to read. If you hold out your arm
and make a piece sign, then your index and middle finger are about 5 degrees
apart. So it is crucial to get enough words into focus.
I was often reading texts at very high font sizes, like 30pt or so. Hey, I have
bad eye sight and sit quite far away from my monitors. But I found that this
makes it really hard to read fast, so I fixed my setup. I moved my monitors a
lot closer and decreased my font size. *A lot*.
In my experience, a font size of 12pt (assuming normal DPI) is the *largest* you
want to use. I currently read websites at 10pt, which seems to be the best
compromise between readability and strain on the eyes. (I also find it hard to
read Japanese below 10pt. There just aren't enough pixels left.)
At those sizes, the font used matters a lot. I've always been very fond of the
Microsoft fonts, even though I haven't run any of their systems for years. The
Google Droid font is also very nice. Regardless, experiment and use something
that is clean and very easy to read.
Speaking of font size, column width matters just as much. It's no use if you see
a lot of text, but the current paragraph fits into one huge line across your >20
inch display. Ideally, you would get a whole sentence into your focus at once.
The maximum line length therefore should be about 100 characters or 20 words.
If you are a console hacker, then I'd also recommend checking out bitmap fonts.
They really shine at such sizes. Remember that you can only fix bugs in code
that you see. The more lines fit on your screen, the better you can debug.
Faster pacing
-------------
This is where the "speed" in "speed reading" comes from. Chunking is the
requirement, but it on its own won't make you faster. The human body, and that
includes the brain, is very efficient at avoiding work. It is a ruthless
optimizer and always do what is easiest *right now*. Being good at conserving
energy is the reason we are still here, but also why any kind of exercise is so
hard. If you *somehow* can get away with spending less, you will do so. That's
why you only get muscle growth if you push yourself hard enough to make it
absolutely necessary. You will never get stronger just by jogging, and you will
never get faster by reading at a comfortable pace.
To get faster, we need a kind of setup that makes it easier to process text
faster than anything else. The best way to do this is to externally enforce a
high speed. For digital texts, you can use the RSVP again. I prefer short
sprints, so take a text of at most 5000 words, which is about a longish blog
article. Take your current reading speed and multiply by 2. Use a chunk size you
are comfortable with, or about 3-4 words when in doubt. Try to keep up, but
never slow down. If you missed too much, try again, at the same speed. You may
change the chunk size, but never decrease the words per minute!
Don't worry that you will not get everything at first. In fact, don't worry if
the text makes no sense at all. Concentrate and try to get as much as possible.
At first, you may only make out a word here and there. Soon, you make out
groups. Whole chunks. The occasional sentence. Then some meaning returns. That's
when you do the next step - you go *faster*.
Because the computer shows the text for you, you can't cheat. You can't fall
back and read a sentence again or slow down in any way. You must either pay
attention and use your eyes maximally efficient or you won't understand the
text.
Here's an idea for an exercise and how I did it. Because I read at 400wpm, I set
my speed to 800wpm. I would read like that for about 5 minutes. Then I increased
my speed to 1000wpm, again for 5 minutes. Then go back a bit, to 900wpm, which
will now seem much easier. Continue alternating between "can kinda keep up" and
"can barely make anything out" for a total of about 30 minutes, maybe an hour at
most.
The principle behind this is a bit like high-intensity interval training where
you run as fast as you can for 20 seconds, then jog for 10 seconds and repeat
this in total for 5-10 times. The idea is not to be able to always run as fast
as during those sprints, but by putting this huge, but short pressure on your
muscles, to greatly increase your normal speed.
It is perfectly normal and actually good to be confused and not understand
anything during this exercise. :) This speed is far too fast for your internal
voice to keep up and your brain is under huge pressure to make any sense of what
you are reading asap. Once you go down to a more normal rate, you will actually
overshoot and read faster than you thought would be necessary. Voilà, you read a
bit faster! The brain gets used to this high speed and soon comprehension
returns. In fact, I found that I got bored now if I would read at 400 or 500wpm,
even after just one week! Be warned that this may annoy any non-speed-reading
observer. ;)
As material I used minor blogs I enjoyed reading, but didn't care too much about
if I missed anything, and novels I had already read or that were kinda
predictable. That way, if you go blank from time to time, you can find back
into the text easily. And it's a great chance to read Twilight without any
guilt! (You can find usable novels in .txt or .pdf form in certain bays or,
for older texts, in the Gutenberg archive, for example.)
It took me about a week to read 800wpm that way without missing anything. After
two weeks, I could keep up 1000wpm almost all the time, and 1200wpm if I really
concentrated. You don't have to do this all day, but try to do at least 20
minutes daily.
Reading nonlinearly
-------------------
Finally, it's time to fully exploit the parallel processing and to do more
aggressive pattern prediction. It's time to throw away the chains of
<del>oppression, comrade!</del> intended text flow that the author gave us and
to read in any order and any direction that gets to the meaning faster.
Reading nonlinearly just means you read text the same way you look around. You
jump to the points that look most interesting, figure out the context around
them, then jump to the next spot. But if you read everything sequentially, you
can't do that! At least, you'd have to go back and start reading the current
sentence you're in.
Imagine your vision would work sequentially - like normal reading. You go into a
room and move your eyes to the upper left, start moving them to the right, line
by line, until you have scanned the whole room. Sure, you would *see* everything
eventually, but it would be *way* stupid and inefficient. Instead, you first
have a quick look around, maybe 2 or 3 unconscious eye movements, to figure out
if anyone is in the room and where the interesting stuff is. Nothing unusual on
the floor or ceiling, so you skip those areas altogether. But you saw something
like a face over there, so you concentrate more on this point until you
recognize who it is (and in what mood they are). This takes maybe a second or so
in total, and you may have only actually looked at 5% of the scene, but you sure
know everything that matters. So why not read that way?
A good exercise I found was to enforce a time limit per page. I set up a
timer[^pororo] to give me a little beep every 20 seconds, following which I
would *have* to turn the page, no matter how far I was. This would equal a
reading speed of about 800wpm for a small paperback. You do this for maybe 5
minutes, then go faster. Go to 15 seconds, then 10, then 5. Finally, go back to
20 again. It will now be far easier.
Sometimes, it was no problem to read a page very fast, but soon I could tell on
first sight if I would be able to make it or not, *before* being conscious of
any content. If I recognized the page as hard, I would scan it rapidly first,
working out the structure and main phrases on it. This would take only a few
seconds, but reduce the difficulty of the page drastically. I could then clarify
the missing pieces, reading them far faster than before. Like with vision, you
first establish where core ideas (=people) or interesting words (=colors) are,
then concentrate on them exclusively.
Instead of going for whole pages, you can also train to read multiple lines at
once. At first, start with 1 second per line, for maybe a minute. Read any way
you want, but after 1 second, move on to the next line. It helps to trace the
lines with your finger or a pen to enforce a consistent speed. Then do 2 lines
simultaneously in 1 second, again for a minute. Then 4. Then whole blocks of
texts, ideally whole paragraphs. Such huge blocks are very nice for skimming and
getting a feel for the book, where everything is and what the main ideas will
be, but it's a bit troublesome for normal reading. Still, it took me about 2
weeks to get used to reading about 2-3 lines at once. I now have a far broader
pattern in which my eyes move over the page, not clinging to every word, but
rather "painting" the page in a zig-zag pattern with a brush about 2-3 lines
thick.
Another good exercise is to read *backwards*. You start at the end of the line
and right to the beginning, i.e. for an English text, you read right-to-left.
Once you got a bit of practice at that, you can alternate and read in a zig-zag
pattern. The advantage is two-fold: you save a lot of eye movement and you get
used to understanding sentences out of order.
Combined with a harsh time limit, I found that this exercise greatly improved my
ability to jump in the middle of a paragraph, figure out what's going on and
assemble meaning by moving into all directions, not just left-to-right.[^ltr]
[^ltr]:
It may help if you are used to multiple languages that have a different
word order or writing direction. German and Japanese, for example, build up
quite large word stacks and you may end up with a sentence that keeps on
piling up modifiers and objects without revealing the crucial verb or target
at the end, so maybe this practice makes it easier for me to adapt to
backwards reading than for others. Also, Japanese is read both left-to-right
and up-to-down (and then right-to-left), depending on context, so I'm
already used to changing directions.
Once you go beyond a certain speed, it stops being uniform. I noticed that I can
read consistently at 300-400wpm using my previous techniques, but when speed
reading I vary between 700wpm to 1200wpm from page to page. Especially dialogue
really slows me down. This also means that each book has its own speed, so
measuring reading speeds in "words per minute" stops being useful. "Bits of
information per minute" would be better, but how do you calculate that?
[^pororo]:
I wrote my own timer for such purposes. You can check it out on
[Github][Pororo]. Basically, you set a timer for each level
of the task, like a 23s timer for the page and a 200page timer for the book.
Alternatively, I used the metronome function of my mp3 player, especially
when reading on the train or when waiting for something.

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---
title: Developing Synesthesia
date: 2011-01-27
techne: :done
episteme: :broken
---
Synesthesia is the automatic connection of different senses. Typical example: perceiving numbers as having a color. Or the LSD version: seeing music.
<%= image("cat-lick-funny-stamp.jpg", "I licked a funny stamp") %>
Many years ago, I was fascinated by the idea and really wanted to have this myself. Tasting sound would be awesome! Alas, I didn't seem to have any synesthesia nor did I ever find a way to replicate it.
Well, until now that is. Some months ago, I started taking cold showers for my skin. To make it less painful, I started to pay very close attention to the sensations as they arose. I figured, the worst part of it is the anticipation of unpleasantness, not the actually coldness.
I then noticed that "aw, cold!" consisted actually of four parts. First, there is a feeling of "cold", then slight pressure as the water hits my skin, almost simultaneously, there's a response of "retreat", with muscles contracting, blood rushing away and so on (each being a separate, but hard to isolate sensation) and finally, there's aversion, a mental pulling-away - the actual awfulness.
I found it easy to drop the awfulness by just concentrating on the other parts. They were way too interesting anyway. (That made taking cold showers much easier.) But I didn't stop there. I wanted to perceive clearly what the first three parts were *like*. What does it feel like to perceive "cold" versus "pressure"?
Problem is, the closer I looked, the more they merged. I couldn't tell them apart! I could tell spatial dimensions, duration and (roughly) chronological order, but there was no "intensity" or "quality" at all! Temperature, pressure, touch, muscle movements and blood flow were all *the same kinda thing*. The only thing that had any intensity at all was the aversion.
So I extended this search to other perceptions. I meditated and wanted to see what "thoughts" were like. Or "music". Or "pain". Or "light". But whenever I introspected, I found them breaking apart into two components - "sensations" and "aversion", with all sensations being fundamentally identical and interchangeable and only "aversion" being seemingly different. (I'm not sure if "aversion" is a good name. "push/pull" seems fitting, but not perfectly so. "Expansion/contraction", as Shinzen Young uses it, may be better, but I'm unsure if that's what he means by it.)
The result is that all sensations merge, especially in meditation. I see sounds, hear pain, feel light, touch numbers and so on. This shouldn't surprise me, as the Buddhists have been telling me this for some time now, but I still didn't see it coming. I still don't really believe it. Color and sound are different, gods dammit! But whenever I pay attention, I can't find differences. I'm confused.
> Not the wind, not the flag - mind is moving.
The main result of this is that my ontology is now strongly leaning towards idealism. I consider mental events as ontologically fundamental (instead of, say, numbers, logical structures or matter[^1], as most rationalists currently seem to do). I'm still very uncertain of it, but suspect that all mental events are fundamentally identical. The idea of different <em>kinds</em> of perceptions seems wrong to me.
[^1]: Personally, I find "matter" slightly embarrassing by now. The definition has shifted so much in the last 150 years, from atoms to quarks to fields to configurations to all kinds of other things that the claim that modern "materialists" have anything to do with [materialism](/tl;dr#materialism) as conceived before the Enlightenment is laughable. It very much reminds me of religious folk talking about "God" and meaning dozens of completely incompatible things, but presenting it as unity. </ad hominem>

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---
title: Fiction
is_category: true
---
<%= category :fiction %>

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---
title: ! 'Great Filter Says: Ignore Risk'
date: 2012-01-24
techne: :done
episteme: :discredited
slug: 2012/01/24/great-filter-says-ignore-risk/
disowned: true
---
Quick, maybe silly thought.
Assume there is a late Great Filter that kills a civ before it manages to take over the galaxy. For simplicity's sake, say there are only two possible candidates:
1. (*Caution*) Civs are *too cautious*, avoid obvious technological progress out of fear it might harm them and so waste their limited resources and fail to prepare for natural catastrophes like the next meteor.
2. (*Risk*) Civs are *not cautious enough*, build whatever they can and end up killing themselves with nanotech and 3D printers that for some strange reason always convert their planets into paperclips.
Further assume only one of these candidates is true, but you don't know which. Now some civ arises, sees a Great Filter, reasons (like all civs) that it was following the wrong strategy, switches, kills itself. (Or there wouldn't be a filter.)
How do you avoid this problem? You can't reason yourself out of it. You can't just go, "I'm not meta enough" and switch a second time. The *other* civs would have done the same. It's a standard coordination problem where all participants run the same decision algorithm.
You can't even go indexical and reason that the *first* few civs wouldn't see a Great Filter. They would see a young universe and correctly assume they just happened to be early and the lack of life has nothing to do with late filtering events, so they would follow the obvious of the two strategies. But as they died out, they must've chosen wrong. We can exploit that! We just *pretend* we never saw a Great Filter and figure out what we would've done, then do the opposite. But again: any late civ would figure this one out, and they *still* die. Everyone is choosing the wrong option because the *algorithm* you're stuck with is broken.
The only sensible strategy, therefore, is to *flip a coin*. You *must* act independently from your decision algorithm so as to maximize your chance of anti-coordinating with the other civs. 50% is the best you've got. But then, the other civs would figure *that* out and *some* would succeed. It only takes 5 coin flips for a >95% chance of victory, after all.
Some possible solutions:
1. It is *really hard* to get a civ to adopt a random strategy. Not being random *is* the Great Filter.
2. There are more than 2 options, such that random chance of picking the right one is pretty low. We can estimate it! Calculate how many civs there should've been up to now and you know an lower bound for the option set.
3. No civ chooses the right option set, so despite random strategies, they *still* all fail 'cause the real correct option can never come up.
4. Survival is impossible.
There you have it. As my random strategy to save us from Hansonian Damnation and Happiness Paperclipping (Happyclipping?), I choose Pray To Possibly Dead And/Or Non-Existent Gods. You can thank me later.

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---
title: Great Filter
is_category: true
---
<%= category :"great-filter" %>

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---
title: Backups
date: 2011-11-12
techne: :rough
episteme: :believed
---
<%= image("backup.jpg", "backup ALL THE THINGS!") %>
So, I spent two hours today and further [gwernified][Gwern URL] my life. Seems like a good time to summarize my backup strategy. Maybe it inspires someone to save more of their own data. As the saying goes, nobody wants backup, but everybody wants restore.
# Strategies
1. All data in /home is synced between my laptop and desktop machine. That's the most basic level of redundancy.
2. Everything except TV shows etc. is backed up every 6 hours on a dedicated backup drive. I use a custom [rsync script][RBS] for incremental backups. That way, each snapshot is self-contained, but snapshots share hardlinks and save on space. A new snapshot of ~200GB of data takes ~150MB and takes ~6 minutes. I do it this way because I often restore stuff and found rdiff-backup horribly slow. I have 2 weeks of snapshots for everything, plus unlimited monthly snapshots for most partitions.
3. Most TV shows, music etc. is also mirrored on the backup drive. (This isn't really crucial because Piratebay is a good backup strategy in itself.)
4. The whole backup drive itself is mirrored on a second backup drive. (To preserve the backup history.)
5. I have a third backup drive that I update every couple of months or so and store at my dad's workplace. (I never throw away old drives. I just put a backup on them and let them rest.)
6. I [take a screenshot][daily screenshot] every 5 minutes and store it on the backup drive. Useful to reconstruct days or restore content other strategies miss.
7. Everything that *can* be open and online, [is so][Github]. I'm currently transitioning my notes to my website and some of my daily task tracking to [Beeminder][]. As Linus said, "Only wimps use tape backup: *real* men just upload their important stuff on ftp, and let the rest of the world mirror it.".
8. I put everything I edit in a git repo to preserve its history. Especially my private notes, tracking data and so on. I have a cronjob that commits my notes every 20 minutes so I don't have to think about it.
9. I backup my notes, mails and Anki deck on Amazon's S3 every month in case my house burns down <del>or the police raid me</del>. Takes up about 1.5GB and costs me ~30 cents a month. (I don't sync my Anki deck with ankisrs.net because its pretty large (>14k cards, 900MB of media) and I don' want to burden Damien. Once he allows me to pay for my account, I'll sync again.)
10. I [mirror all videos][backup video] I link to on my website because they have a bad habit of getting DMCA'd out of existence. I run linkchecker once a month to fix broken links.
11. I also let Google track me completely. Hey, they aren't more evil than future me and my search history has saved my ass a lot in the past. If they also profit from my data, good for them.
12. I [track][fume] all useful daily activities (and [time spent][fumetrap]) so I can see how much time I waste. (My task suggestion script also balances activities.)
13. I log all chat communication. This was my very first backup setup and is tremendously important. "Huh, didn't I talk about this with him before? ...\*grep\*... Yup, 7 weeks ago. \*quote\*". In fact, if anything has a log option, I use it and never throw away the logs. Text is easy to compress.
14. I use Gentoo, and so save the sources and binaries for all packages I use (and back them up as described above). Every once in a while, a library breaks something and I need a clean package *now*. Or an obscure program disappears and no-one mirrored the sources. Sucks. Don't let it happen to you. Don't clean your cache. (Or at least, have monthly snapshots).
15. I try to put my beliefs and predictions on [PredictionBook][]. Keeps me honest and forces me to turn empty beliefs into ones that actually predict something. And I now have proof whenever I say "Told you so!". Good for my hipster cred.
That's about it. This is all more-or-less automatic, so no effort on my side and it's all cheap. You only really notice how valuable backups are when you have them and can constantly restore stuff. "Oh, that pdf from last week I thought wasn't useful? Need to quote it.", "Crap, deleted the wrong file.", "Nah, that paragraph sucks, lets get the first version.", "I watched this amazing pr0n a month ago, but the link is dead. What's the name?", ...
# Future
There are a few things I'd really love to store in the future.
1. A webcam in my room. I already have one and modded it to record infrared as well. (Most chips do, but have a filter, typically on the lens. Just scrape it off.) So it also works reasonably well in the dark. I just need to set it up and can get IRL screenshots as well.
2. I really need to record my thoughts more, but I don't know how. I already try to write them down as much as I can, but that's cumbersome. I thought about using an audio recorder, but that isn't as automatic as I want either.
3. Similarly, I'd really love to record IRL conversations, but current tech still sucks too much. Luckily, I'm enough of a loner that I barely have any non-text conversations, but you know. Need to win some more debates with my mother. ("No, I didn't say that at all! Here, listen!")
# Rules
So to summarize the summary, I think the most important rules to backup are:
1. Use it. You *will* need your old data at some point and hate yourself if you don't have it. Life is already horrible enough. Don't increase your suffering through laziness.
2. Automate it. The less you have to think about it, the better. When in doubt, just backup it. Space is cheap.
3. Histories matter. Don't just save your files. Save your histories, ideally in something like a git repo. Keep old backups.

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@ -1,268 +0,0 @@
---
title: vim
date: 2010-11-17
techne: :done
episteme: :deprecated
---
~~~
#!sh
alias evil="for s in {1..3}; do
echo -n 'VI! ';
sleep .666;
done; echo; vi"
~~~
A GNU Dawn
==========
Below is a little write-up of the vim features I used often enough to
value them, but still rarely enough to constantly forget them. However, during
the fall of 2010, I eventually overcame my hatred of Lisp and converted to
emacs. Maybe I'll write a similar list for it one day. Or I'll just wait until
emacs ships with "M-x write-article-based-on-todo-list".
Enjoy the (untouched) article nonetheless.
Ye Olde Vim confige
===================
Hello, my name is muflax, and I am a vim addict. My ~/.vim directory is about
6MB large and contains 20,000 lines of code[^0]. I use so many features, that I
often forget about some of them. Heck, I implemented tab completion for code 3
times because I forgot that I already did it each time and only noticed it
months later during a cleanup!
[^0]: To be fair, I store every plugin there and never install anything
system-wide so that my setup is mostly independent from the current machine.
It couldn't go on like this. My memory couldn't keep up with this. I probably
only knew half the hotkeys I have mapped myself. I dream of vim; have terrible
nightmares because I can't remember how to automatically create a list of
ascending numbers. I have spent more time this year implementing or tweaking
something in vim than programming in general. (Ok, this is slightly exaggerated.
But only slightly.)
Now, if I were sane, I would cut down my config a lot, or switch to a GUI editor
(TextMate is very nice) that remembers my features for me, or just switch to
emacs[^emacs] already, because I'm at least halfway there anyway.
[^emacs]: But why not emacs? To be honest, emacs is great. It is easily the
second-best editor and some parts of it outshine vim easily, like process
integration or the higher level of semantic awareness. I only have two problems
with it.
The first is I-know-what's-best-for-you syndrome, i.e. emacs often
enforces a specific behaviour that it thinks is right. Well, most of the time,
emacs _is_ right, but occasionally it just stands in my way. The most annoying
thing was the lack of a permanent visual mode as in vim aka the ability to move
my cursor freely to any position on the screen.
The second problem is LISP. I hate LISP. I refuse to learn it. I refuse to
deal with people that like it. (But afaik there may be some ports to a sane
language, so maybe this point is moot nowadays.)
Luckily, I am not sane. So instead, I just made another SRS deck, and put in
all those features, using a card each, and then just learned them like
everything else. Hey, I have fully outsourced my long-term memory, I might as
well use it for stuff that matters!
And to cultivate this deck, I needed a complete list of all vim features I
currently (should) know. All of them! So here it is, in no particular order,
including all relevant plugins. You can just google them or check my [Config][] on
github.
I'm gonna leave out all the very elementary features everyone knows, like / or
dd, and some of the hotkeys are mine, obviously, not standard. I'll also skip
over config-only features because you don't need to remember those. See the
awesome help for what they do.
The List
========
1. **ci(** aka change inside, deletes everything the current set of () and puts
you into insert mode. Works the same way for all closures, like **ci"** or
**ci{**, or use **cib** for the current block. Apart from **c** for change,
this also works with **d** and **y**. **d%** deletes everything until it
hits a (matched) parenthesis.
2. **yankring** plugin, implements a yankring like the killring in emacs.
Automagically manages your buffers when copying or deleting something,
allowing you to cycle through it when yanking it back into the text. Very
useful when cut-and-pasting multiple parts. Use just like normal yanking,
C-p to cycle, :YRShow for a list. Also shares yank buffer among all
instances (omg its heavan).
3. **C-x** and **C-a**, in CM, de/increments the currently
selected value. See my config for an enhancement to make it work
with boolean values, too (using **gy**).
4. **gq**, re-formats the selection, breaking lines and so on.
5. **\>**, **<** and **=**, on a selection, indent
right/left/automagically. Great for pasting or reworking loops.
8. Some **ctags** features. **[i** shows the first line contain
the word under the cursor (good to look up a declaration),
**C-w i** opens it in a new window, **C-]** (and for me,
**C-Space**) jumps to the definition of the current keyword,
**:tag [keyword]** dito.
9. **folding**, to show/hide code levels. I put fold in and out
both on **Space** and fold according to syntax. Useful for complex
source code.
10. **:bprev** and **:bnext** to switch buffers (I put them on
**F1** and **F2**), also **:tabprev** and **:tabnext** (**gT** and
**gt**), like in vimperator, for tabs.
11. **NERDtree** plugin, **:NERDtree**, as a nice integrated file
manager. Occasionally useful.
12. **:jesus**, because Jesus saves. Your file. (Uses **cmdalias**
plugin, dito the next one.)
13. **:pd** or **:perldo**, for a more powerful regex engine.
14. **WW**, to just save a file. Faster than **:w<CR\>**.
15. **pastetoggle**, on **F3**, to toggle paste mode, i.e. yanking
text with or without formating it.
16. **F11** and **F12** to automagically **underline** the current
line, used in my notes for headers. See my config.
17. **Align** and **AutoAlign** plugin, to align multiple lines in
intelligent ways. I mostly use it to align multiple variable
declarations around the = sign, which Align even does automagically
for some languages. Use on a selection with **:Align=** or any
other sign.
18. **BufExplorer**, to get a nice list of open buffers, use with
**\\be**. Builtin, of course, is **:ls**, which is also nice.
19. **a.vim**, alternate between source/header files via **:A**.
Also, **\\ih** and **\\is** jumps to header/source file under the
cursor.
20. **matchit** plugin, extends the **%** command, which jumps (in
order) to the innermost parentheses on the left, then its match on
the right. **matchit** enables it for tags and so on, too.
21. **taglist** plugin, a nice sidebar for method names and shit,
like in IDEs. Use with **:Tlist**. Occasionally useful.
22. **template** plugin, uses file templates instead of blank files
for certain file types.
23. **"\*y** and all related yank operations. Yank into the X11
clipboard, so that you can share among vim instances. **yankring**
already covers this, but still useful sometimes for other apps.
Requires vim to be compiled with X11 bindings.
24. **\*** in CM, searches for the word under the cursor.
25. **gU** + motion, **gUU** for whole line, turns it uppercase.
**gu** for lowercase, **g\~** to toggle it.
26. **J** and **gJ**, to join lines, removing (or not) spaces as
necessary.
27. **R** to enter replace mode, nice for changing constants. I
can't believe how late I learned that one.
28. **!cmd**, filter text through cmd. Very useful with selecting
some text in visual mode and then doing a **!sort** on them.
29. **:&** repeats a search, allowing you to change its flags (add
a **/g**, for example). Also, **:%s///** for the whole file, btw.
30. **:sm/foo/bar/** or **:s/\\vfoo/bar/**, to activate regex
magic, like () and so on. Far nicer than vim's standard, but
**:pd** is even nicer.
31. **:retab**, replace tabs with proper whitespace.
32. **vimdiff $file1 $file2**, use vim as a diff tool. Hopefully
you know this one already, use **do** and **dp** to move chunk
here/away (obtain / push).
33. **:vimgrep**, grep inside vim. D'uh.
34. **C-v** enters visual block mode. I always forget this one when
I need it.
35. **{**and **}** move backwards/forwards through paragraphs, dito
**(** and **)** for sentences. (I really use the cursor too much
instead of vim's better syntactic movements.)
36. Speaking of movement, **b** and **w** move to the next word on
the left/right, **e** moves to the end of the word. Use those,
like, a lot.
37. **daw** deletes the current word (from anywhere in it), **das**
the current sentence.
38. **g;** and **g,** cycle backwards/forwards through your
changelist, putting your cursor there. So you can go somewhere
else, look something up, then jump right back to where you where.
Dito **C-o**, **C-i** and **:jumps** for jumps instead of changes.
Awesomesauce.
39. **m[register]** saves the current location in a register,
**\`[register]** jumps back to it, **\`\`** jumps to the last
location.
40. **u** and **C-r** are undo/redo, **U** undoes all changes on
the current line. So far, so good. But vim also has a powerful undo
tree. **:undol** shows the undo list, and **g-** and **g+** move
you along it. You can also use **:earlier** and **:later**, in
combination with either a count or [n]s, [n]m or [n]h for a time.
No if only vim could merge branches like Photoshop can...
41. **f[char]** and **t[char]** move you on/before the next
occurrence of [char] on the right, **F**and **T** on the left.
**;** and **,** repeats this movement in the same/opposite
direction. Of course, can be combined with deletion and so on.
42. **:make** executes make and jumps to the first compile error,
if any. (But I normally prefer to have a second terminal open for
that.)
43. **surround** plugin, mostly provides keys to change or remove
surroundings (blocks, quotes or tags). Use like **ds"** to remove "
quotes, **dst** to remove text block, **cs"(** to replace "" with
() and **ys[motion]{** to wrap something in {}. Works in visual
mode, too, of course.****(Also install the **repeat** plugin, to be
able to repeat the surround commands. Works like normal repeating.)
44. **FuzzyFinder** plugin, plus the **FuzzyFinderTextMate**
plugin, to have far nice fuzzy matching of buffers, files and so
on. I have **\\b**, **\\f** and **\\o** mapped to buffers, files
and everything (as in TextMate). Incredibly useful. (See
[here][fuzzyfinder] for installation instructions.)
45. **NERDcommenter** plugin for more intelligent commenting. Most
importantly, **\\cSpace** to toggle commenting, **\\cc** to comment
out, **\\cu** to remove comments.
46. window movement, most importantly:**C-W w** (and**\\\_**) to
jump to the next window, **C-W s** to split horizontally, **C-W v**
to split vertically, **C-W <** / **\>** / **=** to increase /
decrease /equalize window sizes.
47. **:set spell** for spell checking, **]s** and **[s**to move to
the next/last misspelled word, **zg** to add to the dictionary,
**zug** to undo it, **z=** for suggestions.
48. **SuperTab** plugin, to tab-complete *everything*. Yes,
everything. It's pretty smart and works well with omnicomplete.
Using my options, it works just like them cool IDEs.
49. **UltiSnips** plugin, steals the snippet function from TextMate and greatly
enhances it, so you can tab-complete code fragments into common structures. Great
speedup! Use tab to expand snippets and Shift-Left / Shift-Right to jump to
the next part of the snippet.
(I also tried **XPtemplate**, which is too ugly and hard to use, and
**snipMate**, which I used previously, but doesn't have recursive snippets.)

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@ -1,185 +0,0 @@
---
title: Meditation on XMonad
alt_titles: [XMonad]
date: 2010-05-03
techne: :done
episteme: :discredited
---
Ignorance is the root of all suffering - ignorance about reality,
about what is. By holding wrong assumptions, we create false
expectations and false needs. [^0]
I will not reflect on large parts of reality, but only a small one: window
managers (WM). [^1]
The most basic ignorance about WMs is the ignorance about
their existence. The computer does not just show data to us, but it can show it
to us in any way we want. It is this basic understanding that leads to the first
conclusion: If the way data is shown to us is lacking, it is not our fault, but
the computer is not doing it's job properly. Furthermore, if we have to spend a
lot of time just telling the computer how we would like to see something, we are
actually doing someone (or rather, something) else's work.
Therefore, tiling WMs. If you arrange your own windows, why are you using a WM
at all? Wouldn't it be more honest, instead of saying "I'm running Windows / KDE
/ OS X to show my windows", to admit "Windows / KDE / OS X is running me to show
it's windows."? Sure, the computer can not read your mind and some occasional
hints might be necessary, but the less work you do, the better.
Desire creates suffering. This is maybe the most misunderstood of Buddhist
truths. People hear "desire creates suffering" and think "What? Is this going to
be a moral how material possessions are bad for me? Money, cars, houses and so
on lead to greed, obsession, and so on. I get it.". This is not what this is
about. The problem with desire is not the desire itself. It is not a problem
that we want to be happy, to be rich and so on. The problem is, instead, that
what we want is impossible. Our desires *fail* us. We are mistaken about the
nature of reality and expect the wrong things. We think that money could make us
happier, so we want more of it, but it ultimately won't. From wrong assumptions
you can only get bad results.
In retrospect, I can see this clearly now on my journey to a better window
manager. It was my unwillingness to let go of old habits, my wrong ideas about
what I really need or want, that made adopting a new WM hard. So I went first to
WMs that offered great configuralibity and many features. "You can do anything
you want!" But this lead to useless features and distractions. It is only now
that most WMs fail me because my hardware setup is a bit tricky, that I can
understand. Only now when I understand better what my brain really needs, do I
grow tired of those full of bad design. Xmonad, in a way, is peace for me. It
is mathematical in nature. The fact that it is written in Haskell might seem
like a gimmick at first, but the connection is in fact very deep. I understand
now that it could not have been written in anything else. Xmonad exemplifies the
idea of purely functional programming. "Normal" programming is almost always
imperative - the programmer tells the computer how to do something. But in
functional programming, the hacker instead tells the computer what something
*is*. This is a profound difference.[^3]
In any other customizable WM I have ever used, I would create a complex
configuration to tell it exactly what I wanted it to do in some case or another.
I would do the bulk of the lifting, so to speak, either by constantly adjusting
the windows the WM handled wrong or by writing elaborate procedures to automate
this work. But with Xmonad, this is different. It is not my job to figure out
how to arrange windows, so I should never have to tell my WM anything about
this. The only thing I ever have to tell it is about what is. I should never
write something like "to go to the next tag, you read in all tags, sort them,
filter some out, find the current one and then shift to the next in the list".
I instead write: "I want the next non-empty, non-visible tag now". I give
Xmonad a few simple hints and that is it. "If it's name is in this list, I want
it floating. If I'm currently out of space here, try a different screen. There
is a status bar I'm running, so be careful not to overlap it."
For the first time, I feel like my WM is actually intelligent and wants to help
me. It is not my slave, not my servant who follows my orders. It does not look
down on me, thinking itself smarter than me, only an obstacle to its flawless
performance. Instead, Xmonad is my friend. It understands window handling and
can take care of it. I only tell it some personal preferences. If it doesn't
think I need something, it is probably right.
It is astonishing how easily we pick up delusions. We see something once and
think it should always be that way. Rarely do we question "Is this really
necessary? Is there no other way?"
For me, those are some of the delusions that clouded my
judgement about WMs.
"I need space! I want to see my desktop wallpaper!" What for? Have I not
something better to do than to stare at pretty pictures?
"I want to tell my WM what window is in the foreground and what in the
background." The very concept is wrong. There is no "foreground" with focus -
you either see something or you don't. A window you can not read might as well
not be there at all.
"I understand now, I use a tiling WM. But I want to control what window is
where!" Why? The very idea of a tiling WM is that the WM figures out what to
show you and how. You simply tell it what application has your focus right now
and what other applications belong to it (by giving them all the same tag /
workspace).
"Xmonad has no stacked layout like wmii! I can not easily put dozens of windows
in one column!" Why would you do this in the first place? You certainly can not
read them all. Let Xmonad only show you the ones that matter and search for
other ones if you need them. Or think about grouping them better. Why open 20
PDFs in separate windows if your viewer can take care of that?
"Xmonad has no title bars.[^4] I will miss those!" Are you sure? What do you use
them for? The window content itself tells you what the window is. If the
content is not visible, then a title bar will only waste space. If you need to
find something, let the WM do it for you. If you want status reports, use
notifications.
By embracing not complexity, but simplicity, confusion ends. The best solution
to a problem is to make it obsolete - as Gordon Bells said, "The cheapest,
fastest, and most reliable components are those that aren't there.".
By concentrating not on *how*, but on *what*, false
desires disappear. By letting go off false desires, suffering ends.
<%= image("guru.png", "Guru Meditation") %>
[^0]: Yeah, I have been reading Buddhist philosophy and history
again. Can you tell?
[^1]: The old monks have understood one thing: Truths about reality must be
visible everywhere. There can not be any aspect of reality that is not
permeated by them. Thus, we can improve our efforts by just focusing on one
simple object. Traditionally, one's breath, a candle or a rock have served
this purpose. Some Zen traditions use 只管打坐 (shikantaza, "simply correct
sitting") for this. If you can't understand reality just by sitting down and
concentrating, then reality can't be understood at all. Therefore we must
be able to see all those Buddhist observations in everything we use,
including the most fundamental GUI software - our window manager.
[^3]: The classical example to demonstrate this is Quicksort. If you have ever
programmed something, Quicksort was probably among it, but just to help you
remember, I'm gonna tell you again what Quicksort is. We define Quicksort
recursively like so: An empty sort is always sorted. To sort a list with at
least one element, we take the first element (called the pivot) in the list
and then separate the rest into two lists, one containing all the elements
that are smaller and one containing all that are larger than the pivot. Now,
to get the sorted result, we simply sort the first list, than add the pivot
and finally add the sorted second list. Think about how you would solve this
in an imperative language. In C, it would go something like this:
~~~
#!c
void swap(int *a, int *b)
{
int t=*a; *a=*b; *b=t;
}
void sort(int arr[], int beg, int end)
{
if (end > beg + 1) {
int piv = arr[beg], l = beg + 1, r = end;
while (l < r) {
if (arr[l] <= piv)
l++;
else
swap(&arr[l], &arr[--r]);
}
swap(&arr[--l], &arr[beg]);
sort(arr, beg, l);
sort(arr, r, end);
}
}
~~~
This is a typical example - we tell the computer exactly what to do to get
the result we are interested in. But remember I said that in a functional
language, we tell the computer what something *is*. I already told you what
Quicksort is, so let's write this down in Haskell:
~~~
#!haskell
qsort [] = []
qsort (x:xs) = qsort lesser ++ [x] ++ qsort greater
where lesser = [y | y <- xs, y < x]
greater = [y | y <- xs, y >= x]
~~~
And that's it.
[^4]: Technically, you can add them, but they are not normally there.

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@ -5,9 +5,7 @@ non_cognitive: true
no_comments: true
---
Memetic hazards and brainwashing.
The point of this blog is to iteratively develop certain ideas until they are ready to be merged with the [main site][main]. Smaller thoughts go to [Twitter][]. I also have a [daily practice/activity log][dlog].
Memetic hazards and brainwashing. I also have a [practice/activity log][dlog].
Feel free to comment or [contact][Contact] me directly. There is an [RSS feed][RSS].

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@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
---
title: Theology as Agentic Ontology
date: 2012-07-09
techne: :wip
episteme: :speculation
---
(And with this title, muflax finally crosses the jargon Rubicon.)
carrier quote
based on agents
misinterpretation of genesis
what is the case, by itself vs. what is *made* the case, through some agent

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@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
---
title: Algorithmic Causality and the New Testament
date: 2012-02-09
techne: :done
episteme: :speculation
slug: 2012/02/09/algorithmic-causality-and-the-new-testament/
---
...is what I would name an article I'm seriously considering to write. This is not this article. This is just the idea.
<%= image("20100512after.gif", "title") %>
What's one of the biggest controversies in New Testament studies? No, not the Jesus myth, we all know he was a [12th century Byzantine emperor][Fomenko claims]. No, more important than that, more fundamental.
When, and in what order, were the texts written? I'm going to ignore the *when* and instead focus on the *in what order*.
Why is this important at all? Because then we can trace influences, theological and political developments and so on. We can use this information to figure out what the direction of certain developments was (Did they start with a messiah and made him a prophet or the other way around?), can date the texts much better (If Paul's letter were written *after* the gospels, then who the fuck is "Paul"?) and so on. So basically, you can make significant progress on all historical questions about early Christianity.
Of course, this doesn't just apply to Christianity. It works in any textual tradition, but Christianity is extremely well-documented compared to anything else before basically the Renaissance, so we start there.
You'd think that with such an important question, you'd have good answers by now. If you seriously assume that, you've never *been* in a humanities class. Seriously, these fuckers can't even quantify shit. They are like the little brother who's a bit retarded, but no one has the to heart to tell them how much they make a fool of themselves when they constantly claim that they don't need "math", "computers" or "machines", they have "dialectic". </rant\>
Anyway, back to text ordering. I had an interesting talk with a statistical learning researcher yesterday and he brought up a really cool idea.
Let's say you have two pieces of data, A and B, and you're trying to figure out if A *causes* B. [Traditionally][Judea Pearl], you do this through statistics. You sample and collect some observations, then check if you see conditional probabilities. Basically, if A and B are independent variables, there can't be a causation, but if you can predict B, given A, but not the other way around, then A causes B. (In your face, Popper!)
There's one problem with this - you need a certain amount of samples. It doesn't work with N=1. If you only ever saw A and B once, statistically, you'd be screwed. [But maybe there's another way.][Causal Inference]
Let's say your data is actually a sequence of digits, as produced by two volunteers. You put each one of them in an isolated room and then tell them to write down 1000 digits. Afterwards you compare the texts and notice something - *they are almost identical*. What happened?
Well, one possibility is that one of them copied the other. But you isolated them, this can't have happened. What else? If you thought, "they used the same method to come up with the sequence", then you win. For example, they might both be writing down the prime numbers, but each one made a few minor mistakes. But how does this help us discover causality?
Remember [Kolmogorov complexity][Kolmogorov Complexity]. K(s) of any sequence s is a measure of how well you can compress s. In other words, it tells you how hard it is to find an algorithm to generate s. The lower K(s), the easier the task. So going back to our two sequences A and B, what's their complexity? Well, K(A) and K(B) will be almost identical. After all, it's just K(prime numbers) + K(a few mistakes). But more importantly, what's the complexity of K(A, B), i.e. of a program that outputs both A and B? In our case, it's almost the same - we just have to remember the additional mistakes. K(prime numbers) can be reused.
So we see that in our example, K(A) + K(B) is significantly larger than K(A,B) because there is so much overlap. What if they had used different methods, say if B was writing down π instead? Then K(A) + K(B) would be basically identical to K(A,B). You couldn't reuse anything.
So what do we conclude? If K(A) + K(B), for any two pieces of data A and B, is significantly larger than K(A,B), then they share the process that generated them. They are *causally linked*.
Alright, but how does this give us order?
Let's say there is a third sequence, C. We check it and find it has all the errors in A, but a few additional ones. So K(C) = K(A) + K(additional error) and thus K(C,A) is much smaller than K(C) + K(A) and there's a causal link. But there's more than that. If you search for an algorithm that generates C, if you already have one that generates A for free, what's the result? K(C\|A) is really small, like trivially small - it's just a few additional errors.
Enter Markov and his Condition. In a causal graph, any node is determined only by its direct causes. Basically, once you know all the direct causes of something, there's nothing left to learn. Checking any other node won't give you additional information. We say that the direct causes *screen off* the rest of the graph. Everything is nice and local. We can slightly relax this to construct a statistical ordering. Remember the case where B depended on A, but not the other way around. So obviously A must be the cause of B because otherwise you could learn something about B without involving causation. The *strength* of a causal link is then a measure of how much information you can extract from other nodes.
So now you can order A, B and C. You know the obvious causal connection A-B, so you put this in your graph. But you also know that the complexity of C is really low if you know A, but if you additionally knew B, it wouldn't buy you anything. So you put A-C in your graph and you have a nice little graph C-A-B.
One problem: you don't have a *direction*. This is a general causal problem. You don't know if A caused C by adding errors or C caused A by removing them. You know the *topology*, but have no arrows. Minor bugger. There may be a solution to that problem. You need to introduce a kind of entropy, but that only complicates this nice and simple approach, so we won't do that here.
The result is already quite nice. Just get out your little [Kolmogorov black box][Incomputability] and compute various K(x) and K(y\|x) and you know who plagiarized who. ...oh, your Kolmogorov box is in repair? You ran out of hypercomputronium and can't compute K(x)?
[Well have I got news for you!][Causal Markov] Recall that Kolmogorov complexity is fundamentally compression. You can think of picking a compression algorithm to compare sequences like deciding on a Turing Machine, then finding shortest programs. Also, whatever compression you achieve is an upper bound of the real K(s), so they function as good approximations. If only there were runnable compression algorithms...
There are [shit-tons of compression algorithms][Lossless Data Compression]! Just pick one and compress away. Have fun with your causal graph! Only one little problem - you'll find out that your algorithm is somewhat biased. (The irrational bastard!) You can think of it as a *prior* over your programs-to-be-compressed. For example, if you use run-length encoding (i.e. you save "77777" as "5x7"), then you assume that simple repetition is likely. The more features you build into your algorithm, the more slanted your prior becomes, but typically the better it compresses stuff. For our task of ordering historical texts, we want an algorithm that identifies textual features so it can exploit as much structure as possible (and ideally, in a similar way as humans), but doesn't favor any particular text. (Sorry, I don't yet know what the best choice is. I hear [LZ77][] is nice, but there's still science to do.)
So what do we do now? Gather all texts in their original form and compress the hell out of them. Of course, test the procedure with corpuses that have a known ordering first. Bam, definite answers to problems like the [Markan priority][]. History is uncertain no more.
So yes, I'm yet another engineer who looked at some field within the humanities and thought, that's all rubbish, I bet I can solve this shit right now.
<%= image("philo_engineers.jpg", "SMBC engineer ban") %>

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---
title: Catholics Right Again, News At 11
date: 2012-03-14
techne: :done
episteme: :discredited
slug: 2012/03/14/catholics-right-again-news-at-11/
---
So I've [said][Why You Don't Want Vipassana] [repeatedly][The End of Rationality] now that I have serious problems with vipassana and the whole Theravada soup it emerged from. It's not just a technical problem, but a deep rejection of the assumptions, goals and interpretations of that framework, at least in its current form. I still like them enough that I'm not interested in taking my stuff and going home. I merely believe that vipassana, as it exists today in its numerous incarnations, is in serious need of repair, but still worthwhile. But before we start with the fixing, let's have a look at what's *broken*.
Interestingly enough, I found that the Catholic Church[1] had already written my criticism for me, in their [Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on some aspects of Christian Meditation][Catholic Meditation], and I only need to comment on some minor aspects of it and maybe translate some it back into Buddhist lingo. In contrast to the glorious [Visuddhimagga][] (and Theravada scripture in general), the Catholic maps are much less detailed and are plagued by important holes and mistakes due to doctrinal commitments, but what they lack in precision, they make up in interpretation. The Catholic [vehicle][Yana] may have inferior engineering compared to the [Causal vehicle][Sutrayana], but it has one major advantage - it's driving in the right direction.
The Church says (emphasis mine):
> In order to draw near to that mystery of union with God, which the Greek Fathers called the divinization of man, and to grasp accurately the manner in which this is realized, it is necessary in the first place to bear in mind that man is essentially a creature, and remains such for eternity, so that **an absorbing of the human self into the divine self is never possible**, not even in the highest states of grace. However, one must recognize that the human person is created in the "image and likeness" of God, and that the archetype of this image is the Son of God, in whom and through whom we have been created (cf. Col 1:16). This archetype reveals the greatest and most beautiful Christian mystery: from eternity the Son is "other" with respect to the Father and yet, in the Holy Spirit, he is "of the same substance." **Consequently this otherness, far from being an ill, is rather the greatest of goods.** There is otherness in God himself, who is one single nature in three Persons, and there is also otherness between God and creatures, who are by nature different.
>
> [...]
>
> A consideration of these truths together brings the wonderful discovery that all the aspirations which the prayer of other religions expresses are fulfilled in the reality of Christianity beyond all measure, **without the personal self or the nature of a creature being dissolved or disappearing into the sea of the Absolute**.
This is really a two-pronged criticism. First, and most directly, it calls out the bullshit monism that has crept into modern Buddhism and the futile attempts to find unity with the Absolute. I hope I don't need to elaborate on why this is nonsense, so let's go on to the second part.
Advanced vipassana, in its common interpretations, breaks down the barrier between subject and object. It leads to a state of unity of perception in which only sensations exist, but no-one *observing* these sensations and no objects these are sensations *of*. In the thinking just the thought, in the seeing just the seen, and so on.
This is the second mistake, in that it denies the fundamental nature of a self. It has some damn good reasons to do so, but is still wrong. I find it interesting that Catholicism promises a path to salvation *without* the dissolution of the self. It wouldn't have to sell this to the laity, they don't care either way. So why is this promise in there? Only someone deep down the Paths, one way or another, would really care about it at all. I'm skeptical of Catholics actually being that good, but you know, maybe I still underestimate them.
Regardless, the real alternative only probably only becomes apparent to advanced practitioners who actually experience it, who can see for themselves that you don't need to surrender yourself to make progress. Not all gods demand submission and dissociation.
> The seeking of God through prayer has to be **preceded and accompanied by an ascetical struggle and a purification from one's own sins and errors**, since Jesus has said that only "the pure of heart shall see God" (Mt 5:8). The Gospel aims above all at a moral purification from the lack of truth and love and, on a deeper level, from all the selfish instincts which impede man from recognizing and accepting the Will of God in its purity. **The passions are not negative in themselves** (as the Stoics and Neoplatonists thought), **but their tendency is to selfishness**. It is from this that the Christian has to free himself in order to arrive at that state of positive freedom which in classical Christian times was called "apatheia," in the Middle Ages "Impassibilitas" and in the Ignatian Spiritual Exercises "indiferencia." **This is impossible without a radical self-denial**, as can also be seen in St. Paul who openly uses the word "mortification" (of sinful tendencies).20 Only this self-denial renders man free to carry out the will of God and to share in the freedom of the Holy Spirit.
This is what really pisses me off about modern mindfulness practice. They have not just forgotten, but are outright in denial about the necessity of struggle. (Although I consider that possibility that I just naturally fall relatively close to asceticism and am myopic about how obvious the path is.)
I'd like to point out the similarity between "indiferencia" and equanimity in the Theravada models. Same territory, similar maps, radically different approaches. Also, the point about the neutrality of passions is important as well. Theravada people tend to reject their emotions for no good reason.
> Therefore, one has to interpret correctly the teaching of those masters who recommend "emptying" the spirit of all sensible representations and of every concept, while remaining lovingly attentive to God. In this way, **the person praying creates an empty space which can then be filled by the richness of God**. However, the emptiness which God requires is that of the renunciation of personal selfishness, not necessarily that of the renunciation of those created things which he has given us and among which he has placed us. There is no doubt that in prayer one should concentrate entirely on God and as far as possible exclude the things of this world which bind us to our selfishness. On this topic St. Augustine is an excellent teacher: if you want to find God, he says, abandon the exterior world and re-enter into yourself. However, he continues, **do not remain in yourself, but go beyond yourself because you are not God: He is deeper and greater than you**. "I look for his substance in my soul and I do not find it; I have however meditated on the search for God and, reaching out to him, through created things, I have sought to know 'the invisible perfections of God' (Rom 1:20)." "To remain in oneself": this is the real danger. The great Doctor of the Church recommends concentrating on oneself, but also transcending the self which is not God, but only a creature. God is "deeper than my inmost being and higher than my greatest height." In fact God is in us and with us, but he transcends us in his mystery.
I'm simultaneously fascinated by the approach and skeptical of it. Anyway, kenosis is a cool practice, one that only rarely pops up in Buddhism. I think it should. If only to give you your own familiarity with the God one later has to slay. (Sorry, spoiler? God dies at the end.)
> Without doubt, a Christian needs certain periods of retreat into solitude to be recollected and, in God's presence, rediscover his path. Nevertheless, given his character as a creature, and as a creature who knows that only in grace is he secure, **his method of getting closer to God is not based on any technique** in the strict sense of the word. That would contradict the spirit of childhood called for by the Gospel. **Genuine Christian mysticism has nothing to do with technique: it is always a gift of God, and the one who benefits from it knows himself to be unworthy.**
Third fetter: attachment to rites and rituals. Experiment. Figure out *why* the technique exist. Don't just follow the script.
(I also like the observation that the ideal practitioner always feels unworthy, always in a state of sin. Says something about their moral awareness.)
> Some physical exercises automatically produce a feeling of quiet and relaxation, pleasing sensations, perhaps even phenomena of light and of warmth, which resemble spiritual well-being. **To take such feelings for the authentic consolations of the Holy Spirit would be a totally erroneous way of conceiving the spiritual life.** Giving them a symbolic significance typical of the mystical experience, when the moral condition of the person concerned does not correspond to such an experience, would represent a kind of mental schizophrenia which could also lead to psychic disturbance and, at times, to moral deviations.
Take that, mindfulness!
> From the rich variety of Christian prayer as proposed by the Church, **each member of the faithful should seek and find his own way**, his own form of prayer. But all of these personal ways, in the end, flow into the way to the Father, which is how Jesus Christ has described himself. **In the search for his own way, each person will, therefore, let himself be led not so much by his personal tastes as by the Holy Spirit, who guides him, through Christ, to the Father.**
Of course it's easy to say that you shouldn't get attached to established methods; it's hard to actually do.
I personally struggle a lot with it. I *love* pre-defined ritual and I've always been at unease with free-form meditation or prayer, including the vague aspects of vipassana. Actually moving beyond the scripts and developing your own path as a *reaction* to what you encounter is seriously hard. Reconceptualizing this as lesson received by a Supreme Teacher, who instructs *you personally* is a clever way to get around this difficulty.
The main problem I have is the lack of reason for a practice. So I know how Mahasi noting works, but I wonder what I note *for*. I can note sensation all day, but what's the purpose behind all that? Sure, it advances me in the path, but the description is on the wrong meta-level. It's like someone instructing you how to write a novel by telling you to type "I", then "t", "space", "w", "a", "s" and so on.
> For the person who makes a serious effort there will, however, be moments in which he seems to be wandering in a desert and, **in spite of all his efforts, he "feels" nothing of God**. He should know that these trials are not spared anyone who takes prayer seriously. **However, he should not immediately see this experience, common to all Christians who pray, as the "dark night" in the mystical sense.** In any case in these moments, his prayer, which he will resolutely strive to keep to, could give him the impression of a certain "artificiality," although really it is something totally different: **in fact it is at that very moment an expression of his fidelity to God, in whose presence he wishes to remain even when he receives no subjective consolation in return.**
>
> In these apparently negative moments, it becomes clear what the person who is praying really seeks: is he indeed looking for God who, in his infinite freedom, always surpasses him; or is he only seeking himself, without managing to go beyond his own "experiences", whether they be positive "experiences" of union with God or negative "experiences" of mystical "emptiness."
Unconditional acceptance, despite the full understanding of one's own sinful nature. And I thought was the only person to [get this][Dark Stance].
This provides a different solution to the Dark Night nanas. Don't overcome them - embrace them. They teach you what you're really looking for - actual emptiness. Don't work around them.
I doubt anyone involved in the writing of this document is an actual arhat. And yet they get it right. "When in doubt, do what the Catholic Church says" seems like a really good heuristic lately. They have accumulated an amazing amount of good insights and stable social practices over the centuries. If you don't know what to think about a topic, going with the Church doctrine (and ignoring it if the Church hasn't said anything about it) seems to me like an almost universally good idea, and I say that as a filthy unbaptized heathen.
However, I don't think this wisdom is particularly connected to Christianity or any unique theological idea in Catholicism, but rather the *long* history of being the state religion of various large empires. Other "empire religions" like Confucianism or Islam do a great job as well, but except for maybe Confucianism and (some) Hinduism, none have the vast experience and large supply of dedicated intellectuals as the Catholic Church. Also, institutional wisdom almost always outperforms individual insight, so having hundreds of specialized priests think about a problem and trying solutions for a couple of centuries gives you some serious experience. Don't underestimate it.

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---
title: On the Crucifixion
date: 2011-03-11
techne: :rough
episteme: :discredited
disowned: true
---
<%= youtube("http://www.youtube.com/v/PZBqsqvfj0Y") %>
We know that the crucifixion of Christ is a myth[^1]. We also know that it isn't
unique; there are plenty of life-death-rebirth gods. The theme goes back to at
least 2,000BCE in its explicit form. But what's the charm? What is its
attraction?
There are two points that can be made, I believe.
The first would be a [Jaynesian][Julian Jaynes] argument; that the early
"reborn" gods are hallucinations of former rulers that continued beyond their
death. The king would give commands, many of which were in the form of explicit
voice-hallucinations by his subjects, and as such they tended to hang around a
while after the king's death. The bodily death of a person didn't wipe it out
completely; resurrection becomes obvious. (I'm not gonna give a detailed account
how this worked, for Jaynes and others have already done so.) I find this very
convincing for many cases. [^2]
In the case of Jesus, however, we have a somewhat different scenario. For one,
it plays out much too late. The bicameral mind would've already largely been
gone, so it seems unlikely that many of the early believers actually had the
dead still hanging around. (Which, of course, is the main reason reborn gods
have fallen out of favor since then.) Furthermore, it seems unlikely that the
man existed in the first place. His resurrection was not a construction to
explain away his incomplete death; instead, death came first and life was build
around it much later.
Luckily, early Christianity is the best documented idea of the whole ancient
world, so let's take a closer look how the story unfolded.
There are two sources we can build on, Mark and Paul[^3]. Additionally, we will
take a look at John, as will become clear soon. While it may be possible that
Mark is actually a later, condensed gospel, I find the argument for it
unconvincing. The story is much too sober and it already has signs of extension,
so it seems more likely to me that Mark is one of the earliest documents, maybe
even the first written gospel, period.
What stands out in Mark's gospel is the lack of a biography. Jesus appears out
of nowhere, gets baptized, heals a lot of people, appoints his staff and finally
is killed. The miracle stories are very non-specific, giving just minimalist
accounts, reminiscent of today's anecdotes about "spiritual healers" (c.f.
[Sathya Sai Baba][]). The person described here is just one con-man among many,
with some Jewish justification thrown in in an obvious attempt to later support
his authority over the Jews, capitalizing on John the Baptist as well.
But the tone changes dramatically at the end. Suddenly, Jesus becomes insecure
and actually takes his own practices seriously. Before, you get the impression
he is doing all the miracles, handing out the teachings only for his own profit
or to shut people up. Now, he begs God to save him! This might certainly be a
later addition, retconning a sudden arrest into an expected betrayal. Yet
observe Jesus on the cross. Mark (15-16) tells it like this[^4]:
> It was nine o'clock in the morning when they crucified him. The inscription of
> the charge against him read, "The king of the Jews". And they crucified two
> outlaws with him, one on his right and one on his left. Those who passed by
> defamed him, shaking their heads and saying, "Aha! You who can destroy the
> temple and rebuild it in three days, save yourself and come down from the
> cross!" In the same way even the chief priests - together with the experts in
> the law - were mocking him among themselves: "He saved others, but he cannot
> save himself! Let the Christ, the king of Israel, come down from the cross
> now, that we may see and believe!" Those who were crucified with him also
> spoke abusively to him.
>
> Now when it was noon, darkness came over the whole land until three in the
> afternoon. Around three o'clock Jesus cried out with a loud voice, "Eloi,
> Eloi, lema sabachthani?" which means, "My God, my God, why have you forsaken
> me?" When some of the bystanders heard it they said, "Listen, he is calling
> for Elijah!" Then someone ran, filled a sponge with sour wine, put it on a
> stick, and gave it to him to drink, saying, "Leave him alone! Let's see if
> Elijah will come to take him down!" But Jesus cried out with a loud voice and
> breathed his last.
This Son of Man is clearly panicking, not in control at all. He dies on the
cross and is quickly buried.[^5] Finally, Mark concludes:
> Then as they went into the tomb, they saw a young man dressed in a white robe
> sitting on the right side; and they were alarmed. But he said to them, "Do not
> be alarmed. You are looking for Jesus the Nazarene, who was crucified. He has
> been raised! He is not here. Look, there is the place where they laid him. But
> go, tell his disciples, even Peter, that he is going ahead of you into
> Galilee. You will see him there, just as he told you." Then they went out and
> ran from the tomb, for terror and bewilderment had seized them. And they said
> nothing to anyone, because they were afraid.
It just ends there. Jesus doesn't even appear after his death. None of his
teachings, in any way, justify his death or give it any meaning whatsoever. He
is just suddenly taken away and killed, story over. The earlier "prophecies" and
assurances that it went "just as planned" are clearly later additions, but the
core seems very harsh. In fact, there's barely any attempt at wisdom or
teaching![^6] This gospel is not about resurrection at all.[^7]
Now let's take a look at Paul. Taking a conservative approach[^8], there are
four authentic letters, namely Romans, I+II Corinthians and Galatians. Some of
the others might be authentic, at least partially, but existing dogma hides the
early developments we want to see. Paul writes about a lot of stuff, much of
which is of little importance to us. Like Mark, he rarely gives any *explicit
teaching* about or by Jesus. He insists that truth is revealed to him by God,
but he never feels the need to actually articulate this truth. Some vague
sentiments and emotional sing-song are enough.
For example, in I Corinthians 1:11-31, Paul writes:
> For Christ did not send me to baptize[^9], but to preach the gospel - and not
> with clever speech, so that the cross of Christ would not become useless. For
> the message about the cross is foolishness to those who are perishing, but to
> us who are being saved it is the power of God. For it is written, "I will
> destroy the wisdom of the wise, and I will thwart the cleverness of the
> intelligent." Where is the wise man? Where is the expert in the Mosaic law?
> Where is the debater of this age? Has God not made the wisdom of the world
> foolish? For since in the wisdom of God the world by its wisdom did not know
> God, God was pleased to save those who believe by the foolishness of
> preaching. For Jews demand miraculous signs and Greeks ask for wisdom, but we
> preach about a crucified Christ, a stumbling block to Jews and foolishness to
> Gentiles. But to those who are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ is the
> power of God and the wisdom of God. For the foolishness of God is wiser than
> human wisdom, and the weakness of God is stronger than human strength.
>
> Think about the circumstances of your call, brothers and sisters. Not many
> were wise by human standards, not many were powerful, not many were born to a
> privileged position. But God chose what the world thinks foolish to shame the
> wise, and God chose what the world thinks weak to shame the strong. God chose
> what is low and despised in the world, what is regarded as nothing, to set
> aside what is regarded as something, so that no one can boast in his presence.
> He is the reason you have a relationship with Christ Jesus, who became for us
> wisdom from God, and righteousness and sanctification and redemption, so that,
> as it is written, "Let the one who boasts, boast in the Lord."
Paul is very explicit here in his outright rejection of any kind of argument. No
wonder the teaching is so lacking of content; it is empty on purpose! Paul takes
his conviction from the warm, fuzzy feelings he gets when he thinks of (not
about!) the Christ. Everything else, he argues from Jewish law or his own
prejudices. There is literally nothing about the actual crucifixion or even the
character of Jesus Christ in there. It is merely a source for him to draw all
this "faith" from.
What, then, is the crucifixion? What did later Christians get it *from*? All we
have seen so far are miracles stories, interpretations of Jewish law and some
organizational issues.
What we really see happening is a hijacking. Gnostic thinkers, most notably
[Marcion][] and [Simon Magus][] [^10], develop their own theology, based on Jewish
mythology, a rejection of Jewish law and many (mostly Greek) mystic techniques.
To increase mass appeal, they retrofit it into existing legends and begin a
process of "historization", identifying a spiritual messiah figure with an
actual person. Over time, the idea of a Jewish faith healer as central figure of
a cosmic struggle sticks, people like it and the myth moves. Mark assimilates
anecdotes and myth into a plausible story. Followers like it, but the narrative
is severely lacking. Luke and Matthew rewrite it, introducing many new popular
anecdotes, giving Jesus an actual character and adding a proper arc structure.
Now intellectuals can find something in there, too! That's the way the story
should've happened, you know.
Believing that Jesus must have lived (others say so), and that his teachings
must've been profound (his followers swear by it), mystics start substituting
their own ideas for whatever really happened and teach what they thought the
Son of Man should've taught. Full fan-fiction mode kicks in and a couple of
decades later, all coherent structure is gone. The New Testament is born,
optimized for sounding as profound and authoritative as possible without
excluding any prevailing idea, pandering to as many biases and prejudices as
possible.
In other words, the crucifixion is a form of secularization[^11], making
abstract mystic teaching more palpable by giving them concrete form. We could
look at early Gnostic documents or try to reconstruct them from similar, but
better documented traditions (say, the Upanishads, the Pali Canon or Crowley's
work). But let's unravel it from the inside.
We come now to John, whose gospel is a clear case of later Christian editing of
an originally Gnostic document. Just look at this beginning:
> In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was
> fully God. The Word was with God in the beginning. All things were created by
> him, and apart from him not one thing was created that has been created. In
> him was life, and the life was the light of mankind. And the light shines on
> in the darkness, but the darkness has not mastered it.
Except for a change of names, this is exactly the basic Gnostic world view of
the Supreme God from whom all other beings emanate, of the broken Demiurge that
makes the world but doesn't understand it, and of Sophia (wisdom) who brings the
divine spark into this world, giving humanity its soul and way of liberation.
John's new Jesus is divine in ways he never was in Mark. God is not Jehovah
anymore - the god that walked the earth, talked to people and messed with their
affairs. John's God is as unworldly as can be.
But back to the cross. After preparing his disciples for the upcoming sacrifice,
Jesus is arrested and found guilty. John gives us a much more detailed story.
> So they took Jesus, and carrying his own cross he went out to the place called
> "The Place of the Skull" (called in Aramaic Golgotha). There they crucified
> him along with two others, one on each side, with Jesus in the middle. Pilate
> also had a notice written and fastened to the cross, which read: "Jesus the
> Nazarene, the king of the Jews." Thus many of the Jewish residents of
> Jerusalem read this notice, because the place where Jesus was crucified was
> near the city, and the notice was written in Aramaic, Latin, and Greek. Then
> the chief priests of the Jews said to Pilate, "Do not write, 'The king of the
> Jews', but rather, 'This man said, I am king of the Jews.'" Pilate answered,
> "What I have written, I have written."
>
> Now when the soldiers crucified Jesus, they took his clothes and made four
> shares, one for each soldier, and the tunic remained. (Now the tunic was
> seamless, woven from top to bottom as a single piece.) So the soldiers said to
> one another, "Let's not tear it, but throw dice to see who will get it." This
> took place to fulfill the scripture that says, "They divided my garments among
> them, and for my clothing they threw dice." So the soldiers did these things.
>
> Now standing beside Jesus' cross were his mother, his mother's sister, Mary
> the wife of Clopas, and Mary Magdalene. So when Jesus saw his mother and the
> disciple whom he loved standing there, he said to his mother, "Woman, look,
> here is your son!" He then said to his disciple, "Look, here is your mother!"
> From that very time the disciple took her into his own home.
>
> After this Jesus, realizing that by this time everything was completed, said
> (in order to fulfill the scripture), "I am thirsty!" A jar full of sour wine
> was there, so they put a sponge soaked in sour wine on a branch of hyssop and
> lifted it to his mouth. When he had received the sour wine, Jesus said, "It is
> completed!" Then he bowed his head and gave up his spirit.
>
> Then, because it was the day of preparation, so that the bodies should not
> stay on the crosses on the Sabbath (for that Sabbath was an especially
> important one), the Jewish leaders asked Pilate to have the victims' legs
> broken and the bodies taken down. So the soldiers came and broke the legs of
> the two men who had been crucified with Jesus, first the one and then the
> other. But when they came to Jesus and saw that he was already dead, they did
> not break his legs. But one of the soldiers pierced his side with a spear, and
> blood and water flowed out immediately. And the person who saw it has
> testified (and his testimony is true, and he knows that he is telling the
> truth), so that you also may believe. For these things happened so that the
> scripture would be fulfilled, "Not a bone of his will be broken." And again
> another scripture says, "They will look on the one whom they have pierced."
>
> After this, Joseph of Arimathea, a disciple of Jesus (but secretly, because he
> feared the Jewish leaders), asked Pilate if he could remove the body of Jesus.
> Pilate gave him permission, so he went and took the body away. Nicodemus, the
> man who had previously come to Jesus at night, accompanied Joseph, carrying a
> mixture of myrrh and aloes weighing about seventy-five pounds. Then they took
> Jesus' body and wrapped it, with the aromatic spices, in strips of linen cloth
> according to Jewish burial customs. Now at the place where Jesus was crucified
> there was a garden, and in the garden was a new tomb where no one had yet been
> buried. And so, because it was the Jewish day of preparation and the tomb was
> nearby, they placed Jesus' body there.
Several things stand out about this.[^12] For one, Jesus is now fulfilling all
kinds of prophecies. John is a great example of the later attempt to write Jesus
into the Jewish messiah. This is not part of the Gnostic teaching and was also
clearly not in Mark or other early documents. Only now does this become
necessary with the church spreading among and breaking away from the Jews.
Furthermore, Jesus now interacts with witnesses. He is finally in control. He
even comforts his mourning family. This doesn't look like a sacrifice at all
anymore. And we see one thing missing that changes the whole dynamic, that
betrays its Gnostic roots: God is absent. Read closely. Jesus does not pray, he
is not the Christ, he does not beg, does not bring the Kingdom. John's gospel is
not about a resurrection, but a transformation. Jesus frees the divine spirit
and breaks the cage of the flesh.
The crucifixion is the symbol of this transformation and is used in that light
by Paul who references his own death and resurrection. It stands not for an
overcoming of death. In no meaningful way does Jesus die; his body dies, but the
transformation continues independent of it, as we will see now. In stark
contrast to Mark, John continues after Jesus' death.
<%= dailymotion("http://www.dailymotion.com/swf/video/xnryl") %>
> Now very early on the first day of the week, while it was still dark, Mary
> Magdalene came to the tomb and saw that the stone had been moved away from the
> entrance. So she went running to Simon Peter and the other disciple whom Jesus
> loved and told them, "They have taken the Lord from the tomb, and we dont
> know where they have put him!" [...]
>
> But Mary stood outside the tomb weeping. As she wept, she bent down and looked
> into the tomb. And she saw two angels in white sitting where Jesus' body had
> been lying, one at the head and one at the feet. They said to her, "Woman, why
> are you weeping?" Mary replied, "They have taken my Lord away, and I do not
> know where they have put him!" When she had said this, she turned around and
> saw Jesus standing there, but she did not know that it was Jesus.
>
> Jesus said to her, "Woman, why are you weeping? Who are you looking for?"
> Because she thought he was the gardener, she said to him, "Sir, if you have
> carried him away, tell me where you have put him, and I will take him." Jesus
> said to her, "Mary." She turned and said to him in Aramaic, "*Rabboni*"
> (which means Teacher). Jesus replied, "Do not touch me, for I have not yet
> ascended to my Father. Go to my brothers and tell them, 'I am ascending to my
> Father and your Father, to my God and your God.'" Mary Magdalene came and
> informed the disciples, "I have seen the Lord!" And she told them what Jesus
> had said to her.
It then goes on to fabricate a "tradition" of revelation. This kind of thing
becomes important for the growing church, but is of little concern to us.
But this ascension is important. It is a purely spiritual experience of which
the bodily death is just a vivid metaphor. It is the central technique around
which the early church is built. The miracles are only there to finance it, the
prophecies to gain a greater audience, the morals to further its influence. But
the core is this accessible, graphic and guided mystical transformation.
But what *is* transformed? Now that is the real strength of the crucifixion.
*Everything*. *Anything*!
You see, it is a placeholder. It can take on the role of any mystic technique.
It is a universal metaphor. The Gnostic can see Sophia, the Theravadan can see
the [Arising and Passing Away][], the new convert sees hope. What the
crucifixion provides is a usable interpretation for a wide variety of confusing
experiences. Instead of having to deal with the mind and the world as they
really are, the crucifixion gives security. The difficult part of the ongoing
transformation has already been done by someone else, the purpose is clear, the
goal relatable. Overcoming death, freeing the spirit, getting closer to God -
pick whatever seems most attractive to you. The Christ died for all of these, so
have faith.
The crucifixion is a Rorschach blot of the psyche.
> I looked at the Rorschach blot. I tried to pretend it looked like a spreading
> tree, shadows pooled beneath it, but it didn't. It looked more like a dead cat
> I once found, the fat, glistening grubs writhing blindly, squirming over each
> other, frantically tunneling away from the light. But even that is avoiding
> the real horror. The horror is this: In the end, it is simply a picture of
> empty meaningless blackness. We are alone. There is nothing else.
>
> -- Dr. Malcolm Long, Watchmen
<%= image("rorschach.jpg", "Rorschach") %>
[^1]: [Robert M. Price][], yada yada, Christ myth proponents not convincing? Do
you also believe in Oz? If not, how about Hercules? If you understand why
they are myth, you will understand why Christ is, too.
[^2]: A completely unjustified speculation: the Buddha stands out by being the
only one that breaks the pattern. He taught within a context that still
accepted general rebirth, so continuing the theme would be very obvious and
in fact, later Buddhists, particularly in the Mahayana tradition, did bring
it back by making Buddha an ascended god, or by inventing the idea of the
Bodhisattva, a being that intentionally ensures its own rebirth to help
others. But in the original story, Buddha was a mortal who distinguished
himself by *not* being reborn. He successfully extinguishes himself after
death and his disciples didn't doubt it. Why is this remarkable? It would've
happened during the transition to conscious minds, according to Jaynes'
theory. There would be lots of remnants around, lots of old ideas colored by
bicameral minds. What the Buddha did, maybe, was achieve full subjective
consciousness(, destroy his personal god called the self) and teach it to
his students, thus killing the dead voices. He wouldn't hang around after
death because he changed the minds of his followers, so he was truly gone -
[Tathagata][]. Later students, already conscious, couldn't understand the
remarkableness of this feat anymore, so they retconned the Samsara story
into it, maybe even actually inverting it. Now the goal of enlightenment is
to destroy the linguistically constructed self and see the world "raw",
non-subjectively. I would strongly suspect that during this retcon, they
invented the figure of the Buddha, moved him closer to their time and
assembled his story out of ongoing myths. The "real" Buddha, the one that
brought death to the world, is almost certainly much older, dating back to
maybe 1000BCE.
[^3]: Mark and Paul, of course, are likely not really Mark and Paul, but rather
anonymous texts attributed to the fictitious characters. Paul, at least, is
most likely based on a real person, in the same way that Jetpack Hitler is.
[^4]: Always using the NET bible, as on [bible.org][].
[^5]: I find it fascinating that there is explicit mention of how fast Jesus
died. Also, his followers took his body right away. This gives some credence
to the idea that his death was faked. However, Jesus does not return in any
way. He might've successfully gone into hiding (or to India, as some
traditions have it), but that seems a bit too speculative to me. I don't
really see how you could fake a crucifixion, or why you would draw attention
to the fact afterwards. If Mark was in on the lie, he wouldn't have told us
about the preparations or the sudden death. It would look much more like
Luke.
[^6]: If you find my dismissal of Mark too harsh, try reading it yourself, but
as if it were new. Imagine we met at a friend's house and I introduce you to
some text I wrote. It's all true, I inform you. It's about my former
Japanese teacher, Takashi, but I wrote it in English for you, translating as
necessary. Try reading Mark that way, substituting Takashi for Jesus, Osaka
for Galilee, Suzuki the Monk for John the Baptist and so on. What would you
think about this Takashi? What is his message? Could you even decipher any?
[^7]: There is the idea that the New Testament is a (partial) parody. Some parts
of it might be, especially in Acts, but I don't buy it for Mark. It follows
well-known woo-woo con-men structures, has obvious editing mistakes and no
underlying plot. The text is partially manipulative, partially sincere, as
is typical for the genre. Compare with reports about Sai Baba or Osho, for
example.
[^8]: I'm eagerly awaiting Price' upcoming book, "The Amazing Colossal Apostle".
I'm certainly seeing the merit of rejecting all Pauline letters as authentic
already, but I'm not fully convinced yet. Also, I didn't want to make my
analysis contingent on it.
[^9]: I'd love to know what exact practices Paul is talking about. I suspect
something akin to what modern Pentecostals are doing.
[^10]: Robert Price identifies Simon Magus as Paul. I haven't looked much into
the evidence for this yet, but it seems plausible to me.
[^11]: Funny thing is, about a millennium later, the same thing happened to
Christianity, too! The Reformation is nothing but an attempt to rationalize
Catholic dogma. This process continues to this very day, producing Christian
Atheism and Universalism (see Mencius Moldbug's glorious 5-part series
[How Dawkins got pwned][] (link to part 5, which links to previous parts)).
Or, as Jaynes said it:
> What happens in this modern dissolution of ecclesiastical authorization
> reminds us a little of what happened long ago after the breakdown of the
> bicameral mind itself. Everywhere in the contemporary world there are
> substitutes, other methods of authorization. Some are revivals of ancient
> ones: the popularity of possession religions in South America, where the
> church had once been so strong; extreme religious absolutism ego-based on
> "the Spirit", which is really the ascension of Paul over Jesus; an
> alarming rise in the serious acceptance of astrology, that direct heritage
> from the period of the breakdown of the bicameral mind in the Near East;
> or the more minor divination of the *I Ching*, also a direct heritage from
> the period just after the breakdown in China. There are also the huge
> commercial and sometimes psychological successes of various meditation
> procedures, sensitivity training groups, mind control, and group encounter
> practices. Other persuasions often seem like escapes from a new boredom of
> unbelief, but are also characterized by this search for authorization:
> faiths in various pseudosciences, as in scientology, or in unidentified
> flying objects bringing authority from other parts of our universe, or
> that gods were at one time actually such visitors; or the stubborn muddled
> fascination with extrasensory perception as a supposed demonstration of a
> spiritual surround of our lives whence some authorization might come; or
> the use of psychotropic drugs as ways of contacting profounder realities,
> as they were for most of the American native Indian civilizations in the
> breakdown of their bicameral mind. Just as we saw in
> [previous parts of the book] that the collapse of the institutionalized
> oracles resulted in smaller cults of induced possession, so the waning of
> institutional religions is resulting in these smaller, more private
> religions of every description. And this historical process can be
> expected to increase the rest of this century.
>
> [...]
>
> Science then, for all its pomp of factness, is not unlike some of the more
> easily disparaged outbreaks of pseudoreligions. In this period of
> transition from its religious basis, science often shares with the
> celestial maps of astrology, or a hundred other irrationalisms, the same
> nostalgia for the Final Answer, the One Truth, the Single Cause. In the
> frustrations and sweat of laboratories, it feels the same temptations to
> swarm into sects, even as did the Khabiru refugees, and set out here and
> there through the dry Sinais of parched fact for some rich and brave
> significance flowing with truth and exaltation. And all of this, my
> metaphor and all, is a part of this transitional period after the
> breakdown of the bicameral mind.
[^12]: Also note that John is trying to provide plausible reasons why Jesus was
taken from the cross so early. Did somebody get accused of fakery, I wonder?

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---
title: A Third Approach To Docetism
date: 2012-08-13
techne: :wip
episteme: :speculation
---
Sometimes I feel like doing a crazy thing. Like writing a theological essay about docetism and harmonization. Because this is the most important thing in the world.
So I did.

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---
title: Theology
is_category: true
---
<%= category :jesus %>

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---
title: The Fundamental Doctrine of True Theology
date: 2012-06-30
techne: :wip
episteme: :speculation
---
A defense of existence.
Salvation through locality.

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---
title: Self-Baptism
date: 2012-04-23
techne: :done
episteme: :broken
---
Can you baptize yourself, if necessary? The answer is quite clearly yes, at least when no valid other baptizer is available.
# The Argument
I don't wanna turn this into a round of Inerrantist "[To the Bible!][Batmobile]". Let's try an actual argument instead.
I will argue that none of the features of baptism need another person present, assuming none is available. A correct (but minimalistic) baptism proceeds as follows:
1. The baptizer intends to do the same as the Church does (i.e. to perform the ritual accurately, even though they might screw it up).
2. The recipient of the baptism desires to be baptised.
3. The recipient is repentant for their sins, denounces Satan and embraces God.
4. Water is poured over the recipient's head (or the recipient is submersed in water).
5. With the water still flowing / while submersed, the words are spoken: "I baptize you in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit." (Or some equivalent paraphrase.)
6. 4) and 5) are repeated two more times. (May be skipped if necessary.)
7. The recipient is now correctly baptized.
Steps 2), 3), 6) and 7) are obviously independent from a baptizer and are to be performed by the recipient themselves. I will only need to argue that 1), 4) and 5) can be performed by the recipient themselves, if necessary.
Of those, 4) and 5) do not seem to rely on the baptizer at all. In the case of a necessity (say if the priest is wounded and unable to move), surely anyone may handle the water, even the recipient themselves. As the water can be poured, the recipient also remains able to speak the words during the ritual. None of this necessitates a separate baptizer.
Finally, consider 1). Note right away the importance of the *intention*, not of credentials. In an emergency, *anyone* is capable of performing a valid baptism. The Catechism of the Church says so [explicitly][CCC baptism]:
> In case of necessity, anyone, even a non-baptized person, with the required intention, can baptize, by using the Trinitarian baptismal formula. The intention required is to will to do what the Church does when she baptizes. The Church finds the reason for this possibility in the universal saving will of God and the necessity of Baptism for salvation.
Furthermore, the purpose of baptism is the purification of the recipient, to wash away sin. This is a supernatural transformation caused by the Holy Spirit, *not* the baptizer. Therefore, even a Non-Christian can perform the baptism. This makes it clear that priests aren't *special* in some way. They don't possess some inherent unusual skill or gift, they themselves do not *transform* the recipient. Thus, they ought not to be necessary at all.
As additional support, consider the case of bootstrapping. Say you and a friend are stranded on an island. You're both still not baptized, but had intended to join the Church right after your disastrous journey. You do happen to have the Catechism with you, so your friend baptizes you, intended to "do what the Church does", speaks the right words and so on. Then you do the same to him. You are now both correctly baptized. It seems very implausible that your friend is of any causal relevance in this ritual, therefore this should also work when you are stranded alone.
Finally, consider the case of someone who has never heard of the Church or salvation, say a Chinese intellectual living in 400BCE. Salvation is universal, therefore even this person must be to receive God's grace. They obviously can't be baptized, so what are they supposed to do?
The Catechism says:
> For catechumens who die before their Baptism, their explicit desire to receive it, together with repentance for their sins, and charity, assures them the salvation that they were not able to receive through the sacrament.
This seems straightforward. The recipient's desire for salvation saves them, not the specific procedure. The ritual merely facilitates this process. Therefore, even if the self-baptism were invalid, it would still *include* a repentance for sins, an acceptance of the Triune God, and the intention to receive salvation and perform a correct baptism. Worst case, they are saved *anyway*.
# The Purpose of the Argument
Alright, so they can perform something as good as normal baptism, so why not do both? When necessary, baptize yourself, then seek out a priest asap?
This [Pascalian][Pascal's Wager] argument fails because baptism is *unique*. It is inherently an unrepeatable ritual and causes a permanent change. Therefore, you can't baptize someone *again*. So if your self-baptism was invalid, you could just perform a correct baptism afterwards. But if it *wasn't*, then the "second" baptism would be an impure ritual, itself unacceptable.
One solution to this is the [conditional baptism][]. Instead of speaking the normal words, the baptizer says: "*If you are not yet baptized*, I baptize you in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit."
Alright, so you *can* pull off Pascal's Baptism - simply always use the conditional form. There's one problem with this, though. Using the conditional baptism explicitly states that the baptizer *doubts the validity* of the formal ritual(s).
This clearly violates step 1). You can't simultaneously intend to perform correctly and doubt you intended to perform correctly. Similarly, if you are baptized by someone else and you later perform a conditional baptism, you are doubting them as well. There are circumstances where this may be justified (if you underwent emergency baptism by a Non-Christian, for example, or a heretic church), but those are unusual.
This is therefore a standard game-theoretical problem. Under normal circumstances, you can only perform a baptism if you intend to do it correctly, but a conditional baptism contradicts this intention.
# The Relevance of the Argument
Does this matter? After all, we are not stranded (I hope). We have access to the Church, we can get baptized the normal way just fine. Why care if self-baptism is valid?
Consider two things. First, the Church may not be valid itself. It *could* have been corrupted by Satan, for example. Deception is clearly possible, just think of the Cartesian Demon. Furthermore, the Church has undergone several major transformation, like the Council of Trent or Second Vatican Council. Any of those could have made the sacraments invalid by leading the intentions of the priesthood away from the Will of God (and the Communion of Saints).
If you do not trust the existent Church, then you can't receive baptism from them (as you can't be baptized "just to be sure").
But second, knowing what I just told you, you can't default to the position of the Chinese philosopher anymore. You are not ignorant any longer, you *know* about baptism and the Triune God, and you are not hindered from performing the ritual. Mere desire will *not* save you.
- If you self-baptize, you will explicitly affirm that the Church in its present state is unable to perform the sacraments.
- If you *do* rely on the Church, you will not be saved in case it truly *is* corrupt.
- If the Church is corrupt, is it so corrupt that it contradicts the expressed and potentially sincere intention? Does the baptizing priest still refer to the same thing?
- You can't do *both* baptisms as this contradicts the intentions of at least one of the two.
- You can't do neither or you won't be saved at all.
So what do you do?
(Behold, a moral basilisk. Do not be turned off by the Catholic framing - consider its general form, and the fundamental problem how knowing the right thing to do can force you to solve *even harder* problems. Also note that a solution [exists][Rigid Designator]. *All* basilisks can be slain.)

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---
title: Michel Thomas French
date: 2012-07-31
date: 2011-09-11
techne: :done
episteme: :believed
---

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---
title: The Futility of Translation
date: 1970-01-01
techne: :wip
episteme: :speculation
---
For weeks now I want to quote a certain song. But I can't. It's in German. And I can't translate it. Not in a way that does it any justice, at least.
The song is Die Interimsliebenden by Einstürzende Neubauten. Watch it:
<%= vimeo("http://player.vimeo.com/video/36592271") %>
(BTW: I love the video. It's so amazingly meta-pretentious.)
The lyrics consist of a massive amount of puns, clever rhymes and idiosyncratic phrases that probably only make sense to someone familiar with German culture. I don't want to pull a Continental here, but it really feels like you first ought to deeply immerse yourself in the *spirit* of a culture before you can *possibly* attempt to understand just this one song.
But maybe it's worth a try anyway.
Translations have one impossibly-to-solve problem, one that classical debates like the subs vs. dubs flame wars tend to ignore. Or at least they don't make it explicit.
Yes, you can translate a layer of communication from one language into another with a reasonable level of accuracy. A textbook has typically only a single layer, only one message it wants to get across at any given time. Thus, textbooks can be translated just fine.
But you lose once you get to multiple layers. These complex layers won't function the same way in different languages, so even though you can find a fairly good mapping between any two layers, there's one thing you won't be able to preserve - the Schelling points, i.e. the obvious or interesting points of interaction between layers. (Defining "obvious" and "interesting" is left as an exercise to the reader.)
For example, puns exploit non-obvious but powerful interactions between the sound and the meaning of a word. They work by finding a slight alteration that keeps the sound of a word mostly the same (i.e. you don't jump to a different plateau in sound-space), but also adds an association to a new meaning that is unexpected, but still *works*, is still related to the original meaning.
There will be many such interactions in any human language, but they will be at different *points*. Unless two languages are closely related, or you'll have to rely on luck to find any overlap. Thus, to attempt a translation of a pun in context, you'd have to find a *new* pun that also works in the *same* context and is about *equally clever*. Good luck with that.
But these association themselves might add further layers by adding another meta level, e.g. by referencing the spelling of the word. The more complex they become, the more impressive - and rarer - they will be.
And then you encounter Heidegger or James Joyce.

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---
title: From Math to Morality
date: 2012-06-20
techne: :wip
episteme: :speculation
---
> Ludwig Boltzmann, who spent much of his life studying statistical mechanics, died in 1906, by his own hand. Paul Ehrenfest, carrying on the work, died similarly in 1933. Now it is our turn to study statistical mechanics. Perhaps it will be wise to approach the subject cautiously.
>
> -- (D.L. Goodstein, "States of Matter")
> You can't answer a kid's question. They don't accept any answer. A kid never goes, "oh thanks, I get it". They fucking never say that! They just keep coming, more questions, "Why?", "Why?", "Why?", until you don't even know who the fuck you are anymore by the end of the conversation. It's an insane deconstruction.
>
> -- [Louis CK][Louis CK why])
Recently, [Leah][Leah Conversion] converted from "weird quasi-Platonist virtue ethicist" to Catholic. And even though I'm not a Catholic, I don't think the connection between "quasi-Platonist about math" to "[objective][One True Morality] morality exists" is an accident[^accident]. Because that's likely the same reason I changed my mind, too.
[^accident]: Of course, I'll leave it to Leah to describe her specific reasons. I don't have any deep insights into her personality, I'm just struck that we don't just agree about one thing, but about a whole *cluster* of things, and I'm seeing a pattern.
Let's start with a question: Why does math work?
I've been seriously wondering this for most of 2009-2011.
Where does the unreasonable effectiveness of math come from?
- nominalism
If math is just a language game, why does it work so much *better* than other language games? Consider Hegelian Dialectic, the Worst Thing Germans Ever Came Up With[^worst].
[^worst]: Yes, literally worse than Hitler. I'm not a fan is what I'm saying.
Consider this section from Stove's fantastic essay, "[What is Wrong with Our Thoughts?][]":
> [Hegel's Development, by H.S. Harris] is, naturally, full of quotations from Hegel's early writings. In subject-matter these passages range from the astronomical to the zoological. For the examples which I promised earlier in this essay, I have chosen two of the astronomical ones. First:
>
> > In the indifferences of light, the aether has scattered its absolute indifference into a multiplicity; in the blooms of the solar system it has borne its inner Reason and totality out into expansion. But the individualizations of light are dispersed in multiplicity [i.e. the fixed stars], while those which form the orbiting petals of the solar system must behave towards them with rigid individuality [i.e. they have their fixed orbits]. And so the unity of the stars lacks the form of universality, while that of the solar system lacks pure unity, and neither carries in itself the absolute Concept as such.
>
> Second:
>
> > In the spirit the absolutely simple aether has returned to itself by way of the infinity of the Earth; in the Earth as such this union of the absolute simplicity of aether and infinity exists; it spreads into the universal fluidity, but its spreading fixates itself as singular things; and the numerical unit of singularity, which is the essential characteristic (*Bestimmtheit*) for the brute becomes itself an ideal factor, a moment. The concept of Spirit, as thus determined, is *Consciousness*, the concept of the union of the simple with infinity;
>
> [...] And now I ask you: is it not true, as I said earlier, that these two real examples of the pathology of thought are far more revolting than any of the invented ones which made up my list of forty pathological propositions? Do you know any example of the corruption of thought which is more extreme than these two? Did you even know, until now, that human thought was capable of this degree of corruption?
Hegelian language games are clearly utterly useless, as we would expect. But this cannot be said about math. If it is just as arbitrary, just as much a game - are we also deluded about its effectiveness?
So pure formalism does not sound very appealing[^appealing].
[^appealing]:
Another criticism is that, in practice, humans don't think very "formally", that is like a formal proof finder. It is very common for mathematicians to agree on a proof of an important theorem, even though it turns out that the proof has many small technical errors. They are inevitably found and fixed, of course, but if we just unwind a set of rules, then why is it that we find those shortcuts and see the "meaning" of ideas? Where do these intuitions come from? And how come that they are so reliable?
So one might be tempted to say, maybe that's just not a well-defined answer. Maybe "Why does math work?" is just another Hegelian confusion. And of course it's not necessary at all to know *why* math works to actually use it. Pragmatism is perfectly adequate if we just want to get stuff done.
But philosophy has a strange attraction to it, and we still want to get this nagging question out of our head. Desperate, we try to re-animate the corpse of [Logical Positivism][], and say, "Why does math work?" is a meaningless question. It just seems meaningful to us, but actually isn't. But then we try going meta. Why does it seem meaningful to ask, "Why does math work?"? What is it about this question that makes it seem meaningful, even when it isn't? A genuinely meaningless question, like "Why is blue a kind of chair?", doesn't appear meaningful, after all.
And more meta, if we accept Logical Positivism, we can just ask, why does Logical Positivism work? It doesn't? Then it is self-refuting. Or is this question also meaningless? Then what, exactly, is Logical Positivism asserting? It is meaningless to ask why Logical Positivism works, but it does in fact work, and we should use it to conclude that asking why math works is meaningless, even though it does in fact work and Hegelian Dialectic doesn't?[^meta]
[^meta]: This is a general meta-point that is easy to miss. Plantinga makes the same kind of argument by [using evolution to refute naturalism][Plantinga naturalism], a move so clever, I can only imagine him going [trolololo][] for a whole week after he came up with it. Epistemology is hard, let's go justified shopping.
So the question stands.
The simplest explanation is this: math works because the universe runs on math. It is a perfect description of the mechanism because it *is* the mechanism.
Max Tegmark took this idea and ran so far with it, you may actually come out in another universe if you try to follow him.
There are two simple arguments you can make about the existence of morality. The first has some similarity to Pascal's Wager, and really just points out the self-refuting character of moral nihilism. It goes like this: If objective morality exists, we want to follow it. If it doesn't, then who cares? Nothing we do matters anyway. So even if we have no idea if it exists, we should simply *assume* it does.
Ok, maybe, but what if we run into contradictions or incoherent requirements or stuff like that? That's where the second argument comes in. *Assume*, just as a language game if you want, that objective morality, discoverable by reason, exists. Just for the lulz.
Think about some [axioms][Why The Gods Are Trolling You] that must be true in such a case. Try to do the equivalent of deriving arithmetic from the Peano Axioms, or geometry from Euclid's Axioms. (This problem is left as an exercise for the reader.)
And if it turns out that the construction you end up with is beautiful, simple, elegant and self-consistent, has clear structure, in short, looks just like math... you can then ask yourself, why is that?
If objective morality *didn't* exist, if it *weren't* true, weren't *about* something, just an arbitrary game... where does all the structure come from?
Shouldn't it look a lot more like [godshatter][]? The product of an unreliable, disinterested process - evolution - that outright optimizes for non-moral goals. It would not look coherent, understandable, axiomatic. Yet, when you actually try this, you may find[^may] that it actually does.
[^may]:
Yes, it is somewhat unfair that I'm not actually making a case for simplicity of description, that I only hint, vaguely, at some of the axioms. And that, for some people at least, the inherent complexity and incompressibility of terminal value seems much better argued for, much more plausible. It might help to take game theory, think in terms of cooperation, contracts and enforcement, and run with that as far as you can, see how much of "terminal" value you can derive from it, and then wonder again if maybe there is more elegance, at least on a meta-level above your individual life. But ultimately, I can only say, at least for now: lol u suck.
Why does morality work? Why is it understandable at all?
Well, the simplest explanation is: because, like math, the universe actually runs on morality.

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@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
---
title: Meta-Morality
title: Morality
is_category: true
---

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@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
---
title: Morality for the Damned (First Steps)
date: 2012-01-30
techne: :done
episteme: :discredited
slug: 2012/01/30/morality-for-the-damned-first-steps/
disowned: true
---
*This is maybe the most important question I'm currently trying to solve. I wish I could write (or better, read) a fully fleshed-out sequence dissolving it, but I don't even know if it's solvable at all, so I'm stuck with a lot of despair and confusion. However, here at muflax, inc. we occasionally attempt the impossible, so let's accept the madness and try to at least delineate what the problem even is.*
The hardware you run on [is evil][Asymmetry Evolutionary]. You have no built-in privileged knowledge of morality. God is absent. The world is already getting [paperclipped][Paperclipper] by beings with no concerns for rights, sovereignty or the sacred.
The problem is thus: you are in Hell. How can you still do the right thing?
You might resign yourself to acceptance. You might realize the elegance of Empty Set Morality - if nothing exists, no-one is harmed, no-one is coerced, nothing is desecrated. Thus, the Empty Set is moral, maybe the only moral state. You will not bring about any immorality yourself - will birth no-one, rule not, transgress nothing. Yet, others will. What are you going to do about them? How do you stop [over 200,000 sins a day][World Population]?
Even though you carry no responsibility for the sins of others, your hatred of sin compels you anyway. You might consider pulling a [Ted Kaczynski][]. The world is evil, and you will feel a lot of disgust for it. [This is good.][Chapman Disgust]
But changing the world is really hard. You are not just facing some minor [existential risk][Existential Risks]. You are fighting against Azathoth itself and the billions of intelligent brains at its disposal. You don't need a bunch of pipe bombs. You need a [special kind of savior][Lelouch].
You can barely contain your despair, yet you desire to bring the world out of existence. Other [saints][RMS]) have failed on mere subsets of this problem:
> I'm the last survivor of a dead culture. And I don't really belong in the world anymore. And in some ways I feel I ought to be dead. [...] I have certainly wished I had killed myself when I was born. [...] In terms of effect on the world, it's very good that I've lived. And so I guess, if I could go back in time and prevent my birth, I wouldn't do it. But I sure wish I hadn't had so much pain.
And yet, the problem grows worse. [One prophet][Mainländer] still hoped that the universe is an act of suicide, a process of God becoming non-existent. And in a way, Empty Set Morality hopes for the same thing, hopes for a meaning in annihilation. Can such a thing even be done?
Says [the Dead One][LW SL5]:
> But if you combine a functionalist view of mind with big worlds cosmology, then reality becomes the quotient of the set of all possible computations, where all sub-computations that instantiate you are identified. Imagine that you have an infinite piece of paper representing the multiverse, and you draw a dot on it wherever there is a computational process that is the same as the one going on in your brain right now. Now fold the paper up so that all the dots are touching each other, and glue them at that point into one dot. That is your world.
>
> [This idea is] the point where you mentally realize that perfectly dry astrophysics implies that there is no unique "you" at the centre of your sphere of concern, analogous to the Copernican revolution that unseated earth from the centre of the solar system. It is considered to be more shocking than any of the previous future shock levels because it destroys the most basic human epistemological assumption that there is such a thing as my future, or such a thing as the consequence of my actions.
>
> [It] is a good candidate for Dan Dennett's universal acid: an idea so corrosive that if we let it into our minds, everything we care about will be dissolved. You can't change anything in the multiverse - every decision or consequence that you don't make will be made infinitely many times elsewhere by near-identical copies of you. Every victory will be produced, as will every possible defeat.
In a world without consequences, without change, harm will never end. You might be - eternally, acausally - moral, but everything else is in sin never-ending. Non-existence is an illusion of causal disconnection, a mere anthropic illusion. Embrace the [B-Theory][] and never cease. It [has been prophesied][Eternal Return], yet the hope that we might affirm it has failed us. We now correctly face its horror.
A denial of infinity's evil is hard to do. If you deny St. Occam and his Universal Prior, how can you explain their effectiveness, can explain this world, explain the sheer feat of explanation itself? Yet there is an element of self-refutation in it. Solomonoff-kami, despite being infinite and uncomputable, will only ever believe finite, computable theories itself. So the very models that lead us to the Big World Crisis will never bring themselves to believe it, nor are constructions of the self within them in any way obvious. A bit of Discordian distrust might be in order.
Face only Azathoth for now, not The Generalized Blind Idiot God. Face only this: you are in Hell. The [Traceless One][Tathagata] has erred. All is suffering. It can not be overcome.
Through the mere act of reflection, you bring the [Elder Axioms][Laws of Form] into the world, and with them, evil.
What, then, are you to do?
Until the answers become clear, meditate on the corpse that is this world, hoping to find emptiness within it somehow.

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@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ Says Wiki-sama:
Another way to express the idea of locality is to think in terms of a cellular automaton or Turing machine. Locality simply means that the machine only has to check the values of a limited set of neighbor cells (8 for the Game of Life, 0 for a standard TM) to figure out the next value of the current cell for any given step.
The fact that some interpretations of quantum physics (Many Worlds most notably) are more local than others (Copenhagen) is commonly used as a major argument in their favor. I've [started collecting][Unifying Morality] features of moral theories and noticed that locality also applies to them, but I've never seen anyone make the argument, so here it goes.
The fact that some interpretations of quantum physics (Many Worlds most notably) are more local than others (Copenhagen) is commonly used as a major argument in their favor. Locality also applies to moral theories, but I've never seen anyone make the argument, so here it goes.
Moral theories must make prescriptions. If a moral theory doesn't tell you what to do, it's useless (tautologically so, really). So if after learning Theory X you still don't know what you should do to act according to Theory X, then it's to be discarded. Theory X must be wrong. (And don't try to embrace [moral luck][Moral Luck]. That way lies madness.)

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---
title: Utilitarianism, A Summary
date: 2012-07-01
techne: :wip
episteme: :troll
---
A summary of utilitarianism, with the help of [co-author Anthony Hollander][make people alive], age 9.
---
Dear Val, Jhon, Peter and Lesslie,
This may seem very strange, but I think I no how to make people or animals moral. Why Im teling you is because I cant get the things I need.
A list of what I need.
1. Diagram of how evreything works. [inside youre brain.]
2. Model of a brain split in half. [both halvs.]
3. The sort of inteligents they yous for computers. [inteligents must be very very safe.]
4. Tools for scanning people in.
5. Computer box, 8 foot tall, 3 foot width.
6. Picture of a society showing all the good things.
Sorry but in number 5 in the list the box needs internet. If you do get them on 1st March I can pay £10, £11, £12, £13 or £14.
Send your answer to me,
Love from Anthony,
London, NW11

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@ -1,124 +0,0 @@
---
title: On Purpose
date: 2011-03-11
techne: :done
episteme: :discredited
---
Two reflections on purpose and two open questions.
# Purpose cannot be created.
I'll just let [Alonzo Fyfe][Fyfe Purpose] speak for me.
> However, the common atheist response to the question of meaning and purpose in
> life is almost as absurd.
>
> This is the idea that each of us gets to choose our own meaning or purpose in
> life, and whatever we choose has real value.
>
> If we are talking about a person, and I have the ability to choose where that
> person was born, who its parents were, what it likes and dislikes, and what
> happened to him five years ago, this should be taken as a reliable sign that I
> am dealing with a *fictional* character. I do not have the liberty to make those
> types of decisions if we are talking about a real person. Instead, there is a
> fact of the matter.
>
> The same is true of assigning a purpose or meaning to life. If a person has
> the liberty to simply 'choose' a purpose or a meaning, then this should be
> taken as proof that he is creating a fictitious entity. This 'purpose' or
> 'meaning' is no more real than the character she invented for some story or
> book.
>
> To live one's life as if this fictional purpose or meaning is real is to live
> a lie.
# Desire is not about content.
Do desires exist? Has desire fulfillment value?
According to [Desirism][], desire fulfillment itself has no value, but the
existence of desires creates value within the agent that has them. In other
words, if Bob wants to eat cheese, then eating cheese has value for Bob, but
only because this attitude exists in Bob's mind. The important assertion of
desirism is that desire fulfillment itself has no value, so it cannot be said
that it is good for Bob to want to eat cheese, nor that it is good *in general*
to eat cheese.
(This has the implication that if there were only agents without desires, then
no value at all would exist. It is only for an accident of evolution that we
happen to have desires.)
Overall, this is not an esoteric claim. It follows quiet neatly from standard
scientific models. But is it true?
Think about [wireheading][Wireheading]. Why should I bother to fulfill a complex
set of desires if I'm also able to self-modify? I could simply replace all my
desires with a single trivial one, say "I desire 1+1 to equal 2". What would be
the difference in this case?
How do you identify desires? How do you *know* if a desire fulfilled?
One possibility might be that desire is about a state the world should be in.
Say, I might desire that every human has access to health care. But that seems
weak. For example, economics is full of "as if" models built just around this
assumption. A nice one is [Rational Addiction]. Regardless of their predictive
power, they tend to be very different from the way people actually think.
Or maybe we are talking about "reasons for action". Essentially, every moment
there are thousands of things we could do, but ultimately something compels us
to do a specific thing. This thing we might call a desire. But this again is
weak. For one, that would mean that desires are either in principle
unfulfillable (because they are only present when we act, but not when results
occur) or they are fulfilled through each action immediately. This again seems
false.
What we are really after is the sensation of fulfilling desires, not the actual
desire. Or in other words, utility is about mind-states, not world-states. This
becomes clear to anyone paying close attention to their mind upon the moment of
desire fulfillment. It is only[^1] this short moment of aggravation and
cessation-of-aggravation that matters, not the content of the desire.
A content-of-desire model of purpose therefore fails.
[^1]: While trying to map this during vipassana, I noticed an additional stage
right before the aggravation. Sometimes for a short moment a glimpse of
"heaven" pops up, but the promise is never actually fulfilled. I haven't yet
mustered the necessary concentration to check if it always occurs.
# Why does this state of cessation exist at all?
It seems so unnecessary. Agents with preferences would work just fine without
it. I can drop my free will, so to speak, yet still act and choose just fine. I
do lose my ability to make complex conscious decisions, but why the difference?
And why, if I don't drop it, do I have cessation-of-aggravation even for trivial
things?
# How does one act if there is no purpose?
Maybe there really isn't any meaning to life. My brain is just broken, hoping to
find any. But then what? There seem to be only two responses to this question.
Either, "there's ultimate meaning, duh", but they all are very silly attempts of
what this meaning might be. Or, "get rid of the need to know". I utterly detest
this option. It is, maybe, the only thing I actually consider evil. If the only
alternative to suffering is "not looking for answers", then I prefer the
suffering. I'd rather not have this kind of "enlightenment", thank you very
much.
But this doesn't seem right. I have a strong intuitive sense that there is
meaning and I'm just too stupid to figure it out. Maybe my intuition is
misleading me. Yet, I don't seem to be the only one. A sense of *fulfilling
fate* seems to be not too unusual.
> Long ago, a Pentecostal pastor told me that I could keep on doubting, waiting
> till I had resolved all questions before I would be able to enter into worship
> with a clean conscience, but then that would probably mean I would never
> worship, because there would never be a way to settle all questions about God.
> I must simply decide (now) whether I was going to worship God. I see he was
> right. He would not have put it this way, but what I see in his sage advice
> was the realization that the two issues (of deciding what to think of "God" as
> an intellectual problem versus deciding whether to walk with God) belong to
> different language games, and that to solve one is not to solve the other.
> Thus, why wait to solve both before you can make headway on either one?
>
> -- [Robert M. Price][Price Purpose]

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---
title: Suffering? What suffering?
date: 2012-07-31
techne: :done
episteme: :speculation
---
I'm confused by "suffering". I'm no longer sure it even exists in a morally relevant sense. That's a weird position to be in.
(Maybe that means I'm enlightened. If so, I accept sacred offerings in return for favors in the afterlife, and will petition Papa Nurgle on your behalf.)
I'm not saying "the experience of suffering" doesn't exist, in the sense that "the experience of an integer between 3 and 4, but neither 3 nor 4" doesn't exist. The experience sure does exist, just as the experiences of bliss, joy, sadness, that cramp in your leg that just won't go away, sweetness, anger, and so on, all do exist.
I'm also not saying that nothing is morally relevant in a metaphysical sense, but without suffering as one foundation, moral realism becomes quite a bit smaller, and I'm not sure if the concept of "harm" even makes sense without it. (Of course, "suffering" is obviously important even for moral anti-realists as a political tool. I'm not giving up this use, the same way that consequentialist hedonists would agree that sacredness is not a moral property, but still a very useful social property.)
What I mean is this: I cannot tell a difference, experientially, between "suffering" and "bliss", any more than between "calmness" and "bliss". It is as if someone had declared "green" is an Evil Color that must be eradicated, but "purple"[^jcm] and "yellow" are Good or Neutral Colors. They are different experiences, of course, but one isn't privileged over another, and they are all Just Fine As They Are.
[^jcm]: Jesus Christ, Marie!
In Theravada Buddhism (and Zen, to the extent that I understand it), this is very likely the actual position behind the teachings, hidden behind complex [lies to children][lie to children]. You can't tell the new monk that "you being freaked out by suffering is a delusion on your side; experience the full suchness of the experience and you will realize your mistake". They'd believe you're bullshitting them or not taking them seriously. But what you are really trying to tell them is that suffering-as-bad is an erroneous belief-in-belief, but not an actual belief.
Consider what the Buddha actually *does*. He proposes that suffering (dukkha) is a fundamental property of all experience, in the same way that subject-lessness (anatta) and impermanence (anicca) are. This doesn't *change* for the Buddha. He's not part of a different reality. He also still experiences everything he did before, including pain in the form of frequent headaches, and he still dies. Yet, he is liberated, independent of his death, merely through observation. Liberated of what, exactly?
"In the seeing, just the seen; in the hearing, just the heard; in the thinking, just the thought", as the sutra goes. What is gone is the belief-in-belief, the idea that he was a separate floating ego somewhere, being harmed by the experience of suffering. The actual object-level of experience, the actual dukkha, doesn't change - it can't. What is gone is the mistaken belief that merely *declared* that "this is bad", even though it was not the case that "this is bad", as can be learned by, for example, experiencing "this" in a concept-free way, and then finding no flaw with it. Liberation is the realization that Samsara didn't exist to begin with.
This is clearly analogous to the realization of anatta. It's not like people have a self before they practice, then the practice actively destroys it, and finally they don't have a self anymore. (Though that is the pop-cultural idea.) What's really happening, in the Buddhist framework, is that the belief of having a self clearly distinct from objects it experiences is false, and through practice and arguments this is *demonstrated*[^demo], and in the end, the practitioner understands how they were non-dual all along, without a dividing line between subject and object, without a stable core of experience.
[^demo]:
As an obvious implication, this means that realization of anatta (and the rest of enlightenment) is a *conceptual* thing. Zen and early Theravada clearly understand that, and they accept e.g. parables and koans as effective teaching tools. (In LW lingo, anatta is dissolving the question of subjectivity.) However, only some folks might be able to get the necessary conceptual steps. Not everyone has +10 meta (da fewls!).
Furthermore, in the fundamental sense, this doesn't *matter* - everyone *already* is enlightened, they just don't *know* that. Getting them to know that is hard, though. (But their dana is still green, as some would say.) This still leaves "normal" problems, and chopping that wood, and getting on with your life, now that "Samsara" has been taking care of.
I'm sure this makes Theravada's ultra-seriousness *hilarious* for Zennists and Tantrikas.
So, what is bad about suffering, or any experience for that matter? "Ah, *pain* clearly is bad! You can just *feel* it!" So as a good empiricist, I waited for the next headache, or any other source of pain, and then I put my ass on my cushion, and tried to investigate this feeling for myself, paying close attention, as if I had never encountered it before.
And sure enough, there is the sensation of pain. It has a distinct texture, maybe a location and extension, and a certain frequency[^frequency] of being there, like all sensations. But there is no badness to be found, just as there is no self, distinct from the sensation, that experiences it.
[^frequency]: All experiences flicker. Start looking, you'll see it. Some flicker quite fast, but they all do. Even walls.
However, there might well be the *additional* sensation of a thought that says, "this is bad". But this thought itself, despite its alleged content, is itself not bad, nor is it fundamentally connected to the experience of pain. It might just as well say this about bliss, or cats, or itself. Most importantly, it is clearly false - the pain itself isn't bad. Lastly, I might sometimes find flinching sensations, attempts to push away my attention, but those flinches themselves aren't bad either (as they are the same thing that pushes my attention *towards* things when I concentrate). And so, having investigated all components, there is no mysterious "badness" left over at the end.
And [then I thought][Dark Stance], maybe I'm not looking at the right thing. So I investigated sorrow, grief, sadness, disappointment, laziness, disgust, and all the other candidates I could think of, and they are all alike. There is an experience, which is not bad, and maybe a belief about the experience, which is not bad (and demonstrably false if it claims the experience is bad), and if I feel particularly meta, there are beliefs about beliefs, and there even might be complicated webs of experiences, but all of that can similarly be investigated.
I can't even tell the difference, in a thought-experimental way, from a world *with* inherently bad experiences, and a world *without* them. "Behold, I flip this switch, and *now* this sensation is *bad*! It is now *true* suffering!" just... doesn't work. The referent of the thought "this is bad, make it stop" cannot be found - the thought is empty, a behavioristic gesture.
So where is it? Where's the invisible dragon of bad experiences? Because I sure can't find any.

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@ -14,9 +14,7 @@ episteme: :believed
And I'm *appalled* by that suggestion! I'm not *rationalizing*! I have a complex meta-ethical set of axioms that has morally-neutral trolling as a derivable theorem!
I didn't start out with the conclusion here, I did proper meta-ethics and *discovered* it! I'm not *that* [biased][Es gibt Leute, die sehen das anders.].
(However, if you think I'm actually doing harm, tell me. I'm not deliberately trying to be a douche.)
I didn't start out with the conclusion here, I did proper meta-ethics and *discovered* it! I'm not *that* crazy.
Let's start with a simple definition - what's trolling? Trolling, [like crackpottery][Crackpot Theory], is arguing for positions that are not merely motivated by truth-seeking[^truth]. The major difference, however, is that a crackpot actually believes what they are saying, they just use an interestingness prior to select their beliefs. A troll is intentionally adjusting their beliefs for the specific argument, either in content ("lol bible says kill the gays") or strength ("I feel very strongly about this definition!").

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---
title: Unifying Morality
date: 2012-01-22
techne: :done
episteme: :speculation
slug: 2012/01/22/unifying-morality/
---
> There are no more elephants.
> There is no more unethical treatment of elephants either.
> The world is a much better place.
> -- Flight of the Conchords, [The Humans Are Dead][]
One strength of a theory is how much evidence it unifies. If you can show that your idea solves a wide range of problems, especially if they had previously no obvious connection, then you're probably on to something. Ethical philosophy is famously hard to unify. A [standard introduction][Stanford Metaethics] starts with the trolley problem and demonstrates how hard it is to come up with an answer that doesn't have obvious but undesirable consequences.
One major reason I take Jaynes' [theory of bicameral minds][Some Thoughts on Bicameral Minds] seriously - it unifies [a lot of problems][Jaynes Evidence]. No competing theory can explain the particular features of auditory hallucinations, command structures and independent but universal importance of spirits/gods in the ancient world. So even though Jaynes' arguments may have some flaws or gaps in their present form, and despite being certainly weird (ancient human had no subjective consciousness, but could write?!), we should still consider it.
Maybe such a line of reasoning would be beneficial in morality. Maybe if one collected a wide range of problems and simply showed in table form how meta-ethical theories fared and how much ground they managed to cover, one could use this as an argument by itself. Like [this table][QM table] for interpretations of quantum physics. Or like [Battleground God](http://www.philosophersnet.com/games/god.php), simply giving the reader a range of problems and showing them how certain answers interacted with each other. It wouldn't argue any particular position by itself, but it would show how consistent you are. Just a [philosophical health check][].
I think many negative moral theories suffer from bad framing. It's even in the name. Who wants to be a *negative* utilitarian? That's like totally depressing, man. But "negative" really just means that they aren't interested in *adding* something to the world to make it better, but in *removing* something. If we could re-frame these theories according to their strengths, maybe people wouldn't react so badly to them?
Imagine a world without hunger, poverty, broken promises, pain, rape, lies, war, greed, boredom, loneliness, confusion, anger, hatred, depression, torment, shame, disappointment, dying, disgust, mutilation, disease, betrayal and loss. There is such a world. It's the world of antinatalism.
Maybe we should remind people how bad things really are. If lottery advertisement started with a list of the millions of people *didn't* win, maybe buying a ticket wouldn't look so attractive anymore. If endorsement of life started with a list of [all the bad things][Child sexual abuse] that happen every day, maybe saying stop would sound much more appealing. If people realized what their ethical ideas [actually entailed][Mere Addition], maybe they wouldn't endorse them so easily.
It's worth a try.

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---
title: Why I'm Not a Vegetarian
alt_titles: [Vegetarian]
date: 2011-12-20
techne: :done
episteme: :believed
---
This post isn't so much an actual argument per se, but a belief dump of the core arguments why I'm not a vegetarian. I'm currently rethinking the issue (thanks to [Alan Dawrst][]) and might change my mind over the next few months. I always find it hard to reconstruct what I believed in the past and why, so I'm writing it down. To counter some bias, I'm also trying to state what kind of evidence would be necessary to convince me of vegetarianism. I'll revisit this within a few months once I've resolved a few moral confusions.
# Animals are not morally relevant agents.
Morality, as I understand it, requires certain features to act upon. The state a rock is in is not morally relevant *per se*. I don't have my metaethics worked out yet, but there are at least three features I'm pretty sure are necessary to be morally relevant: a self, consent and the ability to obey laws. I don't think animals have any of these, so whatever we do with them is not a moral concern. (Also note that there are *humans* who don't have all three. There might be game-theoretic reasons to treat them *as if* they had them, but no moral ones.)
I'd give this argument maybe 60% certainty, so I'm in no way confident and this alone would not be enough to justify ignoring animals as moral agents. The potential harm is too great, and while I wouldn't make preventing it a top priority, I would still act to minimize the suffering I might cause. If only this argument remained, I would avoid [most animal products][suffering per kg]. But let's take a look at the three features.
## A Self
Basically, there are three levels. Pure phenomenal consciousness (feeling pain), a subjective experience that makes these things happen *to* someone (*I* am feeling pain) and abstract thought to reflect on this (thinking: "I am feeling pain"). To be morally relevant, you need to have at least the subjective experience. No farm animal does. So they aren't relevant.
A counterargument wouldn't need to convince me that animals certainly have a self, but merely that they *might* have one. A sufficiently large risk (say, >20%) is enough for me. One way to do this is the simple ["recognize yourself in the mirror" test][Mirror Test]. No farm animal passes it. (Some animals do, and I consider them likely enough to fulfill this requirement of moral relevance.) Of course, any animal that has language and can refer to itself also passes, and I'd give it at least 20% confidence that some non-human animal can do so, so this might also be a possible path. None of these seem to be farm animals, though.
## Consent
The ability to agree to (or reject) a proposed deal. The main problem is that I'm not sure that consent is actually *real*. It might well be a general confusion. But I still think it's more likely than not that something-not-too-unlike consent can be naturalized and exists in humans. But what do you need? Language is certainly sufficient, but it seems a dog can also accept or reject food, so is it *consenting*?
I'm really hesitant to accept [hypothetical][Hypothetical Consent] or [implied][Implied Consent] consent. I would strongly prefer any consent to be explicit and (ideally) formalized. I currently don't see how explicit consent can work without the abilities of thought and language. So animals can't consent and are not morally relevant.
There are two ways to negate this argument. Either show that animals *can* meaningfully consent (this is also relevant for [antinatalism][Antinatalism FAQ] - if non-existent humans can consent, then it seems much more likely that animals can too, and vice versa), or show that humans *can't* consent, i.e. that consent is a confused concept. This is probably the weakest of the three features and I expect to change my mind about it, but I don't know in which direction yet.
## The Rule of Law
To slightly paraphrase [Moldbug][Moldbug Left Right]:
>[Anyone] should be free to make any promise. In return, he or she can expect to be held responsible for that promise: there is no freedom to break it. All promises are voluntary until they are made, and involuntary afterward. A pair of reciprocal promises [...] is an *agreement*.
Any organization of agents that allows and enforces such agreements establishes the Rule of Law. Basically, it's the "lawful" component in the D&D moral system. It's what makes Divine Command Theory moral (and why I'm very sympathetic to it, despite its untenable foundation in non-existent gods). Ideal Confucian government embodies it.
Without arguing for a specific implementation, it seems clear that animals can't obey (or even understand) laws or act as citizens of a lawful state. Therefore, they aren't morally relevant.
Evidence to the contrary would be, for example, a demonstration that animals can form states (or reasonably similar organizations). Or show that the concept is confused, for example because we really want some *consequence* of lawful states, but don't actually want the laws themselves.
# Farm animals under typical Western conditions do not suffer significantly.
See [Richard Carrier's][Carrier Vegetarianism] post for the actual argument. Basically, animals in modern farms don't experience a significant amount of pain or suffering. It ain't heaven, but it's not so bad that we should prevent it at all costs. The benefits in increased reproduction (for the animals) and better nutrition (for the humans) easily make up for whatever suffering remains. (This might no be true in non-Western countries or when you [ritually slaughter][schächten] them, but the proper response to that is urbanization and secularization, not vegetarianism.)
There are two ways this could be wrong. First, you could try to show that there is some fundamental desire that animals in modern farms can't fulfill. Obviously, I don't see such a desire, but it might exist. The best case for this so far is [Eduardo Sousa][]'s farm. However, animals don't seem to reject modern farms or suffer tremendous stress. But we might've missed something.
The second way this could be wrong is to show that categorical [antinatalism][Antinatalism FAQ] is correct (and that animals are morally relevant). Basically, if it is always wrong to bring a life into existence, then we shouldn't breed animals, ever. (And we should seek the extinction of all wildlife.) I'm currently working through the various antinatalist arguments, but so far, I'm not convinced of the most categorical form, but I already accept basic antinatalism (it is *often* wrong to create life), and some of the arguments still look promising to me once I'm done repairing them.
# Even if they suffer, I morally discount against them (and I'm justified to do so).
It's true that I strongly discount anything that doesn't directly affect me or those close to me. The question is, am I justified in doing so, or is it a bug in my judgment? I have not seen a good argument for universalism (if you don't already have it as a preference) except that it would be simple.
However, this is inherently the weakest argument. If we accept that animals immorally suffer, then discounting just changes the level of importance we should assign to it. But given the [huge amount of animals][Dawrst Wildlife] (10^10 and more!), even strong discounting can be overcome. If we accept that breeding animals violates their rights or consent, then no amount of discounting is relevant. Consent can't be morally overridden.
But as it stands now, animals probably don't have rights, so we can discount. They don't suffer much, if at all, so even their large numbers aren't sufficient, especially because human benefits outweigh it. Therefore, eating animals is acceptable.

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---
title: Daily Log (introduction)
date: 2012-03-09
techne: :done
episteme: :personal
slug: 2012/03/09/daily-log/
---
I like talking about ideas. I like logging stuff. Writing this blog has vastly increased my thinking output. (Which is good, and unexpected.) I see people use daily logs of what they did and these people kick my ass when it comes to achievements, even though for each individual day, they don't do more than I can. It's just the pure, raw consistency. They still do the same shit 6 months from now and by then, they utterly outperform me.
Time for some algorithmic magic! I'm now retrocausally turning myself into someone more like [such a person][Wolfire], so I have decided - rippling back *from the distant future*! - to keep a daily log. (Good thing I don't have a sense of privacy.)
Some rules:
- I already track [time investments][Beeminder fume]. That's fine, but I also need to track content. I can't easily quantify "5 interesting things" per day. But interestingness correlates with word counts, and I can track *that*. So each log entry must have a minimum amount of 300 words per day. (I might still experiment with the exact number. I want it small enough to not be an additional chore, but large enough to force me to do stuff. I also want to make it *possible* to catch up when I miss a day, but not easy. This ain't kindergarten, yo.)
- Only ever talk about something I did this day. No "building up a buffer". No "talking about that weird idea I got 3 weeks ago" or some philosophical implication I noticed. Only what happened on that day. Only what I did. (And rant-y remarks when I can't help myself.) Ideas go to the blog, not the dlog.
- Absolutely daily. Not weekdays. Not "significant improvements". Not deadlines. Daily, ruthless, brutal practice. (The mindset I'm currently in makes "brutal" awesomely fun. Fun is crucial, not protestant work-ethics. *Fuck* protestant work-ethics.)
- Only actual improvements. No "I played games all day to relax" bullshit. I know me, I know I would totally write this if I didn't include this rule.
- No copy pasta. If I get bored of writing the same entry again, I must do something different.
- Time goes midnight to midnight, not waking to waking. Sleep? [Practice don't care.][honeybadger]
Because not everyone might be interested in the daily log entries, I'm moving them to a separate location. They will be less content-y than this blog, but more personal, which you might still find interesting. (Or motivating. I like reading other people's logs from time to time.)
(And because I'm lazy, I'm using Wordpress again instead of a proper nanoc setup I've been intending to get up and running for months now. Meh, whatever works now. I can fix it later.)
So starting today: muflax becomes a saint, over at [daily.muflax.com](http://daily.muflax.com/).

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---
title: Google Web History
date: 2012-02-27
techne: :done
episteme: :personal
slug: 2012/02/27/google-web-history/
---
Since 2008-03-04 Google tracks all my searches. Thanks to [XiXiDu][xixidu search], I noticed that I could download and analyze the whole data set. There's an existing script, but it didn't work for me, so I wrote my own. It's up on [Github][github web history] and should be fairly self-explanatory for Ruby users.
Anyway, instead of spamming Twitter, here's some interesting results.
The history spans ~1.4k days and has ~132k entries, of which ~37k are searches. The rest are mostly search results I clicked. That makes it ~25 searches per day. Not bad.
My Top 10 search terms, ignoring word order:
1. ezt (23)
2. read (23)
3. fefe (18)
4. pharyngula (15)
5. reader (15)
6. 吉井和哉 (13)
7. nanoc (12)
8. muflax (11)
9. squid314 (11)
10. dexter (10)
Everything except 6), 7) and 10) are failed attempts to enter a (partial) URL and pressing return before Firefox could autocomplete it. (Yeah, I once read Pharyngula. I know.) 6) is one of my favorite musicians, but I'm quite surprised I googled him that much. 7) is the blog engine my main site uses, so no surprise. 10) is probably also an URL, maybe the episode list or something.
The terms are not surprising, but the low frequencies are. Maybe Google misses a lot of terms due to me not being logged in at the time, but I never consciously log out, so still weird.
More results:
- I google a lot of TV shows.
- I internet-stalk way too many people. I gotta stop that. (Not likely.)
- I google Drew Carey more than porn. And I thought I liked Ryan more.
- [Aki Sora][] is the porn I google most. Well, since my favorite sites shut down anyway and I have to hunt down my hentai like a damn savage again.
- Buddhism-related searches and "how the fuck does this totally normal item work" occur about equally often.
- I only once searched for Jesus. Gotta give the guy a second chance.
- I have googled "google" 3 times. I regret nothing.
- Automatic completion is treated like a shortened search, thus "read" and "reader". This probably hides a lot of searches and might explain the low frequencies.
And finally, number of searches for each hour:
<%= image("hours1.png", "hours") %>
Well, shit. You can totally [reconstruct my sleep cycle][Gwern anonymity] from that. Totally thought it would be more chaotic. Guess I really *do* have an underlying sleep cycle after all.

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---
title: Personal Crap
is_category: true
---
<%= category :personal %>

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---
title: On Samsara
date: 2011-08-02
techne: :done
episteme: :discredited
disowned: true
---
> [The teacher] said, "You know, most of you are not qualified for *samsara*! Let alone the pursuit of nirvana. Do any of you have *jobs*?" And what he got on to was this question of being successful at samsara. It was really an important issue. There is this idea of *revulsion with samsara*. People hear this, "You must become revolted with samsara in order to become a Dharma practitioner!". And many people seem to misunderstand this as, yes, I'm revolted by samsara because I can't keep my bank balance in credit, I've got a problem with personal hygiene, whatever the issue is, people don't like me, I'm always doing the wrong thing and yes, it's miserable, I wanna go and live in a nice Tibetan center where I don't have to deal with it anymore.
>
> This is not revulsion with samsara. When I'm talking about *success* at samsara, I'm not talking about getting rich. I'm simply talking about having an idea and being able to follow that idea through.
>
> So I want to learn a language, so I learn a language. I take a class to learn to do something, I do it. I get a job, I fulfill the role of the job, etc. I'm not always getting the sack because I'm useless. Now, the interesting thing is, in order to be successful at samsara, you need *desire*. And your desire has to be *sufficient* to going after what you want and *getting* it. Put the work in to get what you want.
>
> Then you *get* what you want and *then* you experience samsara. Until you're able to get what you want and go after it and obtain it, you don't know what samsara *is*.
>
> Because that point where you get what you want is extremely interesting. There's nothing wrong with it. It's actually quite *delightful*. But then when you have what you want and you're sitting there with it, thinking, "This is a jolly nice thing!", there's a certain strange edginess about that, which is, "How long can I sit here and admire it?".
>
> Now, from a [Sutrayana][] perspective we would say, that is because this thing that I desired so much does not have the capacity to satisfy me. "The things of the world are hollow and worthless!" (This is not actually true, you know. They are pretty neat, things of the world. I love 'em. More more more!) [...]
>
> And the important thing about this, from a [Vajrayana][] point of view, is that there's nothing wrong with *things*. The things *do* contain the capacity to make us happy forever. It is *we* who get in the way of this process. Because what I want to be doing is not *having* what I want, but moving *towards* it. So that when I *get* what I want, the discomfort of that situation is that I'm no longer in motion. The process has come to an end and in that position, although I *have*, it's a position of emptiness because there's nowhere to go. That is why people do not like to be happy. They like to be moving *towards* happy.
>
> Because happy is *useless* from the point of view of samsara. "So I'm happy. What now? Where do I go?"
>
> -- Ngak'chang Rinpoche, excerpt from talk on [samsara, suffering and suspicion][Samsara Talk]
Compare [Gospel of Muflax][Sayings], written October 2010:
> - TOKSHI said, now is good, tomorrow never good enough.
> - TOKSHI said, don't wish for things because then you will get exactly what you wished for and it will totally suck and you will look stupid.
> - TOKSHI said, don't be happy.
About a month later, I wrote in a draft:
> I experience no dukkha.
>
> What is dukkha? It is one of three marks of existence, according to Buddhism. It means unsatisfactoriness or suffering, in the sense of an axle of a horse cart tumbling in a poor hole, which is the origin of the word. Overcoming it is the whole idea of Buddhism, experiencing it is why the Buddha started his quest in the first place.
>
> I am not using a semantic trick. It is not an exaggeration, not a koan, nothing like this at all. I mean it, straightforward. *I experience no dukkha*.
>
> I understand what dukkha is. I see it in other people, quite clearly. I cannot find it in me.
>
> The teachers cannot help me anymore.
I declared firmly that I want to experience dukkha. Shortly afterwards, I sat down and swore not to rise again until dukkha would appear. Pain came and went, fear came and went, boredom came and went, but no dukkha. Finally, all pain dropped away and I arose happy.
Some days later, dukkha came. I wrote in another draft:
> > I've yet to have an experience of any kind - game playing, sexual, food, travel - where I said, 'This is the most fun I could ever possible have in my entire life. I couldn't imagine, for one second, this being more enjoyable.' I never said that.
> >
> > -- Gabe Zichermann, talk on Game Design
> I actually did. I managed to do exactly this, multiple times in fact. The last time I reproduced this, when I put down a video game controller and felt as happy as I ever could possibly hope to be, yet still unsatisfied, I knew it wasn't just a fluke. There's an upper limit to happiness, I can reach it any time and it still doesn't make the sucking stop.
>
> This was the turning point for me. I realized that I couldn't just "solve my problems" and live a happy life. I realized that it was fundamentally impossible for me to do so. Not officially, not consciously, but psychologically, I became a Buddhist this day.
>
> This feeling, this essential unsatisfactoriness, which Buddhists call dukkha, is what I think makes some people get the idea of enlightenment and others not. If you never felt it, you will not understand what it's all about. I don't know what actually makes the difference, what is necessary to feel it. Maybe you need to have lived a carefree and fulfilled enough life for long enough to max out your personal happiness (like the Buddha or I did) or maybe you need a special kind of mind to have the patience to actually optimize for happiness and fail, and have the clarity to realize it. I see no reliable pattern in the kinds of people to feel it, but if you do, welcome to the path. May it be your last.
Not long after that, I broke. (And started the blog.) I thought at first that something was wrong with the *things*. That my goals sucked. Half a year later, I [gave up on happiness altogether][Stances]. I always suspected there was something wrong with being happy. Wireheading seemed simultaneously attractive and evil. But I couldn't quite put my finger on it. Any unsatisfactoriness seemed to just come from me sucking or following the wrong goal. I hadn't actually done a good job at getting exactly what I want. Luckily, I managed that, often enough to notice something. Two months ago, in another draft:
> You know that feeling when you're almost done with a great game, when you realize that this is the definite last level, there are no more upgrades, no more quests, just this one last obstacle and the boss at the end?
>
> But you aren't ready to quit?
>
> So you draw it out. Organize your inventory. Finish all those minor sidequests you've been ignoring. But nothing can push away that realization. It's about to end. Soon, the boss will go down and then what? Credits, memes and a highscore? Big letdown.
>
> And that's how I feel about life right now. For a while, I thought that's just some depression killing the fun. But I'm not so sure about that anymore.Things are still fun, in a way. It's just that there's not much of an achievement left. None that I care about, anyway.
>
> (I mean, it's not *literally* the end. I don't exactly expect to *die*. Still got a few decades, I guess.)
>
> I'll soon be fully enlightened. I mean, a decade ago I didn't even understand what that meant when I decided to go for it. Now I kinda don't want it to happen. In a way, life was more interesting with a big liberation story behind it. Actually being free? Not so fun.
>
> I really got this playing Minecraft. In a way it's perfect. It's almost exactly what I thought heaven would be like. (Needs more machinery and no height limit, though.) But when I had built a little house, I realized that there's no point to it. I stared upon the vast landscape, knowing that it would be impossible for me to ever be *satisfied* with it.
>
> There is peace, but it's the peace of a blank screen. It is not victory.
Now I have a useful idea what the symptoms are. I understand that the purpose of self-help for me was merely to create new problems so I could always have something to fix. I never wanted to *arrive* anywhere. This mistake I have fixed.
Liberation can now begin.

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---
title: The End of Rationality
date: 2012-02-22
techne: :done
episteme: :discredited
slug: 2012/02/22/the-end-of-rationality/
disowned: true
---
Time for a new belief dump! It's been at least 6 months since the last one, time to do a refresher on what beliefs have changed. This is more of a summary. I will elaborate on some points soon. But there is an overall tone of abandoning the LessWrong meme-cluster, and it certainly feels like my [Start of Darkness][] story. Maybe I suffered a stroke and have gone completely insane. (My reading of continental philosophy should count as evidence.) Maybe I'm just retreating to new signaling grounds. I don't know.
1. Physicalism isn't actually making any sense. It is said that a real answer should make things *less* mysterious. If a question is still as mysterious after answering it as before then you are only fooling yourself, they say. Well, that's certainly the case for substance dualism. Postulating a soul doesn't help. But physicalism is *worse*. I can at least see how in principle a soul *could* explain consciousness. I see absolutely no way how you get *any* mental events out of a physicalist ontology. Not even with quantum physics. So saying "everything is physics" isn't just not solving the mystery - it's *adding even more mystery*.
To use a [programmer saying][Regex 2 problems], "Some people when confronted with the hard problem of consciousness think, 'I know, I'll use reductionism!'. Now they have two problems.". I can kinda see how [quantum monadology][Quantum Monadology] (something Mitchell Porter has been trying to develop, but is very unpopular on LW) might in principle solve the problem. But that's still a radically new ontologoy, even though it has some similarity to current physicalism.
I'd go even further. I don't see how *causal theories* would help. That's Chalmers' critique of course, and I'm really warming up to it. I wouldn't go so far (yet) to say that you really can't explain consciousness in causal terms, or even physical terms, but I certainly see no reason *at all* right now to think you *can* do it, especially considering that every physicalist theory is [under-specified][Multiple Realizability].
Now, there is one clever trick you can do - you sacrifice physical reality on the altar of reductionism. Instead of reducing mental events to physics, you reduce physics to mental events with the power of algorithms. This gets around the consciousness problem and several other philosophical classics, and might actually work. I have an extremely confusing post coming up where I present that view and the Cthulhu-sized problem with it.
So time to be honest with myself. *Physicalism doesn't work*. It's false. Next idea please. Implication: you know these "clever" criticisms by "clever" philosophers of enlightened LessWrong rationality? The philosophers were right.
2. On a related note, I'm not convinced that neuroscience is actually useful for morality. I haven't seen any good come out of it and looking at it from a deontological perspective, I don't think that will ever change. I'm also now completely rejecting utilitarianism (and consequentialism in general). It's not just somewhat incomplete, as I thought a year ago, and just needs an (horrendously complex) fix in the form of The One True Utility Function, but it's actually fundamentally wrong. (Again, the philosophers have been saying this for a long time. Hell, Kant has successfully taken it apart. The *Confucians* have done it too, and that's now Seriously Old News. But you can be forgiven for not understanding Kant or reading old Chinese guys.) I'm writing a post about it, but that might take some time.
Well, if we can't use neuroscience or utilitarian pseudoscience, how do we actually *do* (meta-)morality? The hard way, from first principles and ritual practice. (I'm still not entirely convinced it even *can* be done. Nihilism might still hold, but then moral nihilism is self-defeating, so even if morality is impossible, I'm still going to do it. This is the one problem you *can't* eliminate.)
<rant\> I suspect a main reason why some people even think that economic analysis or neuroscience *could* be relevant is that they are confused about what the *problem* of morality even is. It might just be semantics, but then even (you should read this in a thundering voice) *The Bible* (thank you) talks about morality in the sense I'm using, so I'm not giving up the term. If people want to talk about sociopathic "how can I get what I want" stuff, sure, but don't call it morality. Morality is the problem of right action *despite* your preferences. It is from the onset at odds with what you want. Morality talks about what you *should* want, not what you *do* want. So utilitarianism is inherently solving the wrong problem. This should be obvious even from an outside perspective because the stuff consequentialists end up talking about isn't even the same subject matter as morality - no consequentialist has anything to say about [purity][Shinto] or [honor][Bushido], for example. </rant\>
3. [Fomenko][] has a point. Textual criticism must be extended to all historical sources and, I suspect, will show that large chunks of "authentic" writing are essentially fictional. Furthermore, Fomenko's methods to find structural similarities between seemingly disjunct source texts are [very intriguing][Algorithmic Causality and the New Testament] and, as far as my cursory skimming has shown, have not been seriously addressed at all. However, I haven't even read Fomenko's books yet, so the conclusions I will draw from his arguments might range from "some historical biographies are implausible" to "European history before the late Middle Ages is more-or-less completely fictitious". (His New Chronology, on the other hand, is probably complete bullshit.)
4. I'm basically done with rationality.
Ok, seriously now. I've always enjoyed [XiXiDu][]'s criticisms on LW, but for over a year now, whenever I read his stuff I wonder why he *keeps on making it*. I mean, he has been saying (more-or-less correctly so, I think) that SIAI and the LW sequences score high on any crackpot test, that virtually no expert in the field takes any of it seriously, that rationality (in the LW sense) has not shown any tangible results, that there are problems so huge [you can fly a whole deconstructor fleet through][LW leverage], that the Outside View utterly disagrees with both the premises and conclusions of most LW thought, that actually taking it seriously [should drive people insane][xixidu utilitarian], and much more for month after month, and every time I wonder, dude, you're *right*, why don't you let it go? Why do you struggle again and again to understand it, to make sense of it, to fight your way through the sequences the way priests read scripture? Why don't you *leave*? And then I wondered why *I* don't leave. So now I do.
I barely have enough faith to serve one absent god. I can't also make non-functional rationality work. Recite the litany of the Outside View with me: "Insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.".
5. My attitude towards Buddhism has changed quite a bit. I can see now that "overcoming suffering" is an (awful) retcon of the mission of Buddhism, and that particularly the modern re-interpretations that rely on it are internally twisted and in massive denial. The whole mindfulness approach is extremely irresponsible and the idea that Buddhism is about being happy is outright evil.
The real pursuit of Buddhism was (and is) the end of rebirth, a total cessation. Persistent antinatalism, one might say. This informs all the decisions about practice. Unfortunately because so many approaches now deny this, I can't even read about them anymore. Seeing the same mistakes being made over and over again is not something I can tolerate anymore, especially because I have made them myself in the past. However, I also find it hard to rely on the teachings that *don't* make these mistakes. It takes me more effort to integrate other people's practice, as great as it is, than to re-invent it from scratch. I still enjoy the inspiration, but I am at a point where I don't need teaching anymore. I finally know what I'm doing.
(Of course this cessation thing requires the existence of rebirth in the first place. I have no meaningful evidence at all to support it, but from all of my phenomenal experience, I know it does. I've never spoken about my [Sakadagami][] experience before. Maybe one day I will. They don't tell people anymore that you might suddenly, unexpectedly recall past lives when you sign up for vipassana. Maybe they should.)
6. [Crusader Kings II][] is amazing. That is all.

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---
title: Why Can't I See Through This Wall?
alt_titles: [Wall]
date: 2011-05-20
techne: :done
episteme: :personal
---
*At times I look back on attainments and ask myself what life was before them or what working up to the change felt like. This post is an emotional core-dump for that purpose.*
I sit down and the world shifts. Everything flickers. I look at a wall and it flickers. A little plush sheep, it flickers. I hear a car outside, the sound flickers. Everything is unstable, keeps popping in and out of existence, at high frequencies. Rarely, things [flange][Flanging].
Few thoughts are in my head. I'm quite content. I don't get distracted by thoughts anymore when trying to concentrate. I just get bored. Because I can't see through this fucking wall.
And this is not a metaphor. I sit down to meditate and stare at the wall. There's a [Kasina][], but really, I don't care. It blips out of existence soon enough, merging with the wall. I stare. It blips in, it fluctuates, the wall throws a few waves, occasionally the whole visual field moves as if someone was carrying away the screen in front of my eyes.
I don't care. [Jhana][] arise. Maybe even some happiness. It matters not to me. I ignore it, push it away. Because I want to see through this fucking wall.
It shifts again, it try modifying the intensity of my concentration, but it has no effect. Flickerflickerflicker, wobblewobblewobble, shiiiift. That's all that happens. I get bored.
Why do I even think I can see through this wall? Well, ok, that's not really what I'm trying to do. But that's what it feels like. Really what I'm doing is trying to trigger a buffer underrun. I want to pay attention to something while there isn't actually anything scheduled to be investigated. Whenever a sensation arises, "I" dislocate. At first, it felt like "I" was getting pulled to wherever the sensation arose, noticed it, then snapped back to the default somewhere behind my eyes. This is false. Really the sensation has its own space around it that it instantiates. As such, "spatial awareness" is part of the sensation, not of the actual act of paying attention. Or in other words, abstract space is itself a sensation and not always there.
Even motherfucking space flickers. Oh, a nice relaxing wave goes through some muscles. My spine straightens. I don't care. You flicker too.
In between each flicker there's a gap. It's really fucking short, but there's a gap. I try to perceive it, but I just get the wall or abstract space or some happy little bliss-wave instead. Go away, I don't like you, I want the gap! There's one thing that doesn't flicker and that's what I'm trying to catch. I picked the most solid thing I could find. *Looking at a wall*, pretty solid sensation. But "I" constantly dislocate and now the wall flickers. Sometimes I count each time the wall is actually there. I just go "t-t-t-t-t-t-" because even "tick" takes too long to think. I want to see what's there when the wall isn't there. Enormous pressure builds in my head. My eyes are shaking. I get triple vision. (That's when you get double vision, but you also have an afterimage that interferes with it.) I feel like jumping up and strangling someone. Or something. Maybe this wall.
I try to calm down, pay some attention to the body, to the breath. Breath doesn't flicker so badly. Muscle contractions don't flicker much and they feel good. A bit of pressure goes away. Then I hear some bird outside and wham my attention jumps "breath-bird-breath-bird-breath-bird" flickerflickerflicker. Gah. Back to the wall.
My attention widens and narrows arbitrarily. Depth perception sometimes goes offline for a bit. My eyes constantly lose focus and twitch. My visual fields keeps moving upwards even if I don't move my eyeballs. Light levels morph, the wall becomes almost black sometimes.
I don't care about any of that. I just want to see through that wall.

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